After this, the judges sent off a message to Cueto, by means of Friar Gaspard de Carvajal, in which the deposed viceroy concurred, ordering him to surrender the command of the fleet, and to give up the children of the late marquis, in return for which they would place the viceroy under his charge, who would otherwise be in great peril of his life. On getting aboard ship, Friar Gaspard presented his commission to Cueto and gave him a full account of the state of affairs, in presence of the licentiate Vaca de Castro, who still remained a prisoner in that vessel. In consideration of the danger to which the viceroy was exposed, Cueto sent the children of the marquis on shore together with Don Antonio de Ribera and his wife who had the care of them. The judges still insisted that Cueto should surrender the fleet to their command, threatening to behead the viceroy if he refused; and though Vela Nunnez, brother to the viceroy, went several times with messages to induce compliance, the captains of the ships would not consent to that measure, so that the judges were constrained to return to Lima with the viceroy still in custody.
   Two days afterwards, the commanders of the ships were informed that the judges and their partizans had come to the resolution of sending a strong force of musqueteers in boats to make themselves masters of the ships by force. They might perhaps have easily persuaded Cueto to give up the fleet, of which in reality Jerom de Zurbano had more the command than he, as all the soldiers and sailors who were attached to the deposed viceroy were at his disposal; but Zurbano, to whom the judges made great offers, was quite inflexible. The captains of the fleet came even to the resolution of quitting the port of Lima, to cruise upon the coast of Peru, till such time as they might receive orders from his majesty how to conduct themselves in the present crisis. They believed that the viceroy had many friends and adherents in Lima and other parts of Peru; as many persons who had not taken any share in the deposition and imprisonment of the viceroy, and several of those who were best disposed to the royal service continued almost daily to make their escape on board the fleet. The ships were tolerably well armed and appointed, having ten or twelve iron cannon, and three or four of brass, besides forty quintals of powder. As to provisions, they had above four hundred quintals of biscuit, five hundred bags of maize, and a large store of salt meat; so that they were victualled sufficiently for a considerable time, and they could easily procure water on any part of the coast. Their force however was very small, as they had only twenty five soldiers, and by no means a sufficient number of mariners for the ten ships which composed their fleet. They resolved therefore to abandon four of the smallest vessels, which they were unable to man; and not thinking it right to leave these behind, lest they might have been employed against themselves by the partizans of the judges, they set these small vessels on fire the day after the imprisonment of the viceroy, as likewise two fishing barks which were in the harbour, and then set sail. The four small ships were entirely destroyed, but the two fishing vessels were saved after sustaining very little damage.
   The fleet went into the harbour of Guavra, which is eighteen leagues below3 the port of Lima, where they took in a supply of wood and water. They carried the licentiate Vaca de Castro along with them, and resolved to wait at Guavra to see what consequences might follow from the imprisonment of the viceroy. When this came to the knowledge of the judges, who believed the ships might not go to any considerable distance from Guavra, on account of the attachment of their commanders to the viceroy whose life was in danger, they determined to send a force both by sea and land to attempt acquiring possession of the ships almost at any risk. For this purpose, they gave orders to Diego Garcias de Alfaro, an inhabitant of Lima who was versant in maritime affairs, to repair and fit out the two barks which had drifted on shore. When that was done, Alfaro embarked in them with thirty musqueteers, and set sail towards Guavra. At the same time, Don Juan de Mendoza and Ventura Beltran,4 were sent off by land with a party of soldiers in the same direction. On coming to Guavra in the night, Garcias de Alfaro concealed his two barks behind a light house5, in the harbour very near the ships, where he could not be seen. At the same time, the party which went by land began to fire off their muskets, and the people in the ships believed they were some friends of the viceroy who wished to embark. Vela Nunnez was sent accordingly in a boat to the shore, to learn what was meant by the firing, on which Diego Garcias pushed on his barks between Vela Nunnez and the ships, firing upon him and obliged him to surrender. Intelligence of this event was immediately sent to Cueto, with a message assuring him that both the viceroy and his brother would be immediately put to death unless he surrendered his ships to the judges. Cueto6 accordingly submitted, being afraid lest the threat might be executed; but had certainly not been allowed to do so if Zurbano had been present, who had sailed from Guavra with his ships, two days before the arrival of Diego Garcias, with the intention of going all along the coast between Lima and Tierra Firma to take possession of every ship he might fall in with, to prevent them from being employed by the oydors.
   Immediately after the departure of the fleet under Cueto from the port of Lima, the judges became apprehensive lest the relations of the commissary might put the viceroy to death, which they actually threatened; on which account they came to a resolution, to transport him to an island about two leagues from the coast. For this purpose he was embarked along with a guard of twenty men in one of those barks or floats made of dried reeds which the Indians call henea. When the judges learnt the surrender of the fleet under Cueto, they determined upon sending him as a prisoner to Spain, with a formal memorial of all that had passed, and deputed the licenciate Alvarez, one of their number to take charge of him thither, and to support their memorial at the court of Spain, giving him 8000 crowns to defray the expences of the voyage. For this purpose all the necessary dispatches were prepared, which were signed by all the judges of the royal audience, excepting Ortiz de Zarate, who refused his concurrence. Alvarez went by land to Guavra, to which place the viceroy was transported in one of the barks fitted out by Diego Garcias, and given into the custody of Alvarez, who immediately set sail with three ships that had been placed at his disposal, without waiting even for the dispatches from his brother judges. At this time, Vaca de Castro was carried back to the port of Lima, still a prisoner.

SECTION IV. History of the usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, from the expulsion of the Viceroy to his defeat and death
   While the viceroy remained in the small island, as formerly mentioned, Alfonso de Montemayor and those who had gone along with him to succour Loyasa and Zavallos, returned to Lima, upon which the judges caused them to be arrested and disarmed, ordering them, and several of the captains who were attached to the viceroy, to be detained as prisoners in the house of Martin de Robles, and in the houses of several of the citizens of Lima. These prisoners were persuaded, if the viceroy could regain his liberty, that he would still be able to prevent the arrival of Gonzalo Pizarro at Lima, and to avert the disorders and evils which must flow from his successful usurpation, prejudicial to the rights of the crown and the interest of the colony. With this view, therefore, they concerted to unite together under arms, to bring back the viceroy from the place of his confinement, and to reinstate him in his authority; resolving in the execution of this project, to make the judges prisoners, or even to kill them if necessary, and to take possession of the city in the name of his majesty. They had assuredly executed their project, had they not been betrayed by a soldier, who discovered the whole plot to Cepeda. Immediately on receiving notice of this conspiracy, Cepeda in concert with the other judges apprehended all the leaders, namely Alfonso de Montemayor, Paolo de Meneses, Alfonso de Caceres, Alfonso de Barrionuevo, and some others. Several of these when put to the torture, had sufficient resolution to refuse confession; but Barrionuevo confessed partly, in hopes of satisfying the judges, and that they might not continue his torments. Upon his confession, he was at first condemned to lose his head; but in the sequel the judges satisfied themselves with causing his right hand to be cut off; and all the other leaders of the conspiracy, who persisted in refusing to confess, were banished from Peru.
   After all these revolutionary events, information of every thing that had occurred in Lima, was transmitted to Gonzalo Pizarro, the judges and their friends being in hopes that, he would now be induced to dismiss his army. They were however quite mistaken in this expectation; for he believed that every thing, even the imprisonment of the viceroy, was a false rumour, or a mere concerted trick to force him to lay down his arms, and that they would put him to death when left without support.
   In the mean time the licentiate Alvarez, as already mentioned, set sail from Guavra having charge of the viceroy and his brothers. Notwithstanding that this judge had been the chief promoter of every thing that had been done against the viceroy, having even especially contributed to make him a prisoner, and been most active in punishing those who had conspired to restore him to the government; yet, on the very first day of the voyage, he went into the cabin which had been appointed for the captive viceroy, declaring his repentance for all that he had done against him, and his earnest desire for a reconcilement. He assured him, that, in accepting the charge of his conveyance as a prisoner, he had been entirely actuated by the desire of serving him, that he might get him from under the power of Cepeda, and prevent him from falling into the hands of Gonzalo Pizarro, who was expected to arrive shortly at Lima. To satisfy the viceroy of his sincerity, Alvarez assured him that he was from that moment at full and perfect liberty, and that he now surrendered the command of the vessel into his hands; humbly beseeching him to forgive all that was passed, and declaring himself ready to obey his commands in all things. Alvarez then gave orders to the ten men who had been given him as guards over the viceroy, that they were now to obey the viceroy and not him. The viceroy expressed his entire satisfaction at this conduct in Alvarez, and took the command accordingly; yet in a very short time he treated Alvarez very ill, often calling him villain, traitor, mutineer, and other opprobrious names, and threatening that, though he spared his life for the present because he had occasion for his service, he would certainly have him hanged in the sequel. Yet they continued together till their arrival at Truxillo, as shall be related in the sequel.
   It was soon suspected at Lima that Alvarez had entered into terms with the viceroy, from certain circumstances which had transpired before he embarked, but more especially from his having set sail without waiting for the dispatches of the royal court of audience, which had been delayed a day in waiting for the consent of Ortiz. While they were still in some degree of uncertainty on this subject, and waiting anxiously to know the whole truth, they judged proper to send a representation on the state of affairs to Gonzalo Pizarro, of which the following was the tenor. "That, in consequence of their commissions, and of the express powers confided to them by his majesty of doing every thing which might be necessary for the due administration of justice, and to place the country in good order, they had suspended the execution of the obnoxious regulations, as demanded by the colonists, and had even sent off the viceroy to Spain, which was more than had been required or could have been reasonably asked. As, therefore, there now remained no call or pretence for the military preparations which he had set on foot, they commanded him immediately to dismiss his troops: But, if he were inclined to come to Lima, he must come there as a man of peace, without warlike array; yet, if he considered it necessary to his safety to have an escort, they granted him permission to bring fifteen or twenty horsemen along with him."
   When these orders were prepared, the judges were desirous of sending some of the inhabitants of Lima to carry them to Gonzalo Pizarro; but no one would undertake the commission, which they considered as extremely hazardous. They represented to the judges, that Gonzalo and his officers would reproach them for opposing the just measures in which they were engaged; as they had associated for the general interest of the colony. On this refusal of the inhabitants, the judges gave orders to Augustino, the royal treasurer of Peru7, and Don Antonio de Ribeta, one of the citizens of Lima, to carry this order to Gonzalo. To these messengers they gave formal letters of credence, with which they set out upon their journey for the valley of Jauja, in which Gonzalo Pizarro was then encamped with his army. Gonzalo had already received notice of this intended embassy; and was afraid, if the envoys should give a public notification of the message with which they were entrusted, that his troops might mutiny; as he knew they were exceedingly desirous of marching to Lima in full force, that they might be in condition to pillage that city on the first pretext that offered. To prevent this, he sent Jerom de Villegas with thirty mounted musqueteers to intercept the two messengers now on their way to the army. According to his instructions, Villegas allowed Ribera to continue his journey to the camp; but made Augustino de Zarate a prisoner, and deprived him of his dispatches. Zarate was carried back by Villegas to the province of Pariacaca8, where he was detained a prisoner for ten days, and every means were employed to intimidate him that he might not execute the commission with which he was entrusted.
   At the end of that period Gonzalo Pizarro arrived with his army at Pariacaca, and called Zarate into his presence to give an account of the subject of his mission: Zarate had been already made to understand that his life would be in danger if he attempted to execute the orders he had received literally: For which reason, after having explained the whole distinctly to Gonzalo in private, on being taken into the tent where all the insurgent captains were assembled, he proceeded, as instructed by Gonzalo, to discharge his commission with prudent reserve. Gonzalo desired him to repeat all that he had already communicated to him, but Zarate, understanding distinctly what was expected of him by Gonzalo, in addressing the assembled officers in the name of the judges of the royal audience, used considerable address, and availed himself of the full powers contained in his credentials. He was silent therefore regarding the dismissal of the troops, which was the point of delicacy, and confined himself to such other matters as seemed proper for the service of his majesty and the good of the colony. In this view, he represented to them, "that, since the viceroy was deported, and their demand for suspending the obnoxious ordinances was granted, it seemed just that they should repay the sums which Blasco Nunnez Vela had taken from the royal treasury, as they had promised. That they should forgive those inhabitants of Cuzco who had deserted from their camp to join the late viceroy, since it could not be denied that these men had substantial reasons for what they had done; and that they ought to send a humble deputation to his majesty, to excuse and exculpate themselves from the measures in which they had been engaged." Zarate added several things of a similar nature; to all of which the only answer given by the council of officers, which he was directed to carry back to the judges was, "that it was indispensably necessary for the well being of the colony, that they should appoint Gonzalo Pizarro governor of Peru. After which every thing that was required should be done: But if this were refused, the military council was determined to give up Lima to be plundered by the soldiers."
   Zarate would willingly have excused himself from bearing this answer; but as no other could be procured, he was obliged to return to Lima, where he reported it to the judges, to whom it gave much uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Gonzalo Pizarro had not hitherto carried his pretensions so high, having only insisted for the departure of the viceroy from Peru, and the suspension of the obnoxious regulations, and the judges were much at a loss how to conduct themselves under this new and unexpected demand. After mature deliberation, they sent to inform the insurgent officers, "that they were unable to grant their demand, or even to take it into consideration, unless some person should appear before them authorised to present the request according to the accustomed forms." Upon this message, all the procurators or deputies of the cities who were in the insurgent army repaired to Lima; where, in conjunction with such other deputies of the cities as were resident in that place, they presented a formal request in writing, demanding the same thing which had been formerly done by a verbal message. The auditors, considering this affair as exceedingly delicate, and that they neither had any right to grant what was now demanded, nor sufficient power to refuse it, as Gonzalo was now very near Lima which he held strictly blockaded; they resolved to submit the whole to the consideration of the principal persons of the city, that they might receive their sentiments and advice in the present crisis. For this purpose, they drew up a formal instrument of the whole matter, which was communicated to Don Jerom de Loyasa archbishop of Lima, Don Juan Solano archbishop of Cuzco, Don Garcia Diaz bishop of Quito, Fray Thomas de San Martino provincial of the Dominicans, Augustino de Zarate the treasurer, and to the royal accountant and controller general9. This extraordinary council was desired to consider maturely the demands of the deputies, and to give their opinion freely on what was proper to be done in consequence. In this instrument, the judges explained at full length the reasons which induced them to require advice on this important subject, openly avowing that this measure was not resorted to in the view of following what the council might judge best, since neither the judges nor the council had any power in the present situation of affairs to act otherwise than as prescribed by Gonzalo Pizarro and his officers; but that the judges had called in this manner on the members of this extraordinary council, as recorded witnesses of the constraint and oppression under which they all now acted.
   While these deliberations were going on in Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro drew nigh with his army and encamped about a quarter of a league from the city, drawing up his numerous train of artillery in readiness for service. As a whole day elapsed without the formal appointment as governor being transmitted to him, he became impatient; and dispatched thirty musqueteers into the city under the command of his lieutenant-general, who made prisoners of twenty-eight persons, among whom were those who had formerly deserted him at Cuzco, and others who were most obnoxious for having taken part with the viceroy. Among these were Gabriel de Roias, Garcilasso de la Vega, Melchior Verdugo, the licentiate Carvajal, Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, Alfonso de Caceres, Pedro de Manjares, Luis de Leon, Antonio Ruys de Guevara, and some others of highest consideration in the colony. These were committed to the common prison, of which the lieutenant-general took possession, taking away the keys from the alcalde or keeper. The judges were utterly unable to make the smallest opposition to this strong measure, and dared not even to express their disapprobation, as there did not now remain fifty soldiers in the city; all those who had been formerly attached to them or to the viceroy having gone over to the camp of Gonzalo, who had now a force of twelve hundred men completely armed, including his original troops and those who deserted to him on this occasion.
   Next morning, several of the insurgent officers came into the city, and required the judges to make out the commission for Gonzalo, and to proclaim him governor-general of Peru without delay, otherways threatening to give up the city to plunder, and to massacre the inhabitants, in which case they would begin by putting the judges to death. The judges endeavoured to excuse themselves, alleging that they had neither right nor authority to do what was desired. Whereupon Carvajal, the lieutenant-general under Pizarro, caused four of his prisoners to be brought from the prison, and ordered three of them to be hanged on a tree near the city. These unfortunate men were Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, and Juan de Saavedra. Carvajal only allowed them a short half hour to confess their sins and to prepare for death, adding insult and mockery to his cruelty. He particularly indulged in raillery against Pedro de Barco, who was last executed; saying, as he was a brave commander who had made several conquests, and was one of the most considerable and richest men in Peru, he was inclined to allow him some distinction in his death, and that he therefore granted him the high and honourable privilege of choosing which branch of the tree he preferred for being hanged upon. Luis de Leon escaped at the intercession of his brother who served under Gonzalo.
   On seeing these arbitrary proceedings, and being threatened by Carvajal with a similar treatment of all the other prisoners, and that the city should be given up to pillage if they did not execute the required commission without delay, the judges sent to the members of the extraordinary council formerly mentioned, desiring them to give their undisguised sentiments: upon what was proper to be done. They accordingly agreed unanimously that it was necessary to comply with the demands of Gonzalo; and the judges immediately made out a commission appointing Gonzalo Pizarro governor-general of Peru, until his majesty might give orders to the contrary, and without prejudice to the rights and authority of the royal audience, to which Gonzalo was required to make oath that he would renounce his authority whenever it might please his majesty or the audience to demand it from him, and likewise engaging to submit to their authority in the event of any complaints against him, either as an individual, or in the execution of his high office.
   On receiving his commission, Gonzalo Pizarro made his public entry into Lima, with all his troops in martial order. Captain Bachicao marched at the head of the vanguard with the artillery, consisting of twenty field pieces, which with all their ammunition, carriages, and other equipments, were carried on the shoulders of six thousand Indians, who completely filled all the streets through which they had to pass. The artillery was accompanied by a guard of thirty musqueteers and fifty canoneers. The company of two hundred pikemen commanded by Diego de Gumiel followed next. Then two companies of musqueteers, commanded by the Captains Guevara and Pedro Cermeno, the former consisting of 150, and the latter of 200 men. After these followed three companies of infantry who preceded Gonzalo Pizarro as his body guards, who followed on horseback in his coat of mail, over which he wore a robe of cloth of gold. He was followed by three captains of cavalry: Don Pedro de Porto Carrero in the middle carrying the royal standard belonging to his troop, having Antonio de Altamirano on his right with the standard of Cuzco, and Pedro de Puelles on his left with a standard of the arms of Gonzalo Pizarro. The whole cavalry of the army brought up the rear in regular order. In this array, the whole column of march moved towards the house of the oydor Ortiz de Zarate, where the other judges were assembled. Ortiz had feigned sickness, on purpose to avoid attending the royal court of audience at the reception of Gonzalo, but his brethren adjourned the sitting to his house on the occasion.
   Leaving his cavalry drawn up in the great square, Gonzalo made his appearance before the assembled judges, who received him in form, and administered to him the oath as governor. From thence he proceeded to the town house, where all the magistrates of the city were assembled, and where he was received with all the usual solemnities. Having gone through all the ceremonies, he retired to his own house, and the lieutenant-general Carvajal dismissed the army to its quarters upon the citizens, who were ordered to entertain them at free quarters. Gonzalo Pizarro continued to reside in Lima, exercising his authority as governor in all things pertaining to military affairs, without interfering in the administration of justice, which he confided entirely to the oydors, who held their sittings for that purpose in the house of the treasurer Alfonso Riquelme. Immediately after assuming the office of governor, Gonzalo sent Alfonso de Toro as his lieutenant to Cuzco, Pedro de Fuentes to Arequipa, Francisco de Almendras to La Plata, and others in the same quality to the other cities of Peru10.
   As in the sequel of this history we shall have much to say respecting Gonzalo Pizarro and his lieutenant-general Francisco de Carvajal, it may be proper in this place to give a short account of the age, qualities, and characters of these two men. At this period, Gonzalo Pizarro was about forty years of age, large made and tall, well proportioned, of a dark brown complexion, with a long black beard. He was well versant in military affairs and took great delight in war, of which he endured the labours and privations with much patient fortitude. He was an excellent horseman; and though his genius was rather confined, and his language vulgar, he could express his sentiments with sufficient clearness. He was exceedingly remiss in keeping his secrets to himself, by which weakness he often suffered much prejudice in his affairs and military transactions. He was rather avaricious, and disliked much to give away money; owing to which want of liberality his affairs frequently suffered material injury. He was exceedingly amorous, not confining himself like his brother the marquis to the native women, but gave much offence by his intrigues among the Spanish ladies in Peru.
   Francisco de Carvajal was a man of low descent, the son of a person employed in collecting the tax on salt, and was born in the village of Ragama near Arevala. He had served long in the wars of Italy under Count Pedro de Navarre, having been in the battle of Pavia, where the king of France was taken prisoner. On his return to Spain he was accompanied by a lady of a good family, Donna Catalina de Leyton, to whom he was said to be married; though most people believed otherwise, and some even alleged she had been a nun. After his return to Spain, he lived for some time at the commandry of Heliche, in the capacity of a steward; and went afterwards into New Spain with the lady who passed for his wife. He was for some time employed in Mexico, where he held some office; whence he was sent by the viceroy of that kingdom to Peru, along with reinforcements to the marquis Pizarro, at the time when the Indians revolted, as formerly related. On this occasion, the marquis gave him some lands and Indians at Cuzco, where he resided till the arrival of the viceroy; when he was about to have returned into Spain with a considerable sum which he had amassed from the Indians of his repartimiento; but not being able to procure an opportunity, he had remained in the country. When Gonzalo Pizarro assumed the government of Peru, Carvajal was said to be eighty years of age. He was of the middle stature, but very gross, full-faced, and high-complexioned. He was skilled in warlike affairs, having had long experience, and was able to undergo fatigue infinitely better than could have been expected at his advanced age. He hardly ever quitted his armour, either by day or night; and scarcely ever slept, except on a chair, leaning his head on his hand. He was so much addicted to wine, that when he could not procure such as was brought from Spain, he used to content himself with the strong liquors made by the Indians, of which he drank more freely than any other Spaniard. His disposition was addicted to cruelty, insomuch that he frequently put people to death upon very slight grounds, sometimes even without any reason at all, except merely under pretence of keeping up proper military discipline. Even when ordering any unfortunate persons to condign punishment, he was wont to crack his jokes, and to pay them ironical compliments. He was a bad Christian, and much addicted to impiety, as was manifest in all his words and actions; and was prodigiously avaricious in the acquisition of money, for which purpose he pillaged many of their wealth, by threatening to put them to death, and then letting them free for a good round sum. He ended his days in a miserable manner, with small hope of salvation, as will appear in the sequel.
   To return to the incidents of our history: Our readers may recollect that Luis de Ribera, lieutenant governor in La Plata, and Antonio Alvares alcalde or judge ordinary of that city, with most of its inhabitants, had taken the field with the purpose of joining the viceroy. After journeying a long way in the deserts without receiving any intelligence of the events which were passing at Lima, they at length learnt that the viceroy was deposed and that Gonzalo Pizarro had usurped the government of Peru. As Ribera and Alvarez were the chief leaders and instigators of the citizens of La Plata, they did not dare to return to that city in the present situation of affairs, and took therefore the resolution of seeking refuge among the Indians in the inaccessible mountains. Some of their associates, however, ventured to return to their city, while others went to Lima, where they obtained pardon from Gonzalo; but he forfeited their lands and Indians, and sent Francisco de Almendras to take possession of their repartimientos in his name, as funds for reimbursing the expences of the war.
   We must now advert to the deposed viceroy. After he had been set at liberty by the oydor Alvarez, as has been already related, and the two other vessels which carried his brother, friends, and servants, had likewise submitted to his authority, he continued his voyage with all the three ships to the port of Tumbez, where he and Alvarez landed, leaving proper persons to take charge of the ships. Immediately on landing, the viceroy and oydor began to exercise their respective authorities, by constituting a royal audience, and proclamations were dispersed through every part of the country, giving an account of the illegal deposition and imprisonment of the viceroy and the usurpation of Gonzalo, and commanding all faithful subjects of his majesty to join the standard of the viceroy. He issued these orders to the cities of Quito, San Miguel, Puerto Viejo, and Truxillo; and commissioned captains to go to different places to raise troops; sending, among others, Jerom de Pereira on this errand into the province of Bracamoras. In consequence of these proceedings, many persons came to Tumbez to join his standard. He applied himself likewise to collect provisions and ammunition, strengthening his party as much as possible; and issued orders to transmit to him all the money which was contained in the royal coffers, which was obeyed in many places. Some of the inhabitants however, fled into the mountains, being unwilling to attach themselves to either of the parties which now divided the unhappy colony, while others went to join Gonzalo Pizarro. Intelligence was soon carried to Gonzalo of the arrival of the viceroy at Tumbez, and of his preparations for recovering his authority, and some even of the proclamations and orders of the viceroy were brought to him at Lima. Gonzalo was by no means negligent in endeavouring to counteract the proceedings of the viceroy; for which purpose he sent orders to Ferdinand de Alvarado, his lieutenant at Truxillo, and the captains. Gonzalo Diaz and Jerom Villegas, to collect as many soldiers as possible in that part of the country, lest they might have gone to Tumbez to join the party of the viceroy. He commanded these officers to give every possible interruption to the preparations of the viceroy, yet ordered them on no account to risk coming to a battle with the royalists, however powerful and numerous they might conceive their troops to be in comparison with those of the viceroy.
   It had been long proposed to send a deputation from Gonzalo and the communities of Peru into Spain, to lay an account before his majesty of all that had occurred in the colony; and many of the principal insurgents insisted on the necessity of this measure, to justify their conduct. Others again, among whom the principal persons were the lieutenant-general Carvajal and Captain Bachicao, were of an opposite opinion; insisting that it were better to wait till his majesty might think proper to send out persons to inquire into the cause of his revenues being detained. They alleged that the viceroy must have already fully informed his majesty upon all the late transactions, and would doubtless be listened to in preference to any thing which they could say in defence of their conduct. On this account, the leaders of the insurgents regretted that they had not at the first sent over the judges of the royal audience into Spain, to give an account of their reasons for having made the viceroy a prisoner. And, after many deliberations on this subject, it was at length determined to send home the Doctor Texada, one of the oydors, in the name of the royal audience, to lay an account of the whole before the king. It was at the same time resolved, that Francisco Maldonado, who was master of the household of Gonzalo Pizarro, should accompany Texada, carrying justificatory letters from his master; but without any title, credence, or powers whatever. By these measures, two purposes were served at the same time, both of which were deemed useful: In sending a deputation to the king to justify their proceeding, those of their party who pressed that measure were satisfied; and by employing Texada on this errand, the court of royal audience was virtually broken up, as Ortiz de Zarate could not then hold sittings by himself11. When this proposal was communicated to Texada, he readily consented to undertake the office, on condition that he were furnished with 6000 crowns to defray the expences of his voyage. Accordingly, Cepeda and he composed all the memorials and dispatches which were deemed necessary, which were signed by these two judges only, as Ortiz refused his concurrence.
   When all was in readiness for the dispatch of Texada and Maldonado, a ship which lay in the harbour of Lima was ordered to be fitted out for their reception, of which Captain Bachicao was to have taken the command, with a sufficient number of cannon, and twenty soldiers; having orders to take possession of all the ships he might fall in with along the coast. At this time, Vaca de Castro, the ex-president, who still remained a prisoner in this ship, contrived to gain over a majority of the seamen belonging to the vessel, with the assistance of his friend Garcia de Montalva who occasionally visited him. By these means he acquired the command of the vessel, which was already provided with every thing needful for the voyage, and immediately set sail. This untoward incident gave much uneasiness to Gonzalo Pizarro, both because it delayed the departure of Texada, and because he judged that it could not have happened without the concurrence of several concealed enemies to the present state of affairs. On this the troops were ordered under arms, and all the principal persons who were suspected of disaffection to the party of Pizarro were taken into custody and committed to the common prison of the city, both those who had fled from Cuzco, and those belonging to other cities who had not joined his party. One of the persons committed to prison on this occasion was the licentiate Carvajal, to whom the lieutenant-general Carvajal sent a message, desiring him to confess and make his will, as he was immediately to be put to death. The licentiate did accordingly what he was desired, and prepared himself to die with much firmness and resolution; yet he was urged to be more expeditious, and the executioner was present, provided with cords for tying his hands and strangling him. Every one believed the last hour of the licentiate was come; more especially as, considering his rank and quality, it was not thought possible that he could be treated in this manner merely to frighten him. It was likewise universally believed, that the execution of the licentiate would be speedily followed by that of all the other prisoners; which it was conceived would prove of material detriment to the colony, as they consisted of the very principal people of the country, and of those who had always evinced the most zealous loyalty to the service of his majesty.
   While matters seemed fast tending to this extremity, several of the most judicious persons went to Gonzalo Pizarro, and requested of him to reflect that the licentiate Carvajal was one of the principal persons in the country, and that his brother had been already unjustly put to death by the viceroy, under pretence of the licentiate having joined the party of Pizarro. They urged that it was exceedingly imprudent at this time to put the licentiate to death, as that would necessarily renew the discontents which had formerly taken place on the death of his brother the commissary. They even added, that much good service might be expected from the licentiate, were it only in pursuit of revenge for the death of his brother. They insisted that neither the licentiate nor any of the other prisoners had any hand in the flight of Vaca de Castro; but that it might easily be seen that the slightest pretexts were resorted to on purpose to accuse them, who were already under suspicion as disaffected to the ruling party. Teased and fatigued by these solicitations, Gonzalo Pizarro refused to be spoken to on the subject; so that the licentiate and his friends were induced to try another expedient for his release. They conveyed to the lieutenant-general an ingot of gold weighing forty marks12, with a promise of a much larger present if he would save the life of the licentiate. The lieutenant-general accepted their offers, delayed the execution of the licentiate, and prevailed on Gonzalo Pizarro to set him and all the other suspected persons at liberty.

   After the conclusion of this business, measures were taken for the dispatch of Texada and Maldonado; and at this time there happened to arrive a brigantine from Arequipa, which was fitted out along with some other vessels, and armed with a part of the artillery which had been brought down from Cuzco. In these vessels Bachicao embarked along with the deputies, accompanied by sixty musqueteers, who were all that could be prevailed upon to undertake the voyage. They proceeded on their voyage along the coast to the northwards, and arrived one morning early at Tumbez, where they understood the viceroy then resided. Immediately on their being perceived making for the coast, the adherents of the viceroy gave the alarm and stood on their defence: But as the viceroy believed that Gonzalo Pizarro was on board in person accompanied by a formidable body of troops, he retired in all haste from Tumbez accompanied by an hundred and fifty men, taking the road for Quito. Several of his people however did not think fit to accompany his flight, and preferred giving themselves up to Bachicao, who likewise took possession of two ships which happened to be in the port of Tumbez. From thence, Bachicao went to Puerto Viejo and other places, where he drew together about an hundred and fifty men, all of whom he took along with him in the ships of his squadron. Among these were Bartholomew Perez, and Juan Delmos, respectable inhabitants of Puerto Viejo.
   Continuing his voyage towards Panama, Bachicao put in at the Isle of Pearls, about twenty leagues from Panama to procure refreshments. While at that place, the inhabitants of Panama received notice of his arrival, and sent two deputies to learn his intentions, requesting at the same time that he would not come into their boundaries with his troops. Bachicao sent back word, that although he happened to be accompanied by armed men, it was merely on purpose to defend himself against the viceroy, and that he had not the most distant intention of injuring or even displeasing the inhabitants of Panama. He informed them, that he was entrusted with the transport of the Doctor Texada, one of the royal judges, who was charged with a commission from the court of audience to give an account to his majesty of the events which had occurred in Peru. He farther declared that he should only land in Panama to provide necessaries for his voyage back to Peru, and would reimbark without delay. Lulled into security by these assurances, the inhabitants of Panama took no measures for defence. On coming into the port, two ships which happened to be there, made sail to go away; one of which was taken possession of by one of the brigantines belonging to Bachicao, and brought back to the harbour, with the master and chief mate hanging from the yard arms. This sad spectacle gave great uneasiness to the inhabitants, who judged from this tragical event, that the purposes of Bachicao were very different from his words and promises. But it was not now time to think of defence, and they were constrained to submit, though filled with terror and dismay, leaving their lives and properties entirely at the discretion of Bachicao, who was no less cruel than the lieutenant-general Carvajal, or even more so if possible; being at the same time exceedingly addicted to cursing and blasphemy, and among all his vices not a single spark of virtue could be found to relieve the picture.
   At this time Captain Juan de Gusman was in Panama raising soldiers for the service of the viceroy; but he found it advisable to retire on the arrival of Bachicao, with whom all these soldiers now inlisted. Bachicao likewise got possession of the artillery which had belonged to the vessel in which Vaca de Castro escaped from Lima. Seeing himself master of Panama, Bachicao who was a brutal passionate fellow, exercised the command there in a cruel and tyrannical manner, disposing at his will of the goods and properties of every one, violating every rule of law and justice, oppressing the liberties of the community, and holding every individual under such slavish constraint, that no one dared to act otherwise than as he pleased to dictate. Learning or suspecting that two of his captains had formed the design of putting him to death, he ordered them both to be beheaded without any form of trial; and in similar acts of injustice, and in every transaction, he used no other formality than ordering it to be intimated by the public crier, "That Captain Ferdinand Bachicao had ordained such and such to be done." He thus usurped supreme and absolute authority, paying not the smallest regard to the laws, or even to the external forms of justice.
   The licentiate Vaca de Castro, who was at Panama when Bachicao arrived, fled immediately across the isthmus to Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic, where he embarked accompanied by Diego Alvarez de Cueto and Jerom Zurbano. Doctor Texada and Francisco Maldonado escaped likewise to the same port, where they all embarked together for Spain. Texada died on the voyage while passing the Bahamas. On their arrival in Spain, Moldonado and Cueto went directly to Germany, where the emperor Don Carlos then was, where each gave an account of the business with which they were entrusted. Vaca de Castro remained for some time at Tercera in the Azores; whence he went to Lisbon, and afterwards to the court of Spain; alleging that he did not dare to go by way of Seville, on account of the influence in that place of the brothers relations and friends of Juan Tello, whom he had put to death after the defeat of the younger Almagro. On his arrival at court, De Castro was put under arrest in his own house by order of the council of the Indies. He was afterwards brought to trial on a variety of accusations, in the course of which he was kept prisoner for five years in the citadel of Arevalo. He was afterwards removed to a private house in Simanca, from which he was not permitted to go out: And in consequence of a subsequent revolution in the court of Spain, he was allowed to remain a prisoner at large in the city and territory of Valladolid, till his cause was finally adjuged13.
   On the flight of the viceroy from Tumbez with an hundred and fifty men, as before related, in consequence of the arrival of Bachicao, he retired to Quito, where he was honourably received. In this place he increased his force to two hundred men, and finding the country fertile and abounding in provisions, he determined to remain there till he might receive ulterior orders from his majesty, in reply to the informations he had transmitted by Diego Alvarez de Cueto. In the mean time he appointed strong guards to defend the passes in the mountains, and stationed spies on the different roads, that he might have early intimation of the procedure of Gonzalo Pizarro at Lima, which is three hundred leagues from Quito. About this time four soldiers belonging to Gonzalo deserted on account of some injurious treatment, and seized a small bark in the port of Lima, in which they sailed northwards to a place where they landed, and whence they travelled by land to Quito. On their arrival, they represented to the viceroy, that the inhabitants of Lima and other places were exceedingly discontented by the conduct of Gonzalo, who subjected them to the most harassing and vexatious tyranny, driving them from their houses, and despoiling them of their goods, so that many of the colonists were reduced to depend on other persons for their subsistence. That Gonzalo imposed such burthensome contributions on the whole inhabitants, that they were unable to endure them; and that all were so weary of his tyranny, that they would gladly join any person who might come among them in the name of the king, to relieve them from the cruel oppression and tyrannous violence of the usurper. In consequence of this statement, the viceroy was induced to march from Quito towards San Miguel, appointing to the command of his troops one Diego de Occampo, an inhabitant of Quito, who had joined him on his arrival at Tumbez, and had expended large sums in his service from his own private fortune.
   The licentiate Alvarez always accompanied the viceroy, and these two established themselves as the court of royal audience, in virtue of a commission from his majesty which the viceroy still held. By this royal order, the viceroy was authorised after his arrival at Lima, to hold audience in conjunction with two or one of the oydors who might first arrive, or even in case that any two or three of them should chance to die. In pursuance of this authority, the viceroy ordered a new seal to be made, which he committed to the custody of Juan de Leon, alcalde or police judge of Lima, who had been nominated by the Marquis of Camarosa, grand-chancellor of the Indies, as his deputy or chancellor of the audience of Lima. De Leon had fled from Gonzalo Pizarro, and had joined the viceroy at Quito. In consequence of this arrangement, the viceroy issued such orders and proclamations as seemed needful or expedient, in the name of the emperor Don Carlos; authenticating them with the royal seal, and by the signatures of himself and the licentiate Alvarez. By these means there were two royal audiences in Peru, one at the city of Lima, and the other wherever the viceroy happened to reside; so that it frequently happened that two opposite and contradictory decrees were pronounced and promulgated, in one and the same cause.
   On taking the resolution of marching from Quito, the viceroy sent his brother-in-law, Diego Alvarez de Cueto, to inform his majesty of the state of affairs, and to solicit such reinforcements as might enable him to re-establish his authority in Peru, by waging war against Gonzalo Pizarro. Cueto went accordingly to Spain in the same fleet with Vaca de Castro and Texada, as already related. The viceroy advanced southwards to San Miguel, which is an hundred and fifty leagues from Quito, determining to remain at that place till he might receive farther orders from his majesty. The inhabitants of San Miguel gave him the best reception in their power, and furnished him as far as they were able with every thing he was in want of. He continually kept his small army on foot, to preserve the honour and reputation of his character as viceroy, and that he might be in a convenient situation for receiving such reinforcements as might come from Spain or from any of the American colonies; as every one coming by land from these quarters must necessarily pass by the way of San Miguel, especially if accompanied by horses or beasts of burthen. He expected therefore to be able in this place to collect reinforcements to his army, so as to be in condition to renew the war, and employed himself to collect men, horses, and arms, so that he was soon at the head of five hundred men, tolerably equipped. Some of these indeed were in want of defensive armour, which they endeavoured to supply by fabricating cuirasses of iron, and of hard leather.
   At the time when Gonzalo Pizarro sent Bachicao with the brigantines to get possession of the ships belonging to the viceroy, he dispatched Gonzalo Diaz de Pinera and Jerom de Villegas to collect the soldiers who dwelt in Truxillo and San Miguel, that they might make head against the viceroy in the north of Peru. These officers remained in San Miguel with about eighty men whom they had drawn to their party, till they heard of the approach of the viceroy; on which, not being in sufficient force to oppose him, they retreated towards Truxillo, and established themselves in the province of Collique, about forty leagues14 from San Miguel. From thence they sent intimation to Gonzalo of the advance of the viceroy, and that his army increased daily in numbers, insomuch that it behoved him to think of some appropriate measures to avert the threatened danger. Diaz and Villegas were likewise informed that the viceroy had sent Juan de Pereira, one of his officers, into the province of Chachapoyas, in which there were very few Spanish settlers, to endeavour to collect reinforcements. As they believed that Pereira and his followers entertained no suspicions of their being in the neighbourhood, Diaz and Villegas determined on attempting to surprize them, which they did so effectually one night, that they made the whole party prisoners without resistance. Having beheaded Pereira and two of his principal followers, they obliged the rest of the party, about sixty horsemen, to enter into the service of Gonzalo, by threats of putting them all to death if they refused; after which they returned to their post.
   The viceroy was greatly incensed by this untoward event, and determined to seek an opportunity of revenge. With this view he departed secretly from San Miguel with a body of an hundred and fifty horse, and took such judicious measures that he arrived one night undiscovered at Collique, where he surprized the enemy, and obliged them to fly in all directions. Diaz made his escape almost alone into a district inhabited by hostile Indians, who assailed him and put him to death. Villegas and Ferdinand Alvarado were more fortunate in their escape, as they were able to collect some of their dispersed troops, with whom they took up a new and more secure position not far from Truxillo, and at a safer distance from San Miguel.
   As Gonzalo Pizarro was informed that the viceroy augmented his army from time to time, more especially after this successful enterprize, he resolved to march against him without delay; as hardly a day passed in which the viceroy was not joined by soldiers, horses, and arms from Spain, or some of the American colonies, all of which were landed at the port of Tumbez. He was likewise in dread lest some dispatch might arrive from the emperor, favourable to the viceroy, by which his own adherents might be intimidated, and numbers might be induced to change sides. With this view he assembled his army, determined to march in person against the viceroy, and if possible to bring him to action. He issued therefore the proper orders to all his officers, reviewed and mustered his troops, advanced them the necessary funds for taking the field, and sent off the baggage, artillery, ammunition and provisions, with the main body of the army towards Truxillo, remaining behind at Lima with some of his principal officers, to follow in proper time. About this time a vessel arrived from Arequipa with a very seasonable supply of 100,000 crowns; and another vessel from Tierra Firma, belonging to Gonzalo Martel, sent by his wife to enable him to return home. The arrival of these two vessels was very opportune for Gonzalo Pizarro, as they served to transport great quantities of musquets, pikes, ammunition, and other implements of war, together with a guard of an hundred and fifty men, and greatly facilitated the intended expedition against the viceroy.
   On quitting Lima, Gonzalo Pizarro thought proper to take the oydor Cepeda and Juan de Caceres the accountant-general along with him, both to give the more eclat and appearance of legal authority to his measures, and on purpose to break up the court of royal audience, as Ortiz de Zarate would then be the only judge remaining at Lima, who was not thought of much importance, as he was in bad health. Besides, Blas de Soto, his brother, had married the daughter of that judge; and although that marriage had been effected contrary to the wish of Ortiz, it was considered as some tie upon his conduct. For greater security, however, Gonzalo used the precaution of carrying the royal seal along with him. Gonzalo Pizarro chose to go by sea; and on leaving Lima, he appointed Lorenzo de Aldana as lieutenant-governor of that city, with a garrison of eighty soldiers, to preserve tranquillity during his absence. This small number was considered sufficient to prevent any attempt towards a revolutionary movement, as most of the inhabitants of Lima accompanied the expedition. Gonzalo embarked in March 1545, and landed at the port of Santa, fifteen leagues south from Truxillo, at which city he arrived on Palm Sunday. He remained at this place for some time, waiting the junction of his troops, sending messages in various directions to expedite their march. After some time, he marched from Truxillo into the province of Collique, where the whole of his army assembled. At this place he reviewed his army, which amounted to above six hundred horse and foot. The troops under the viceroy were nearly as numerous; but those under Gonzalo were much better armed, and better supplied with every thing requisite for war, as well as being all veteran soldiers, accustomed to war and discipline, and well acquainted with all the difficult passes of the country. The troops of the viceroy on the contrary, had for the most part come recently from Spain, were quite unaccustomed to war, and ill armed; besides which their powder was bad in quality.
   Gonzalo used every effort to collect provisions and all kinds of necessaries for his army, more especially as he had to pass through a desert country which intervened between the province of Motupe15 and the city of San Miguel, a distance of twenty-two leagues without any inhabitants, and entirely destitute of water or other means of refreshment, consisting every where of burning sands without shelter from the heat of the sun and almost under the equinoctial line. As this march was necessarily attended with much inconvenience and difficulty, Gonzalo used every proper precaution that his troops might be supplied abundantly with water and other necessaries. For this purpose all the neighbouring Indians were ordered to bring a prodigious quantity of jars and other vessels calculated to contain water. The soldiers were ordered to leave at Motupe all their clothes and baggage of which they were not in immediate want, which were to be brought forward by the Indians. Above all things, it was taken care that a sufficiency of water should accompany the army, both for the troops, and for the horses and other animals. Every thing being in readiness, Gonzalo sent forwards a party of twenty-five horsemen by the ordinary road through the desert, that they might be observed by the scouts belonging to the viceroy, and that he might be led to believe the army came in that direction. He then took a different route through the same desert with the army, marching as expeditiously as possible, every soldier being ordered to carry his provisions along with him on his horse. By these precautions, and the rapidity of the march, the viceroy was not informed of the approach of Gonzalo and his army, till they were very near San Miguel. Immediately on learning their approach, he sounded the alarm, giving out that he intended to meet and give battle to the insurgents; but as soon as his army was drawn out from the city, he took a quite opposite course, directing his march with all possible expedition towards the mountain of Caxas.
   Gonzalo Pizarro got notice of the retreat of the viceroy about four hours afterwards, in consequence of which he made no halt at San Miguel, except to procure guides to direct him in the road which the viceroy had taken. In the first night of this pursuit, the army of Gonzalo marched eight Spanish leagues, or near thirty English miles, and several of the royalists who had lagged behind the rest, together with the whole baggage belonging to the retreating army fell into his hands. Gonzalo hanged such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and continued the pursuit of the flying royalists with the utmost diligence, through difficult and almost impracticable roads, where no provisions could be procured, always coming up with some of the hindmost of the enemy. Gonzalo likewise sent on several Indians with letters to the principal officers who served under the viceroy, urging them to put him to death, and offering them their pardons for the past and to give them high rewards. He continued the pursuit above fifty leagues or two hundred miles, till at length the horses were no longer able to carry their riders, and the men were incapable of proceeding, both from excessive fatigue and by the failure of provisions. The insurgent army at length arrived at Ayabaca16, where the hot pursuit of the viceroy was discontinued, and the troops of Gonzalo halted for rest and refreshment. Besides the difficulty of overtaking the royalists, Gonzalo had received assurances from some of the principal followers of the viceroy that they would either put him to death, or deliver him up as a prisoner; and, as this came afterwards to the knowledge of the viceroy, he put several of these officers and gentlemen of his army to death. After Gonzalo had supplied his army with such provisions as could be furnished at Ayabaca, he resumed the pursuit, but with less rapidity than before, and keeping his army always in compact order; yet at this time some of his troops remained behind, partly owing to extreme fatigue, and partly from discontent. Leaving the viceroy to continue his retreat to Quito, and Gonzalo in pursuit, it is proper to mention some events that occurred at this time in other parts of Peru.
   In this march, Gonzalo did not think proper to carry along with his army any of the soldiers belonging to the viceroy whom he had taken during the pursuit, both because he could not confide in them, because he had already a sufficient force in proportion to the enemy, and because provisions were very difficult to be procured, as the viceroy had stripped every place through which he passed as much as possible. For this reason, Gonzalo Pizarro sent back all his prisoners to Truxillo, Lima, or such other places as they thought proper, having in the first place put to death such of their chiefs as he considered most strongly attached to the viceroy. As these soldiers were dispersed over several parts of the country, they began to declaim in favour of the viceroy and against the tyrannical conduct of Gonzalo, and found many persons abundantly disposed to listen to their harangues; both because what they alleged was true in itself, and because most of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru were much inclined to revolution and change of party, especially the soldiery and those who were lazy and unoccupied. The real settlers and principal inhabitants of the cities were quite of an opposite description, being friends of peace and order, as most conducive to their interest and happiness, and necessary to the preservation of their properties, and being more exposed in time of civil war than even the soldiers to be harassed and tormented in many ways, as the ruling party was apt on the slightest pretexts to put them to death on purpose to seize their effects, with which to gratify and reward the partizans of their tyranny and injustice. These seditious discourses were so openly indulged in, that they reached the knowledge of the lieutenants of Gonzalo; who, each in his peculiar jurisdiction, punished the authors as they deemed right. At Lima, to which most of these prisoners had gone, Pedro Martin de Cecilia the provost marshal was a violent partizan of Gonzalo, and caused several of these malecontents to be hanged. Lorenzo de Aldana, who had been left by Gonzalo as lieutenant-governor of Lima, was a prudent man, and conducted himself in a quite different manner, being disinclined from acting with such violence as might occasion displeasure to either party in the sequel; for which reason he used all his influence to prevent putting any one to death, or from injuring any person in any manner. Although he held his office from Gonzalo, he never exerted himself zealously in his service, so that the partizans of that usurper considered him as secretly gained by the other party, more especially as he always behaved well to the known friends of the viceroy. On this account, all these men flocked to Lima, where they believed themselves in greater security than anywhere else. The partizans of Gonzalo, on the other hand, made loud complaints against the favourable behaviour of Aldana to the royalists; and in particular one of the alcaldes of Lima, named Christopher de Burgos, spoke of it so openly that Aldana thought it necessary to give him a public reprimand, and even committed him to prison for some time. Several even went so far as to communicate their suspicions of the fidelity of Aldana to Gonzalo Pizarro by letters, and even persuaded him of the truth of their allegations: But he refrained from manifesting his want of confidence in the lieutenant-governor, considering it dangerous to deprive him of his office while the army was at so great a distance, more especially as Aldana had a respectable military force, and was much esteemed by the citizens of Lima

   We have formerly mentioned that several inhabitants of the city of La Plata in the province of Las Charcas, on receiving orders to that effect from the viceroy, had set out from that city on purpose to offer him their services against Gonzalo; but having learnt his imprisonment while on their way to Lima, they returned to their habitations. Gonzalo Pizarro was particularly displeased with these men, as he expected to have been especially favoured by the inhabitants of his own peculiar district, and sent therefore a person named Francisco de Almendras as lieutenant-governor to La Plata, a coarse brutal fellow without feeling or humanity, and one of the most cruel satellites of his tyrannical usurpation; whom he instructed to be peculiarly watchful of the behaviour of those who had shewn an intention of joining the viceroy, and to make them feel on every opportunity how much he was dissatisfied with their conduct on that occasion. In pursuance of his instructions, Almendras deprived the principal persons among these loyalists of their lands and Indians, and exacted heavy contributions from them towards defraying the expences of the war. He likewise affronted and used them ill on all occasions, and even on very frivolous pretences. One Don Gomez de Luna, a principal person among the loyalists of La Plata, happened one day to observe in conversation at his own house, that the emperor Don Carlos must assuredly at length recover the command over Peru. This loyal sentiment was reported to Almendras, who immediately ordered De Luna to be arrested and thrown into the common prison. The magistrates of the city went in a body to supplicate Almendras either to liberate De Luna, or at least to confine him in a place more conformable to his rank; and as Almendras refused to give a satisfactory answer to their representation, one of the magistrates declared publicly, that, if he would not liberate de Luna, they would do so in spite of him. Almendras dissembled his sentiments at the time, but went next night to the prison, whence he caused De Luna to be taken out to the public square and beheaded.
   The inhabitants of the city were exceedingly disgusted by this cruel act of tyranny, which they considered as an outrage against the whole community; and particularly one Diego Centeno was most sensibly affected, as he and De Luna had been extremely intimate. At the commencement of the troubles respecting the obnoxious regulations, Centeno had attached himself to Gonzalo Pizarro, whom he had accompanied to Cuzco, in the capacity of procurator from the province of Las Charcas, being one of the principal persons of his party. Having noticed the bad intentions of Pizarro, and that he did not limit his designs to those objects which he at first proposed, Centeno abandoned the party of Gonzalo and returned to his own house. He now determined to use his utmost endeavours to revenge the cruel death of his friend De Luna, that he might save himself and others from the tyrannous rule of Almendras, and on purpose to restore the country to obedience to its legitimate sovereign. With this view, he communicated his sentiments to some of the principal settlers, among whom were Lopez de Mendoza, Alfonso Perez de Esquivel, Alfonzo de Camargo, Fernando Nunnez de Segura, Lopez de Mendiera, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, and several others whom he believed to have loyal intentions, all of whom he found disposed to second him in executing the enterprize which he had in view. In the prosecution of this purpose, they all assembled one Sunday morning, according to custom, at the house of Almendras, under pretence of accompanying him to church. When all were assembled, although Almendras had a considerable guard, Ceuteno went up to him as if to converse on some affair of moment, and stabbed him repeatedly with his dagger. The conspirators then dragged him out to the public square and cut off his head, declaring him a traitor, and proclaiming that they had done so for the service of the king.
   Considering that Almendras was universally detested, the conspirators had not thought it necessary to use any precautions for conciliating the people; yet all the inhabitants declared for the king, and took immediate measures to support his authority and to defend themselves against the resentment of Gonzalo and the insurgents. For this purpose, they elected Centeno as commander in chief of the province; in which capacity he appointed proper persons to be captains of cavalry and infantry under his authority, and used every effort to inlist a body of troops, which he paid out of his own funds, being one of the richest men in the country; but in this he was assisted by the other inhabitants of the province, who contributed towards the expence. Centeno was of an honourable family, being descended from Hernan Centeno who had made himself illustrious in the wars of Castillo. He was about thirty-five years of age, of very agreeable manners, of a liberal disposition, personally brave, of an excellent character and universally respected. At this time he enjoyed a revenue exceeding 80,000 crowns; but about two years afterwards, on the discovery of the famous mines of Potosi, he became possessed of above 100,000 crowns of annual rent by means of his Indians, as his estate lay very near these mines.
   Having assembled a body of troops, Centeno used every effort to provide them with arms and all other necessary equipments. He placed guards at all the passes, to prevent any intelligence from being conveyed to the enemy till his affairs were in proper order. He sent likewise Lopez de Mendoza one of his captains, first to Porco and thence to Arequipa to collect as many men as possible, and to endeavour to arrest Pedro do Puentes the lieutenant of Gonzalo at Arequipa. But Puentes fled immediately from Arequipa on receiving intelligence of the events which had occurred at Las Charcas. Mendoza therefore took possession of Arequipa without resistance; whence he reinforced himself with all the men, arms, and horses, he could procure, and carried off all the money he could find, with which and his reinforcement he returned to Centeno at La Plata.
   On the return of Mendoza, Centeno found himself at the head of two hundred and fifty men well equipped for war, to whom he explained his sentiments and views, and gave an account of the criminal usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, in the following terms. "You know that Gonzalo, on leaving Cuzco, pretended merely to present the humble remonstrances of the colonists respecting the obnoxious regulations; and you have been informed that, even at the outset, he put to death Gaspard de Roias, Philip Gutierrez, and Arias Maldonado. You have learnt how he conspired with the judges of the royal audience and other inhabitants of Lima, to arrest and depose the viceroy, both of which were done accordingly. After this, while at the very gates of Lima, and before his public entry into that city, he sent in his lieutenant-general, who arrested many of the most considerable and richest inhabitants of the country, under the eyes of the judges, merely because these men had joined the viceroy, and even hanged three of them without any form of trial, Pedro de Barco, Martin de Florencia, and Juan Saavedra. He in the next place has broken up the royal court of audience, sending off its judges to different places, having in the first place obliged them to appoint him to the government. He has since, as you well know, caused many others to be put to death, merely on suspicion that they were favourable to the viceroy, and intended to join his party. Not satisfied with all this, he has seized all the treasure belonging to his majesty in the different receipts of the colony, and has imposed excessive contributions on the inhabitants, from whom he has exacted above 150,000 ducats by means of taxes imposed at his own pleasure. Adding crime to crime, he has again levied forces against the authority of his majesty, with which he has marched against the viceroy, and has carried insubordination and confusion into every part of the country; permitting and encouraging many to hold public discourse contrary to the respect and obedience which is due to his majesty. They were likewise aware, that Gonzalo had token away the repartimientos, or allotments of lands and Indians from many persons, and had converted them to his own emolument. Finally, he laid before them the strong obligations by which they were all bound, as faithful subjects, to exert their utmost endeavours in the service of their sovereign, lest they should draw upon themselves the imputation of being rebels and traitors." By these representations, and others which it were tedious to repeat, he disposed his auditors to concur in his loyal sentiments, and willingly to obey his orders. After this, Centeno sent one of his captains with a detachment to Chicuito, a place belonging particularly to the king, between Orcaza and Las Charcas, with orders to guard the passes with the utmost vigilance, till he and the royalists were in full readiness to execute their principal enterprize, as will be related in the sequel.
   Notwithstanding every precaution employed by Centeno to conceal his operations and intentions, it was impossible to prevent intelligence from spreading in various directions, more especially after the expedition of Mendoza to Arequipa. Every thing he had already done, even the number of his troops, and of the musquets and horses he had collected, was fully known, by means of Indians and Spaniards who had escaped from La Plata, in spite of the guards which had been set, to watch the passes of the mountains. Alfonso de Toro, who acted as lieutenant governor of Cuzco under Gonzalo Pizarro, happened at this time to be a hundred leagues to the northward of that city, keeping guard in one of the passes of the mountains, as by letters from Gonzalo the viceroy was reported to have gone into the mountainous country, and was supposed to have directed his march by that road toward the south of Peru. On receiving notice of the late revolution at La Plata, De Toro returned in all diligence to Cuzco, where he levied forces to oppose Centeno; and, having assembled the magistrates and principal inhabitants of Cuzco, he informed them of what had occurred at Las Charcas, and as there was a sufficient force in Cuzco to suppress the royalists, he thought it incumbent on him to march to La Plata for that purpose. To gain them over to his purpose, he represented that Centeno had revolted without any just cause, and had usurped authority in Las Charcas for his own private ends, under pretence of serving the king; whereas Gonzalo Pizarro, being actual governor of the kingdom of Peru, ought to be obeyed as such till his majesty sent orders to the contrary. That the revolt of Centeno, being both criminal in itself and contrary to the law, every one was bound to resist him, and to punish his temerity. He recalled to their remembrance, that Gonzalo Pizarro was engaged in serving the general interest of the colonists, to procure the revocation of the obnoxious ordinances, in which common cause he had exposed his fortune and personal safety to every hazard, as it was well known that every inhabitant of Peru would be stripped of his property if the regulations were put in force. That besides the general advantage procured by Gonzalo in setting aside the obnoxious regulations, for which all were infinitely indebted to him, it was obvious that he had not in any respect conducted himself contrary to the royal orders, and had not in any manner set himself against the authority of the sovereign; since, on his arrival at Lima for the purpose of presenting their remonstrances, the judges of the royal audience had already arrested the viceroy and sent him out of the kingdom, of which these judges had appointed Gonzalo interim governor; and that in marching in a warlike manner against the viceroy, he had acted at the request and by the orders of the royal audience; as was manifest by his being accompanied by Cepeda, one of the royal judges and chairman of the audience. He asserted that no person in Peru could take upon him to determine whether the audience had acted right or otherwise in conferring the government on Gonzalo; and that it was the duty of all to support him in that office, till they received the ulterior orders of the sovereign.
   At the close of this discourse, every one acknowledged the justice of what he had represented, and voluntarily offered to support Gonzalo with their lives and fortunes; although in reality most of them did so more from fear than good will, as they stood in great awe of De Toro, who had hanged several persons in a summary manner, and had made himself universally dreaded by his cruel and ferocious disposition and conduct, so that no one dared to oppose or contradict him in any thing. After a short deliberation, a set of resolutions were entered into, in which the transactions of Centeno in Las Charcas were recited as seditious and unlawful, and he was declared to have assassinated Francisco de Almendras, the lieutenant governor, to have levied forces in rebellion against the legitimate government, and to have passed the boundaries of the province of Las Charcas in hostile manner; for all which reasons it was just and proper to make war upon him, and to reduce him to obedience. All this was done principally to satisfy or to amuse the people, and to make them believe that the partizans of Gonzalo acted reasonably and lawfully, as all those who signed these resolutions were perfectly aware of the real state of affairs. In reality, although matters were thus represented in the popular assemblages, in justification of the measures of the insurgent party, or at least to excuse their actions under specious pretences, those who took an active part on the present occasion, used often to declare, both in the presence and absence of Gonzalo, that the king would certainly give, or ought to give him the government of Peru, as they were resolved not to receive any other person in that capacity, such being the resolution of Gonzalo in which they all concurred.
   Alfonso de Toro now proceeded to levy an army, of which he declared himself captain general and commander in chief, and appointed captains and other officers to command under his authority. In all his proceedings he carried himself with a high hand, employing force and violence, instead of persuasion and good treatment. He protested publickly and with many oaths, that he would hang up every one who did not assist and contribute to the cause; and even had several persons carried to the foot of the gallows, whose lives he was induced to spare by dint of solicitations. He abused and maltreated others, using everyone in the most outrageous manner who did not give way to him in all things. By this violent procedure he completed his warlike preparations at very small expence; insomuch that it appeared afterwards by his accounts, that he had not expended above twenty thousand crowns in this expedition, as he took away gratuitously all the horses that were to be found in Cuzco, and constrained all the inhabitants who were able to carry arms to accompany him in the expedition against Centeno. By these means De Toro collected three hundred men, tolerably armed and equipped, with which he marched from Cuzco to a place named Urcos, about six leagues from that city, where he remained three weeks in anxious expectation of intelligence from Las Charcas: But all the roads and passes between and La Plata, were so well guarded by the Indians, who were entirely disposed to favour Centeno, that he was unable to learn any thing of the movements or intentions of the royalists in Las Charcas, so that he was constrained to remain continually on the alert lest he might have been surprized. Besides these military precautions, he rigorously punished all who presumed to show the slightest disinclination towards the interest of the Pizarrian faction, or to express their sentiments in any respect in disapprobation of his own designs; insomuch that all were constrained from dread of punishment to appear heartily attached to the cause in which he was engaged.
   After remaining three weeks encamped at Urcos, he determined to march in search of Centeno, and advanced for that purpose to the village named Del Rey. As the troops of Centeno happened to be a good deal scattered at this time, he was under the necessity of retreating on the approach of De Toro. These hostile chiefs being encamped at the distance of about twelve leagues, entered into a negotiation to endeavour to form an accommodation; but, as they were unable to agree upon any terms, De Toro advanced for the purpose of attacking Centeno; who, on the other hand, was unwilling to risk the chance of an engagement, owing to the inferiority of his force, and because a defeat might have dispirited his own party and have been of great advantage to the cause of the insurgents. On this account he retired in proportion as De Toro advanced, accompanied by a great number of large Peruvian sheep loaded with provisions and ammunition, and carrying along with him all the principal curacas or native chiefs, to prevent De Toro from being able to avail himself of the assistance of the Indians. In this manner Centeno continued to retreat across a desert and uninhabited country of forty leagues extent, till he arrived at a place named Casabindo, through which Diego de Roias had formerly descended from the elevated region of Peru into the eastern plain of the Rio de la Plata. Alfonso de Toro continued the pursuit as far as the city of La Plata, which is an hundred and eighty leagues to the south of Cuzca. Finding that place abandoned and entirely stript of every thing which might contribute to the subsistence of his troops, and being unable to procure provisions on account of the absence of all the curacas or caciques, he was under the necessity to discontinue his pursuit of Centeno, and even found himself compelled to return towards Cuzco. In this retreat, De Toro took the command of the advanced guard of fifty men, ordering the main body to march at leisure, and left a rear-guard of thirty of his best mounted cavalry under Alfonso de Mendoza, with orders to use every possible means of procuring intelligence of the motions of Centeno; that, in case of his following, the troops might be collected together in good order to rejoin the van.
   The departure of De Toro from La-Plata on his return to Cuzco was soon communicated to Centeno by means of the Indians. He was astonished at this sudden alteration of affairs; and, as he understood that De Toro marched in great hast, without keeping his troops in close array, he supposed that circumstance to have been occasioned by De Toro entertaining suspicions of the fidelity of his followers, and that he had found them ill-disposed towards the party of the Pizarrians. On these considerations, Centeno resolved to pursue in his turn, in hope of drawing some advantage to the cause in which he was engaged from this measure, and even expecting that several of the followers of Toro might come over to his side. He sent off therefore the captain Lope de Mendoza with fifty light armed cavalry in pursuit of the enemy. Mendoza got in a short time to Collao; and, although de Toro and most of his troops had already passed beyond that place, he made prisoners of about fifty who remained behind, whom at first he deprived of their horses and arms. Soon afterwards, however, he returned these to his prisoners, and even distributed some money among them, receiving their engagements upon oath to join him when required; but he hanged a few of them who were suspected of being particulary attached to De Toro. After this successful exploit, Lope returned in great haste to La Plata, in hope of being able to cut off Alfonzo de Mendoza and his small party, who still occupied that place. But Alfonzo had received intelligence of what had happened at Collao, and had already quitted La Plata in great haste, taking a different road from that pursued by Lope, by which means he got safe to Cuzco.
   Centeno arrived soon afterwards at La Plata with the remainder of his troops, where he assembled all the force under his command, and where he made every possible preparation for continuing the war to advantage, and in particular caused a number of musquets to be made. De Toro continued his retreat to Cuzco, dreading much to be pursued, and lest Centeno might have acquired possession of Cuzco, which he might easily have accomplished in the present situation of affairs; but Centeno thought it more prudent to remain at La Plata, where he augmented the number of his troops and collected treasure which was found in great plenty in the province of Las Charcas.
   The events which had taken place in Las Charcas were soon known at Lima; and as several of the soldiers in that city were attached to the party of the viceroy, they spoke almost openly of going away to join Centeno; and, from the small attention paid by Lorenzo de Aldana to repress these men, he was even suspected of favouring the same cause. Antonio de Ribera likewise, although the brother-in-law of Pizarro, was strongly suspected of being secretly devoted to the royal interest, as indeed his conduct in the sequel evinced; and several other persons of consideration lay under suspicions of the same nature. All this gave much uneasiness to the friends of Pizarro: Yet those persons at Lima who wished well to the interests of his majesty, did not think it prudent at this time to make any open attempt, being satisfied that it was better to wait a more favourable opportunity, and that De Aldana would prepare matters for that purpose, as he seemed clearly favourable to the same cause. His abilities were universally acknowledged, and his good intentions were not doubted, so that all were satisfied that he would conduct matters with much prudence to a favourable issue.
   At this time it became known at Lima that the viceroy had retreated with a small body of troops into the province of Popayan; and that during his retreat he had put to death several of the officers and other persons of consideration in his army; among whom were Rodrigo de Ocampo, Jerom de la Cerna, Gaspard Gil Olivarez and Gomez Estacio; some of these because they were inclined to abandon him, and others for corresponding with Gonzalo Pizarro, and conspiring to put the viceroy to death. On the communication of this intelligence at Lima, it produced different effects according to the different inclinations and views of the inhabitants. It occasioned more reserve among those who were of loyal dispositions; whereas the partizans of the Pizarrian tyranny considered themselves more at liberty to avow their sentiments to Aldana. They went therefore to him in a body, and represented that there were many persons in Lima who were strongly suspected of being hostile to Gonzalo Pizarro, and only waited a favourable opportunity to take up arms against him; and that it was incumbent therefore on the lieutenant governor to punish these men for the scandalous freedoms in which they had indulged, or at least to banish them from the city. They offered to furnish sufficient proof of these facts, and urged him to exert his authority on the occasion. Aldana assured them that none of these things had ever come to his knowledge; and that if he knew who those were against whom they complained, he would take such measures as were necessary on the occasion.
   The partizans of Pizarro became at length so bold that they arrested fifteen of those whom they most strongly suspected of attachment to the deposed viceroy, among whom was Diego Lopez de Zuniga. Having thrown these men into prison, the Pizarrians were inclined to have given them the torture to extort confession, and afterwards to have procured their condemnation by Pedro Martin the provost marshal of the city; so that they were in imminent danger of being put to death, if Lorenzo de Aldana had not exerted himself promptly and effectually to take them out of the hands of the Pizarrians. For this purpose, he caused them all to be brought to his own residence, on pretence that they would be there in more safe custody, and provided them with every thing of which they stood in need, even secretly furnishing them with a vessel in which they embarked and saved themselves from their enemies. This transaction gave much dissatisfaction to the friends of Pizarro, both on account of the escape of the prisoners, and because Aldana refused to allow of any formal investigation into the circumstances of their escape; on which account the Pizarrians firmly believed that Aldana was in secret league with the opposite party. They wrote therefore to Gonzalo Pizarro, giving him an account of all these events, and urging him to give proper orders on the occasion. But Gonzalo did not think it prudent at this time to make any change in affairs at Lima, or to attempt any thing against Aldana; because, as it has been reported, he was afraid of matters taking an unfavourable issue while he was at so great a distance

   When Gonzalo Pizarro was informed of what had been done by Centeno in the province of Las Charcas against his interest and authority, he believed it necessary to use prompt measures for reducing that country to subjection, and not to give his enemies time and opportunity for strengthening themselves and increasing the number of their partizans; as he flattered himself that he would become absolute master of the whole kingdom of Peru, if he were able to get rid of Centeno. After several consultations with the principal officers of his army, on the measures necessary to be pursued on this emergency, in which Gonzalo could not act in person as he had still to oppose the viceroy in the north, it was determined to confide the care of an expedition against Centeno to the lieutenant-general Carvajal. For this purpose all the necessary orders and commissions were made out immediately in the name of Gonzalo Pizarro, by which Carvajal was authorized to levy what men and money he might deem necessary. This employment was very acceptable to Carvajal, as he believed he might derive considerable profit to himself in its execution; and he set out from Quito accompanied only by twenty persons, in whom he had great confidence. The council of Gonzalo Pizarro had other and secret motives for recommending the employment of Carvajal on this occasion, besides those which they publickly avowed. Some were desirous of acquiring by his absence a greater share in the management of affairs; while others were anxious to send him to a distance, from the terror inspired by his cruel and ferocious conduct, and his passionate temper, owing to which he used often to put people to death on the most trifling offences or the slightest suspicions. But all the leaders in the army disguised their real sentiments on this occasion, pretending that the importance of the affair required the talents and experience of Carvajal to bring it to a successful issue.
   Leaving Quito, Carvajal went, directly to San Miguel, where the principal inhabitants went out to meet him, and conducted him with much respect to the house which was prepared for his reception. On arriving there, he desired six of the most considerable persons belonging to the city to dismount and accompany him into the house, under pretence that he had something of importance to communicate to them from the governor. Having caused the doors to be shut, and posted centinels to prevent any communication with the rest of the inhabitants, he represented to these men, that Gonzalo was much incensed against them for having always taken part with his enemies, and more especially on account of having received and favoured the deposed viceroy, and of having readily supplied his army with every thing of which they stood in need. On this account it had been his first intention to have destroyed the city with fire and sword, without sparing a single inhabitant. But, on reflecting that the magistrates and principal inhabitants only were to blame, the people at large having been constrained by force or fear, he was now determined to punish only the most guilty and to pardon the rest. Yet, having certain private reasons for dissembling for the present with some of the principal persons of the place, he had selected the six who were now present, as principal inhabitants, to punish them as they richly deserved, that they might serve as a warning to all Peru. For this reason, therefore, he desired them to confess their sins in preparation for death, as he was resolved to have them all executed immediately.
   They used every argument to exculpate themselves from the crimes kid to their charge, but all they could say was without avail; and Carvajal even caused one of them to be strangled, against whom he was particularly incensed, as he had been principally instrumental in constructing the royal seal which the viceroy employed in his dispatches. In the mean time, a rumour of what was going forward at the residence of Carvajal spread over the city, and came to the knowledge of the wives of the prisoners. These ladies immediately implored the priests and monks who dwelt in San Miguel to accompany them to the place where their husbands were in so great danger. They all went there accordingly, and got in by a private door which had not been noticed by the people belonging to Carvajal, and which had consequently been omitted to be guarded. Coming into the presence of Carvajal, the wives of the prisoners threw themselves at his feet, and implored mercy for their husbands. He pretended to be softened, and granted pardon to the prisoners, so far as their lives; yet reserving to himself to punish them in such other manner as he might see fit. Accordingly, he banished them from the province, depriving them of their lands and Indians, and condemned them in the payment of heavy fines towards defraying the expences of the war.
   From San Miguel Carvajal went to Truxillo, collecting every where on his route all the soldiers, horses, arms, and money he could find. Carvajal had resolved to have put one Melchior Verdugo to death, who dwelt in Truxillo; but as Verdugo got intimation of this intention, he fled to the province of Caxamarca, where his repartimiento of Indians was situated. The bussiness on which Carvajal was engaged was of too great importance to admit of pursuing Verdugo; wherefore, after having got possession of as much money as possible under pretence of a loan, he went on to Lima, always collecting all the soldiers he could procure. He gave no money to his recruits, only supplying them with horses and arms, which he took wherever they could be found. He kept all the money he could find for his own use, every where pillaging the royal coffers and public funds, and even searching for treasure among the ancient tombs. After arriving at Lima, he completed his military preparations, and departed for Cuzco by way of the mountain and the city of Guamanga, at the head of two hundred men well equipped, and carrying with him a great sum of money which he had collected during his march; and at Guamanga he conducted himself in the same rapacious manner as in other places.
   Seven or eight days after the departure of Carvajal from Lima, a conspiracy was detected among those who were well affected to the royal cause, in consequence of which fifteen of the principal persons of that city were committed to prison. Among these were, Juan Velasquez, Vela Nunnez nephew to the viceroy, Francisco Giron another gentlemen of his household, and Francisco Rodriguez. By means of the torture, these unhappy persons were made to confess that they had concerted with Pedro Manxarres, an inhabitant of Las Charcas, to kill the lieutenant-governor Aldana, the provost marshall Pedro Martin, and other friends and partizans of Gonzalo Pizarro, after which they proposed to induce the citizens of Lima to declare for his majesty, confidently expecting that all those who now followed Carvajal by constraint would join their party; and they intended finally to have gone off with all the strength they could muster to join Centeno. Upon this forced confession, Giron and one other of these prisoners were strangled. By the intercession of several respectable persons the life of Juan Velasquez was spared, but his right hand was cut off. All the rest of these prisoners were so severely tortured that they continued lame for the rest of their lives. Manxarres saved himself by flight, and continued to conceal himself among the mountains for more than a year; but fell at last into the hands of one of the officers in the interest of Gonzalo, who caused him to be hanged.
   As Pedro Martin, the provost-marshal, strongly suspected that some of those who accompanied Carvajal had participated in this plot; he endeavoured to discover this by torturing Francisco de Guzman, one of the prisoners. Finding that Guzman made no confession on this head, he interrogated him particularly respecting a soldier along with Carvajal named Perucho de Aguira, and some of his friends, demanding to know whether these men were in the secret. On purpose to free himself from the torture, Guzman said they were. After this confession, Guzman was formally condemned to become a monk in the convent belonging to the order of mercy, in which he accordingly assumed the habit. After this, Martin demanded from the registrar a certificate of the confession of Guzman, by which Aguira and others were implicated in the plot, and Martin immediately sent off this writing by an Indian messenger to Carvajal who was then at Guamanga. On the receipt of this paper, Carvajal ordered Aguira and five others to be hanged, without any further proof or examination. A short time afterwards, the registrar being sensible of the error he had committed in supplying the certificate, sent off a full copy of the confession made by Guzman, in which was an ample revocation of all he had said under torture, declaring that he had falsely charged Aguira and the others, merely to get free from torture. This was however of no avail, as it arrived too late, Aguira and the others having been already executed, although they asserted their innocence to the last moment of their lives, as was certified by the confessors who attended them at their execution; but Carvajal was inexorable.
   Learning while at Guamanga, that Centeno had retired through the desert to Casabindo as he was unable to cope with Toro, Carvajal was satisfied that the affaire of the insurgent party were in a fair train in Las Charcas, where his presence was not now needed, and determined therefore to return to Lima. He was besides induced to take this step in consequence of a difference which subsisted between Toro and himself, occasioned by the charge of lieutenant general under Gonzalo having originally belonged to Toro, of which he had been deprived in favour of Carvajal. He feared therefore, lest Toro, on his victorious return from Las Charcas, being at the head of a much stronger force, might renew their former quarrel. Carvajal had likewise received letters from some inhabitants of Lima, remarking the lukewarmness of Aldana to the cause of Gonzalo Pizarro, and requesting his presence to place affairs at that city on a more secure footing. He returned therefore to Lima; but learning shortly afterwards the successful return of Centeno against De Toro, he again collected his troops and prepared to march against Centeno. With this view, he had his standards solemnly consecrated, not forgetting to impose fresh exactions on the inhabitants of Lima. On this occasion, he designated his army, The happy army of Liberty, against the Tyrant Centeno.
   Before leaving Lima, he sent off messengers to Cuzco by way of the mountain, but chose to march by the route of the plain or low country of Peru to Arequipa, exacting money from the inhabitants wherever he passed. At Arequipa he received letters from the magistrates of Cuzco and De Toro, earnestly requesting his immediate presence in that city; whence, as being the capital of the kingdom, it was proper that the army should march against the rebels. They assured him of being there provided with considerable reinforcements of men arms and horses, and that all the principal persons of the city were ready to accompany him on the expedition: adding, that being himself a citizen of Cuzco it seemed reasonable he should honour that city by his presence. By these and other considerations he was induced to march for Cuzco, though still entertaining some distrust and even fear of Toro, who he was informed had often spoken against him in his absence. When De Toro was informed of the approach of Carvajal to Cuzco, he made every necessary preparation for reinforcing the army, and providing for the intended expedition against Centeno; yet could not conceal his dissatisfaction, that he who had begun the war, and had already suffered great fatigues, and even had gained material advantages, should be superseded by another commander whom he must now obey, and more especially that it should be Carvajal who was put over him, with whom he had been already engaged in disputes. He dissembled however as much as possible, and concealed his resentment, saying publickly that his only wish was for the fortunate management of affairs, whoever might command. Yet with all his caution, he could not so carefully conceal his sentiments, but that he occasionally dropped expressions of resentment.
   The discontent of De Toro was well known to the inhabitants of Cuzco, yet they were in hopes that Carvajal would set every thing to rights on his arrival. Carvajal having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, which he was to enter next day at the head of two hundred men, part cavalry and part musqueteers, De Toro was very anxious to muster all that were able to carry arms; and from this measure, and the precautions he took that every one should be in the most perfect equipment, and the troops steady in their ranks, it was suspected that he entertained some evil design. De Toro was thus posted with his troops, as if in ambush, in the way by which Carvajal had to march into the city. As these circumstances were made known to Carvajal, he ordered his troops to march in close array, and even ordered their arms to be loaded with ball, prepared for whatever might happen. On entering the city, De Toro and his troops were seen on one side, as if ready to dispute the passage. Carvajal halted his men, and the two parties remained for some time observing each other with mutual distrust. At length, as neither side seemed inclined to commence hostilities, both parties broke their ranks, and intermingled as friends.
   Carvajal was exceedingly irritated against De Toro for his conduct on this occasion, but dissembled till he had entered into Cuzco, where he was received in the most honourable manner. A few days afterwards, he caused four of the principal inhabitants to be arrested, and ordered them to instant execution, without consulting De Toro, or even assigning any reason for this cruel and arbitrary proceeding. Some of those whom he put to death were among the most intimate friends of De Toro, who deemed it prudent and necessary to be silent on the occasion. The unexpected cruelty of Carvajal occasioned much astonishment and consternation among the inhabitants of Cuzco, insomuch that none of them dared to refuse accompanying him on the expedition, and he was enabled to leave Cuzco at the head of three hundred well appointed soldiers with which he marched by Collao in the way towards the province of Las Charcas in search of Centeno. As the latter had a considerably stronger force, it was believed by many that Carvajal would be unsuccessful in this expedition, more especially as most of his followers acted more from force than good will, because he allowed them no pay and treated them with much severity. In his whole conduct and deportment Carvajal acted in a brutal and passionate manner, evincing himself on all occasions the enemy of good men; for he was a bad Christian, constantly addicted to blasphemy, and of a cruel and tyrannical disposition, insomuch that it was generally expected his own people would put him to death to rid themselves of his tyrannous and oppressive conduct. Besides all this, it was obvious to many, that right and justice were on the side of Centeno, who was a man of honour and probity, and, being exceedingly rich, had both the power and inclination to reward his followers. It is necessary to quit Carvajal and his expedition for the present, that we may relate the events which took place at Quito.
   We have already mentioned that Gonzalo Pizarro pursued the viceroy from San Miguel to Quito, a distance of 150 leagues or 600 miles, with much perseverance and rapidity, insomuch that almost every day the light armed men belonging to the two armies had opportunities of speaking with each other. During the whole of that long march, neither party had an opportunity to unsaddle their horses. Those belonging to the viceroy, owing to the necessity they were under of escaping from a force so much superior, were even more alert than their pursuers. When at any time they stopped to take a short rest during the night, they slept on the ground in their clothes, holding their horses by the halters, without wasting time in fixing up piquets, or making any of the usual preparations for accommodating themselves and horses during the night. It is true that piquets are seldom used in the sands of Peru for the horses, as it would be necessary to drive these very deep to take sufficient hold; and as there are no trees to be met with in many parts of that country for making piquets, necessity has introduced a substitute in some measure equivalent: For this purpose each horseman has a small bag, which he fills with sand and burries in a hole of sufficient depth, having one end of the halter fixed to the bag, the hole being afterwards filled up and pressed well down to prevent the bag from being drawn up by the efforts of the horse. But on this urgent occasion, the troops of the viceroy did not take time for this measure, but held the halters in their hands, that they might be ready to mount and set out the moment it was necessary by the approach of their pursuers.
   In this long march, both the pursuers and the pursued suffered exceedingly from want of provisions; more especially the Pizarrians, as the viceroy used the precaution of removing the curacas and Indians from all the country through which he passed, that his enemy might find every part of the country deserted and unprovided with any means of subsistence. During this precipitate retreat, the viceroy carried along with him eight or ten of the best horses he had been able to procure, which were led by Indians for his own particular use; and when any of these became so tired as to be unable to proceed, he ordered them to be hamstrung, to prevent them from being useful to the enemy. While on this march in pursuit of the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro was joined by Captain Bachicao, who now returned from Tierra Firma with a reinforcement of three hundred and fifty men and a large quantity of artillery, having disembarked, from twenty vessels which he had procured, on a part of the coast as near as possible to Quito, and had made his way in such a manner across the mountains that he got to Quito rather before Gonzalo. On the junction of Bachicao, Gonzalo found himself at the head of more than eight hundred men, among whom were many of the principal people in South America, both townsmen or burgesses, planters, and soldiers. Owing to this large reinforcement, Gonzalo Pizarro found himself in such a state of tranquil security at Quito as hardly any usurper or tyrant had ever before enjoyed; as besides that this province abounded in provisions of every kind, several rich mines of gold had been recently discovered; and as most of the principal people of the province were either now along with the viceroy, or had attached themselves to him while at Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro appropriated all their Indians to himself, employing them in the collection of gold. From the Indians belonging to the treasurer, Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla, he procured about 800 marks17 of gold in the course of eight months; besides that there were other repartimientos of greater value, and that he appropriated all the revenues and rights belonging to the crown, and even pillaged the tombs of the ancient sovereigns of Quito in search of treasure.
   After a short stay at Quito, Gonzalo learnt that the viceroy had halted at the city of Parto, about forty leagues from thence, at the frontiers of the government of Benalcazar. Resolving to follow him, Gonzalo pushed on as he had done from San Miguel, and the light troops of the hostile parties had some interference at a place called Rio Caliente. When the viceroy was informed of the approach of Gonzalo, he hastily quitted Parto and retired to the city of Popayan at a greater distance from Quito, and was pursued by Gonzalo for twenty leagues beyond Parto. As Gonzalo found that he would have to march through a desert country, altogether destitute of provisions, he here discontinued the pursuit, and returned to Quito. Perhaps this was the longest and hottest pursuit ever made in war; as, counting from La Plata whence Gonzalo first set out, to Parto where the pursuit was discontinued, the distance is not less than 700 large Spanish leagues, or 2800 miles.
   On his return to Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro was so puffed up with the success which had hitherto attended him, that he frequently spoke of his majesty with much disrespect; alleging that the king would be reduced to the necessity of granting him the government of Peru, and even went so far as to say, if this favour were denied him, he would throw off his allegiance. For the most part indeed, he concealed these ambitious sentiments, pretending that he was always ready to submit to the orders of his majesty; but all his officers were satisfied that he meant to assert an independent dominion, and publickly avowed these absurd and criminal pretensions. On returning from Parto, he remained a long while at Quito, continually feasting and rejoicing; he and his adherents abandoning themselves to every degree of licence and debauchery, particularly in regard to the sex. It is even asserted that Gonzalo caused a citizen of Quito to be assassinated, whose wife he publickly lived with, and that he hired a Hungarian soldier, named Vincente Pablo to execute this infamous deed. This man was afterwards hanged at Valladolid, in the year 1551, by a sentence of the royal council of the Indies.
   As Pizarro found himself in the command of a strong body of excellent troops, which appeared entirely attached to his service, some of their own accord and others by constraint, he persuaded himself that no one could oppose him, or prevent him from enjoying his present elevation in peace and tranquillity. He was even convinced that the emperor would be obliged to treat him with cautious respect, and must find himself under the necessity of entering into a compromise. It was at this time, when Gonzalo considered himself as unresisted master of all Peru, that Centeno revolted from his tyrannical usurpation in the province of Las Charcas, and that he dispatched Carvajal for the reduction of that loyal officer, as has been already mentioned.

   Having continued a long time at Quito without receiving any intelligence of the measures which were taken by the viceroy, Gonzalo became anxious to learn what was become of him. Some alleged that he would return to Spain by way of Carthagena, while others gave it as their opinion that he would retire to Tierra Firma, to keep possession of the isthmus, to assemble troops, arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to wait for orders from his majesty; and a third opinion was that he would wait for these orders in Popayan, where he now was. No one suspected that he would be able to collect a sufficient number of troops in that place to enable him to undertake any enterprise for recovering his authority in Peru; yet it seemed advisable to Gonzalo and his officers to take possession of the Tierra Firma, on purpose to occupy the only direct passage between Spain and Peru. For this purpose, Gonzalo Pizarro appointed Pedro Alfonzo De Hinojosa to command the fleet which Bachicao had collected, giving him a detachment of two hundred and fifty men to enable him to occupy the isthmus, and directed him while on his voyage to Panama to coast along the province of Buenaventura and the mouth of the river of San Juan.
   Hinojosa set out immediately on this expedition, dispatching a single vessel, commanded by Captain Rodrigo de Carvajal direct for Panama, with letters from Gonzalo to some of the principal inhabitants of that city urging them to favour his designs. In these letters, he pretended that he was exceedingly displeased on hearing of the violence and rapacity with which Bachicao had conducted himself towards the inhabitants of Panama, in direct contradiction to his orders, which were to land the Doctor Texada without doing injury to any one. He informed them that Hinojosa was now on his way to their city, for the express purpose of indemnifying all those who had been injured by Bachicao; and desired them not to be under any apprehension of Hinojosa, although accompanied by a considerable force, as it was necessary for him to be on his guard against the viceroy and some of his officers, who were understood to be then in the Tierra Firma levying soldiers for their master. On the arrival of Rodrigo Carvajal at a place named Ancona about three leagues from Panama, he learnt that two officers belonging to the viceroy, Juan de Guzman and Juan Yllanez, were then in Panama, having been sent to that place to procure recruits and to purchase arms, with which they were to have gone to Popayan. They had already enrolled above an hundred soldiers, and had procured a considerable quantity of arms, among which were five or six small field-pieces; but, instead of going with these to join the viceroy, they remained to defend Panama against Gonzalo Pizarro, who they expected might send a force to occupy that important station.
   As Rodrigo Carvajal had only fifteen men along with him, he did not think it prudent to land in person; but sent secretly by night one of his soldiers to deliver the letters with which he was entrusted. The soldier accordingly delivered them to the inhabitants for whom they were addressed, who immediately communicated them to the magistrates and the officers of the viceroy. The soldier was taken into custody, from whom they learnt the coming of Hinojosa, and the orders with which he was entrusted. Upon this intelligence, they armed the whole population of Panama, and fitted out two brigantines which were sent off on purpose to capture Rodrigo Carvajal; but, as his messenger did not return, Carvajal suspected what had actually taken place, and set sail for the Pearl Islands to wait the arrival of Hinojosa, by which means he escaped from the brigantines. Pedro de Casaos was then governor of the Tierra Firma; and to be in readiness to defend his province against Hinojosa, he went immediately to Nombre de Dios, where he collected all the musquets and other arms he could procure, arming all the inhabitants of that place who were fit for service, whom he carried along with him to Panama, making every preparation in his power for defence. The two captains belonging to the viceroy, Guzman and Yllanez, likewise put their troops in order for resistance, and at first there was some jealousy between them and Casaos as to the supreme command; but it was at length agreed that Casaos should command in chief, as governor of the province, while they retained the immediate authority over their own men, and bore their own standards. Differences had subsisted for some time between these officers and the governor, because he had repressed some disorderly conduct in which they had indulged, and had advised them to set off with their men to the assistance of the viceroy for whom they were employed to levy troops; while they were averse from that measure, and finding themselves at the head of a respectable force, they made light of the orders of Casaos, and refused to obey him: But the necessity they were now under of providing for their mutual defence, occasioned them to enter into an accommodation of their disputes.
   After the dispatch of Carvajal to Panama, as already mentioned, Hinojosa set sail with ten vessels, and continued along the coast to the north till he arrived at Buenaventura, a small sea port at the mouth of the river San Juan which forms the southern boundary of Popayan, the government of Benalcazar. He proposed to learn at this place the situation and intentions of the viceroy, and to have seized any vessels that might be at this harbour, to prevent them from being employed by the viceroy for returning to Peru. On arriving at Buenaventura, Hinojosa sent some soldiers on shore, who brought off eight or ten of the inhabitants, from whom he learnt that the viceroy remained at Popayan, engaged in assembling troops and military stores for attempting to return into Peru; and that finding Yllanez and Guzman delayed their return from Panama, he had sent off his brother Vela Nunnez with several corporals on their way to Panama, to expedite the transmission of such reinforcements as could be procured, and had supplied him for that purpose with all the money belonging to the king at Popayan. Hinojosa was likewise informed that Vela Nunnez had the charge of a bastard son of Gonzalo Pizarro of twelve years old, who was found by the viceroy at Quito, and was now sent away to Panama, in the hope that the merchants of Panama might ransom him at a high price to acquire the good will of Gonzalo. The individual who communicated all this information added that the viceroy had employed a number of Indians to cut down a quantity of timber, which was to be conveyed to Buenaventura, on purpose to build a small vessel for the accommodation of Vela Nunnez; who must now be within a short distance of Buenaventura, and had sent this person before to inquire if he might come in safety to that place.
   On receiving this intelligence, Hinojosa landed two confidential officers with a party of soldiers, giving them orders to take two several routes into the interior, as pointed out by the informant, on purpose to take Vela Nunnez. Accordingly, one of these officers came up with Vela Nunnez, and the other got hold of Rodrigo Mexia and Saavedra with the son of Gonzalo Pizarro18. Both of these parties carried considerable sums of money, which was pillaged by the soldiers of Hinojosa; and the prisoners were brought on board the vessels, where great rejoicings were made for the happy success of this enterprize, by which their acquisition of Panama must be facilitated, and because they had done especial good service to Gonzalo by the liberation of his son.
   Hinojosa now resumed his voyage, in the course of which he fell in with Rodrigo de Carvajal, who gave him an account of the situation of affairs at Panama, and recommended the propriety of using judicious measures against that place, as it was provided for defence. Hinojosa accordingly appeared before Panama with eleven ships and two hundred and fifty soldiers. At this time there were more than five hundred men in Panama, all tolerably well armed, who were drawn, out under the command of Casaos to oppose the landing of the Pizarrians. But among these there were many merchants and tradesmen, little adapted for war, who hardly knew how to use their weapons, and many of whom were even unable to fire off a musquet. Many among them had no intention of fighting or of opposing the descent of the insurgents of Peru, whose arrival they were disposed to consider as more advantageous than prejudicial. The merchants expected to be able to sell their commodities, and the tradesmen were in hope of procuring profitable employment, each according to his occupation. Besides, the rich merchants had partners or factors who resided in Peru, and had charge of their most valuable effects; and were afraid, if they concurred in opposing Hinojosa, that Gonzalo Pizarro might revenge himself by seizing their goods and maltreating their partners and factors. Those who were principally inclined to oppose the landing of Hinojosa, were Pedro Casaos the governor, Guzman and Yllanez the captains belonging to the viceroy, Arias de Azevedo, Juan Fernandez de Rebollido, Andrew de Arayza, Juan de Zabala, Juan Vendrel, and some other considerable inhabitants of Panama; some from principles of loyalty, others from fear of future evils, lest Hinojosa might act with the same violence as had been done by Bachicao.
   Finding himself resisted, Hinojosa landed with two hundred men about two leagues from Panama, towards which place he marched close along the shore, being, protected on one flank by a range of rocks from the attack of cavalry, and on the other by the boats of his squadron armed with some pieces of artillery. Fifty of his soldiers were left on board for the defence of the ships, and orders were given to hang up Vela Nunnez and the other prisoners whenever the enemy were seen to attack him. Casaos marched with all his troops from Panama to meet Hinojosa, with the determination of giving battle: But when the hostile parties were almost within musquet shot and ready to engage, the whole priests and monks of Panama interposed between in procession, having their crucifixes veiled and every other demonstration of mourning, and prevailed on both sides to agree to a truce for that day, that endeavours might be used to bring about an accommodation. For this purpose negotiators were appointed on both sides; Don Balthasar de Castilia, son of the Conde de Gomera, was named by Hinojosa, and Don Pedro de Cabrera on the part of Casaos, and hostages were mutually interchanged.
   The deputy of Hinojosa affected to be astonished at the opposition of the governor and inhabitants of Panama, since he not only meant no harm to any one, but had come expressly to repair the injuries which had formerly been done by Bachicao, to purchase such provisions and clothing as they wanted, and to repair their ships; declaring that their only object was to oblige the deposed viceroy to return to Spain, pursuant to the orders of the royal audience, as his continuance in the country occasioned perpetual discord in Peru. But, as the viceroy was not there, Hinojosa intended to make only a short stay in the place, having orders from Gonzalo to offer no injury to any one unless attacked, in which case he must defend himself as he best could. The opposite party alleged that the presence of Hinojosa in warlike guise was sufficient to excite suspicion; since, even allowing the government of Gonzalo in Peru to be legitimate as they pretended, he had no jurisdiction in Panama, and had no right to direct the proceedings of any one at that place. That Bachicao had formerly come among them under pretence of peace, yet had committed all those violences and injuries, which Hinojosa now pretended he was come to repair. After a long conference, it was at length agreed that Hinojosa should be permitted to take up his residence in Panama for thirty days, accompanied by fifty soldiers to serve as a guard for his personal safety; but that the fleet and all the other soldiers of his party should repair to the Pearl Islands, where workmen and all necessaries for the reparation of the ships could be procured; and that at the expiry of these thirty days, Hinojosa and his armament were to return to Peru.
   On the conclusion of this convention, which was confirmed by mutual oaths and the interchange of hostages, Hinojosa took up his residence in Panama with a guard of fifty picked men, and hired a house in which he kept open table for every one who pleased to visit him, all of whom he allowed to divert themselves in play or otherwise as they pleased. By this procedure, he gained over most of the soldiers of Yllanez in a few days, and many other idle fellows joined themselves secretly to his party. It was even said that all these men had previously engaged by letter to have gone over to him if he and the governor had come to a battle on the former occasion. Indeed the governor and other principal persons of Panama had been chiefly induced to agree to the present accommodation by distrust of their soldiers, who were all eager for an opportunity of getting to Peru. By the above-mentioned means, Hinojosa soon saw himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, while the captains Yllanez and Guzman were almost deserted by all their men. As they saw likewise that the convention was in other respects ill observed, they secretly withdrew with fifteen men who yet remained, and endeavoured to get to Carthagena. Yllanez was taken soon afterwards by one of Hinojosas officers; on which he entered into the service of Gonzalo Pizarro, and was afterwards engaged on that side in the engagement at Nombre de Dios against Verdugo, to be afterwards related. Hinojosa continued to reside in Panama, where no one dared to oppose him. He increased the number of his troops from day to day, and kept them under excellent discipline, without allowing them to do injury to any of the inhabitants; neither did he intermeddle in any thing whatever except what concerned his troops. At this time Don Pedro de Cabrera and his son-in-law Hernan Mexia de Guzman, who had been banished from Peru by the viceroy, resided in Panama; and these two gentlemen were sent by Hinojosa, with a party of soldiers, to keep possession of the port of Nombre de Dios, which was of great importance to his security, and whence he might receive early intelligence from Spain and other places.
   Melchior Verdugo, an inhabitant of the city of Truxillo, was one of the richest men in Peru, being proprietor of the entire province of Caxamarca. On the arrival of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela, Verdugo, who was originally from the same city in Spain, engaged heartily in his service, and continued in his suite at Lima, till the time when the viceroy proposed to dismantle that city and retire to Truxillo. At that period he commanded Verdugo to go before, that he might secure possession of Truxillo, with orders to levy soldiers and provide arms; and Verdugo accordingly embarked all his baggage and effects, intending to have set sail on the very day when the viceroy was imprisoned. As all the vessels at the port of Lima were then detained, Verdugo was unable to proceed; and, as Verdugo was particularly obnoxious to Gonzalo and his partizans, on account of his known attachment to the viceroy, he was one of the twenty-five who were committed to prison by Carvajal on his arrival at Lima, when De Baro and several others were hanged, as formerly related. For a long while afterwards he was in continual danger of being put to death; but at length Gonzalo granted him a pardon, though he still entertained suspicions of his conduct, but had no convenient opportunity of getting rid of him, till the departure of Carvajal against Centeno, when it was proposed by the lieutenant-general to have surprised him while at Truxillo, as formerly mentioned: But having some suspicions of his intention, Verdugo saved himself by flight, and concealed himself among his Indians in the province of Caxamarca.
   After Carvajal quitted Truxillo, Verdugo returned to that city; but as he expected Gonzalo might soon become master of that place, and would make him feel the effects of his displeasure, he resolved to abandon the country, yet wished to do it in such a manner as might distress Gonzalo as much as possible. While waiting a favourable opportunity for this, he made every preparation in his power for his intended enterprize, collecting as many men in his service as he possibly could, and employed workmen secretly to construct musquets, iron chains, fetters, and manacles. At this time a vessel arrived from Lima in the harbour of Truxillo, on which Verdugo sent for the master and pilot, under pretence of purchasing some of their commodities; and on their arrival at his house he confined them in a deep dungeon which he had previously prepared. After this, he returned to his chamber, causing his legs to be swathed with bandages, under pretence of certain malignant warts or ulcers to which he was subject, and sat down at one of his windows which looked towards the public square in which the magistrates and principal inhabitants used to assemble every day. When the magistrates came as usual to the square, he requested them to come into his house, as he wished to execute certain deeds in their presence, and the disorder in his legs rendered him unable to go out. Immediately on entering, he caused them to be carried into the dungeon, where they were deprived of their badges of office and put in chains. Leaving them under the guard of six musqueteers, he returned to the window of his chamber, whence he gradually enticed about twenty of the principal citizens into his house, all of whom he put in chains and fetters. He then went out into the city accompanied by a guard of soldiers, and proclaimed the king with much loyal solemnity, making prisoners of all who presumed to oppose him; which were very few, as Gonzalo had carried off most of the inhabitants on his expedition to Quito. Having thus made himself master of the city, and returned to his house, he addressed his prisoners, whom he reviled for having embraced the party of Gonzalo, and declared that he was resolved to withdraw from under the usurpation of the tyrant to join the viceroy, and meant to take along with him all the men and arms he was able to procure. For this purpose, he demanded that all his prisoners should contribute in proportion to their abilities, as it was quite reasonable they should give assistance to the royal cause, having frequently made large contributions to the usurper. He insisted therefore that every one of them should instantly subscribe for such sums as they were able to furnish, all of which were to be paid immediately, as he was otherwise resolved to carry them all along with him as prisoners. Every one of them accordingly agreed to advance such sums of money as they were able to procure, which were all instantly paid.
   Having brought this contrivance to a favourable issue, Verdugo made an agreement with the master and pilot of the vessel, and had every thing that could be useful or necessary carried on board. He then carried all his prisoners in irons in carts or waggons to the shore, and embarked with about twenty soldiers, and a considerable sum of money, partly exacted from the inhabitant, partly from the royal funds belonging to the city, and partly, from his own extensive revenues. Leaving his prisoners still in fetters on the carriages, to be liberated as they best might, he set sail along the coast to the northwards. In the course of his voyage he fell in with and captured a vessel belonging to Bachicao, containing a great deal of valuable articles which that officer had acquired by plunder in Tierra Firma, all of which Verdugo divided among his soldiers. He at first inclined to have landed at Buenaventura, on purpose to join the viceroy; but considering the small amount of his force, and the danger of falling in with the fleet of Gonzalo Pizarro, he directed his course for the province of Nicaragua, where he landed and applied to the principal persons there for assistance against the usurper. Finding small encouragement in that quarter, he addressed himself to the royal audience, which was established on the frontiers of Nicaragua, who promised him protection and aid, and sent for that purpose one of their number, the oydor Ramirez de Alarcon to Nicaragua, with orders to the inhabitants of that city to hold themselves in readiness to march with their arms and horses.
   Intelligence was soon received at Panama of the exploit of Verdugo at Truxillo, and his having gone to Nicaragua; and as Hinojosa suspected he might increase his force in that province so as to be enabled to disturb him in the possession of the Tierra Firma, he sent Alfonso Palamino with two ships and an hundred and eighty musqueteers to endeavour to dislodge Verdugo. Palamino easily took possession of the ship belonging to Verdugo; but as the inhabitants of Grenada and Leon, the two principal cities in the province of Nicaragua assembled in arms, under Verdugo and the licentiate Ramirez, to oppose his landing, and were much superior in number to his troops and provided with cavalry, he found himself unable to land with any prospect of success. After waiting some time in vain, he was obliged to sail back to Panama, taking several vessels along with him which he had captured on the coast, and burning several others which he could not carry away.
   On the departure of Palomino, Verdugo levied about an hundred well armed men, with whom he resolved to give as much interruption as possible to the schemes of the insurgents in the Tierra Firma. With this view he determined to make an attempt on Nombre de Dios, which he learnt was occupied only by a small detachment, which had no suspicion of being attacked. For this purpose, he fitted out three or four small vessels, in which he embarked his troops on the lake of Nicaragua, whence he descended into the gulf of Mexico by the river Chagre, which discharges the waters of that lake into the Atlantic. Finding some trading vessels at the mouth of that river, he received accurate information from their commanders of the state of affairs in Nombre de Dios, the number of the soldiers which occupied that place, and the different quarters in which they were lodged. Taking some of these mariners along with him as guides, he contrived to arrive at Nombre de Dios undiscovered about midnight, and went immediately to the house of Juan de Zabala, in which the captains Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia were quartered with some soldiers; who, roused by the noise, put themselves in a state of defence. Verdugo and his people set the house on fire, so that Mexia and his soldiers, who defended the staircase, were constrained to rush from the house to save themselves from the flames; and as the night was exceedingly dark, they escaped unseen, and saved themselves in the woods near Nombre de Dios, whence they escaped across the isthmus to Panama.
   Hinojosa was much chagrined at this exploit, and determined on revenge; but as he wished to give his conduct on the occasion some appearance of justice, he directed some of the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to enter a regular accusation before the Doctor Ribera, the governor of that place, giving an exaggerated account of the insolent invasion of his government by Verdugo, who without any just pretence, had levied contributions, imprisoned the magistrates, and invaded the town of Nombre de Dios on his own private authority. They were likewise instructed to request Ribera to march in person to chastise the insolence of Verdugo, and Hinojosa offered to accompany him on this expedition with his troops. Ribera, who appears to have been then resident in Panama, agreed to all that was desired, and, accepted the proffered military aid to drive Verdugo from his government; on which Hinojosa and his officers swore to obey his orders as their commander on this expedition, and the troops were put in motion to march across the isthmus. On receiving notice of the approach of Hinojosa, Verdugo disposed his troops to defend the place, and caused the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios to take up arms, in addition to his own men. But as it was obvious that the inhabitants shewed no inclination for fighting, Verdugo suspected they might abandon him while engaged, and came therefore to the resolution of abandoning the town, and took post on the shore near his small barks. He waited for Hinojosa in that situation, having some boats in his rear, which he had seized to enable him to secure his retreat in case of necessity. Immediately on his arrival, Hinojosa attacked Verdugo, and several persons were killed at the first brunt. As the inhabitants of Nombre de Dios who were along with Verdugo, observed their governor acting as commander of the adverse party, they withdrew on one side from the engagement into an adjoining wood; by which the soldiers belonging to Verdugo were thrown into disorder, and they were forced to take to their boats and retreat on board their barks.
   After this repulse, Verdugo took possession of several ships that lay at anchor near Nombre de Dios, the largest of which he armed with some pieces of artillery and endeavoured to cannonade the town. But finding that he could do very little injury to the place, which was situated in a bottom, and as he was in want of provisions, and most of his soldiers had been left on shore, he retired with his small vessels and the ship he had seized to Carthagena, to await a more favourable opportunity of annoying the insurgents. Having restored Nombre de Dios to order, Ribera and Hinojosa left a sufficient garrison in the place, under the command of Don Pedro de Cabrera and Hernan Mexia, and returned to Panama, where they proposed to wait for such orders as might be sent from Spain respecting the troubles in Peru.
   On arriving at Popayan, as formerly related, the viceroy collected all the iron which could be procured in the province, erected forges, and procured workmen, so that in a short time he got two hundred musquets constructed, besides other arms both offensive and defensive, and provided every other species of warlike stores. Learning that the governor, Benalcazar, had detached a brave and experienced officer, named Juan Cabrera, to reduce some refractory Indians, with an hundred and fifty soldiers; the viceroy wrote a letter to Cabrera, in which he gave a detailed account of the insurrection and usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, and of his own determination to restore the kingdom of Peru to allegiance whenever he could collect a sufficient number of troops for that purpose. He earnestly intreated therefore, that Cabrera would immediately join him at Popayan with all his men, that they might commence their march together for Quito, to punish the rebellious usurper. To induce compliance, he represented in strong colours to Cabrera, the great and signal service which he had in his power to perform for the sovereign on this occasion; which likewise would be far more advantageous to his own personal interests, than any which could accrue from the expedition in which he was now engaged; as, on the defeat of Pizarro, he would be entitled to partake in the distribution of the lands belonging to Gonzalo and his partizans, and he might depend on being gratified with ample possessions for himself and his followers in the best districts of Peru. Farther to encourage Cabrera, the viceroy informed him of the events which had lately occurred in the south of Peru, where Centeno had erected the royal standard at the head of a respectable force; so that the present conjuncture was extremely favourable for an attack on Gonzalo, who could hardly resist when pressed from both extremities of the kingdom at once; and besides, that the inhabitants of Peru were now quite weary of the tyrannical violence and extortion of Gonzalo, and would doubtless revolt against him on the first favourable opportunity. As an additional inducement to Cabrera to join him, the viceroy sent him an order by which he was authorized to take from the royal coffers at Carthagena, Encelme, Cali, Antiochia, and other places, to the extent of 30,000 pesos for the pay and equipment of his troops; and as Cabrera acted under the orders of Benalcazar, he procured letters to him from that governor by which he was commanded immediately to obey the requisition of the viceroy. On receiving these dispatches, Cabrera immediately secured the funds which he was authorized to take, which he divided among his men, and set out with all possible expedition to join the viceroy at Popayan with an hundred well appointed soldiers. The viceroy had likewise sent orders for reinforcements from the new kingdom of Grenada, the province of Carthagena, and other places, so that his troops daily increased; and having learnt the capture of his brother Vela Nunnez, and the loss of Yllanez and his troops, he had no expectation of procuring any additional reinforcements.
   At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno, leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his march for the south after a general muster and review of his army. Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer. Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who, having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march, and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under pretence of falling sick.
   On receiving intelligence of these circumstances, which he implicitly believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito, satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully were all the passes guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary, Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by means of the Indians called Cagnares, a cunning and intelligent race. Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito, Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among which were many of the principal persons in Peru, his soldiers being inured to war, accustomed to hardships and fatigue, and full of confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained. Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy, particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience, and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives, to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause of the insurgents

   On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes, or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder19. Learning that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was now Saturday the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse, each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.
   At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was accompanied by the licentiate Benedict Suarez de Carvajal brother to the commissary Yllan Suarez de Carvajal who had formerly been put to death at Lima in presence of the viceroy. At that former period Benedict was on his journey from Cuzco to Lima, intending to have joined the viceroy against Gonzalo, and had arrived within twenty leagues of Lima when he learnt the murder of his brother, after which he dared not to trust himself in that city until the viceroy had been deposed and sent on board ship. He was afterwards made prisoner by Gonzalo, who was even on the point of putting him to death; but on setting out for Quito, Gonzalo took him into favour. Carvajal now followed him with good will against the viceroy, upon whom he was eager to take signal vengeance for the unmerited death of his brother; and was even followed on this occasion by about thirty of his friends and relations, who formed a separate company under his immediate command.
   The viceroy had arrived at a village called Tuza, about twenty leagues from Quito, when he learnt that Gonzalo Pizarro was returned to that city, and was now at the head of about seven hundred men. Believing himself however in sufficient force to attempt the recovery of his authority in Peru, the viceroy communicated this intelligence to his principal officers, whom he commanded to have every thing in readiness for battle. On his arrival at the river within two leagues of Quito, and in presence of the enemy who occupied the slope of a hill on the other side, he determined to endeavour to get into their rear, for which purpose he advanced with his troops by a road in a different direction from that on which the insurgents were posted, expecting to derive great advantages from this measure, as the whole infantry of Gonzalo, which formed his principal force, were posted on the slope of the hill directly in front, and his rear-guard of cavalry could have no suspicion of being liable to attack. The viceroy accordingly began his march on the night of the 15th January, leaving his camp standing with all his Indians and dogs, and with fires burning in many places, to deceive the enemy into a belief that he still remained in the camp. Marching therefore in perfect silence by the road which had been pointed out to him for gaining the rear of the insurgents, he expected to have attained his object before day: But as the road, had not been frequented for a long time, he encountered so many obstructions and difficulties, in consequence of the road being broken up in many places, that when day broke he was still a league from the enemy, by which all hope or opportunity of surprizing them was entirely lost. In this dilemma, he came to the resolution of marching straight upon Quito, in which there were very few to oppose him, and which was in no situation to give any resistance. He was in hopes of finding several loyal subjects in that place, who might have contrived to elude following the usurper to the field, and might now join his army, and he expected to find some arms and military stores left there by Gonzalo. On arriving at Quito, the soldiers of the viceroy learnt that Gonzalo was present with all his troops, which circumstance had hitherto been carefully concealed from their knowledge.
   In the morning of the 16th, the scouts of Gonzalo were surprised to hear so little noise in the camp of the viceroy; and having cautiously advanced, they learnt from the Indian followers of the royalist army in what manner the viceroy had passed the insurgents during the night. The scouts therefore made haste to apprize Gonzalo of this event, who learnt soon afterwards by messengers from Quito that the viceroy had taken possession of that city. Gonzalo therefore immediately marched for Quito, determined to give battle to the viceroy without delay; and although the viceroy was perfectly aware of the advantages possessed by Pizarro in the superior discipline and equipment of his troops, he courageously resolved to run the risk of battle, and even to expose himself personally to all its dangers. In this determination, he boldly marched from the city of Quito directly towards the enemy, as if assured of gaining a victory. To Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, who commanded his first company with the royal standard, he assigned the office of lieutenant-general, commanding every one to obey him in that capacity. Cepeda and Bazan led the cavalry, and Ahumada carried the great standard. Sancho Sanchez de Avila, Hernandez Giron, Pedro Heredia, and Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla were captains of infantry, over which Juan de Cabrera commanded as major-general. The viceroy was earnestly requested by all his officers not to engage in the front of battle as he intended, but to take post in the rear with fifteen horsemen, whence he might send succours to wherever they might be required; yet, when the engagement was about to commence, the viceroy rode up to the vanguard, and took his place beside the lieutenant-general, Don Alfonzo, in front of the royal standard. On this occasion the viceroy was mounted on a grey horse, dressed in an upper garment of white muslin, with large slashes, shewing an under vest of crimson satin fringed with gold. Just before beginning the engagement, he addressed his troops to the following effect: "I do not pretend, my loyal friends, to encourage you by my words and example, as I rather look for an example of bravery from your courageous efforts, and am fully convinced you will do your duty as brave and faithful subjects of our gracious sovereign. Knowing therefore your inviolable fidelity to the king our common master, I have only to say that we are engaged in the cause of God." These last words he repeated several times, exclaiming, "It is the cause of God! It is the cause of God!"
   After this short exhortation, the viceroy with Don Alfonzo and Bazan advanced to the charge, being opposed on the other side by the licentiate Carvajal. Gonzalo Pizarro had likewise intended to have taken post in the front of battle, but his officers insisted upon his remaining in the rear with eight or ten horsemen. In the first charge the cavalry shivered their lances, after which they continued to fight obstinately with swords, battle-axes and war-clubs or maces. In this part of the battle the cavalry of the viceroy were much galled by a line of musqueteers of the adverse army which plied them in flank. While fighting bravely, the viceroy beat down one of the insurgents named Montalva; but immediately afterwards received so severe a blow on the head with a battle-axe from Ferdinand de Torres, that he fell stunned from his horse. Indeed, both he and his horse had been so excessively fatigued by the difficult march of the preceding night, in which they had neither been able to take food or rest, that they were both easily overthrown. While this was passing with the cavalry of the van, the infantry on both sides advanced to engage, setting up such loud shouts, that one would have believed them much more numerous than they were in reality. Juan de Cabrera was slain at the very commencement of this part of the battle. Sancho de Avilla, advanced boldly at the head of his company to attack the enemy, brandishing a two-handed sword, which he employed with so much strength and address that he soon broke through and defeated half of the company by which he was opposed. But as the soldiers of Pizarro were more numerous in this part of the field than those who followed Avilla, he was surrounded on all sides, and he and most of his men slain. Until the death of the viceroy was known, the battle was very bravely contested by his infantry; but as soon as the knowledge of that unfortunate event had spread through their ranks, they lost heart and relaxed in their efforts, and were soon entirely defeated with considerable slaughter. At this time, the licentiate Carvajal observed Pedro de Puelles about to end the life of the unfortunate viceroy, already insensible and almost dead in consequence of the blow he had received from De Torres and a wound from a musquet ball: Carvajal immediately dismounted and cut off his head, saying, "That his only object in joining the party of Gonzalo was to take vengeance for the death of his brother."
   When the victory was completely decided, Gonzalo Pizarro ordered a retreat to be sounded to recal his troops who were engaged in pursuit of the enemy. In this battle, the royalists lost about two hundred men, while only seven were slain on the side of the victors. Pizarro ordered the slain to be buried on the field of battle, and caused the bodies of the viceroy and Sancho de Avilla to be carried to Quito, where they were buried with much solemn pomp, attending himself at the funeral and in mourning20. He soon afterwards ordered ten or twelve of the principal royalists to be hanged, who had taken shelter in the churches of Quito, or had concealed themselves in other places. The oydor Alvarez, Benalcazar governor of Popayan, and Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, were wounded and made prisoners in the battle. Gonzalo intended to have ordered Don Alfonzo to be beheaded; but as he had many friends among the insurgents who interceded for his life, and who assured Gonzalo that he could not possibly recover from his wounds, he was spared. Some time afterwards, Gomez de Alvarado sent notice to Benalcazar that it was intended to administer poison to these three prisoners in the dressings applied to their wounds or in their food; and accordingly he and Don Alfonzo took great precautions to avoid this treachery. As the oydor Alvarez was lodged in the same house with his brother judge Cepeda, he had not in his power to use similar precautions, and died soon after; and every one believed that he was poisoned in some almond soup.
   Finding that he could not get secretly rid of Don Alfonzo as he wished, and having no hope of gaining him over to his party, Pizarro resolved to banish him into Chili, above a thousand leagues from Quito, and to send to the same place Rodrigo de Bonilla the treasurer of Quito, and seven or eight other persons of importance, who had always faithfully accompanied the viceroy under every change of fortune. Gonzalo did not put these men to death, as several of his own partizans interceded for their lives; and he did not deem it prudent to keep them near his person, or to permit them to remain in Peru. These exiles were accordingly sent off for Chili, under the charge of Antonio de Ulloa with a party of soldiers. After a march of more than four hundred leagues, mostly on foot, although their wounds were not entirely healed, these prisoners determined to make an effort to recover their liberty, or to lose their lives in the attempt. They accordingly rose against Ulloa and his men with so much courage and resolution that they succeeded in making him and most of his men prisoners. Being near a sea-port, they contrived by great address to gain possession of a vessel, in which were several soldiers and others of the insurgent party whom they overpowered; and leaving all their prisoners, they embarked without either sailors or pilot, and though none of them were in the least acquainted with navigation, they had the good fortune to reach New Spain.
   Not satisfied with wreaking his vengeance on those of his enemies who had fallen into his hands in consequence of the victory of Quito, Gonzalo sent Guevara to the city of Parto to apprehend some of his enemies who resided in that place, one of whom only was put to death, and all the rest sent into exile. He pardoned Benalcazar, who promised faithfully to become attached to his party, and sent him back to his government of Popayan, with part of the troops he had brought from thence in the service of the viceroy. He likewise assembled all the fugitive troops of the viceroy, to whom he in the first place urged the many causes of displeasure which he had for their past conduct, yet pardoned them as he knew they had either been misled or forced to act against him, and promised, if they served him faithfully in the sequel, that he would treat them as well as those who had been on his side from the beginning, and would reward them equally when the country was restored to peace. He sent off messengers in every direction, to announce the victory he had obtained, and to encourage his partizans, so that his usurpation seemed established in greater security than ever. Captain Alarcon was sent to Panama, to communicate the intelligence to Hinojosa, with orders to bring back along with him Vela Nunnez and the others who had been made prisoners in that quarter.

SECTION V. Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order
   At this period, some of Gonzalo's adherents advised him to send his fleet to scour the coasts of Nicaragua and New Spain, on purpose to take or burn all the vessels which might be found in these parts, by which he would effectually secure himself from any attack by sea. By this means, they alleged, when the dispatches and orders from his majesty should arrive in the Tierra Firma, finding no means of sending these into Peru, the ministers of the crown would be under the necessity of granting him favourable terms of accommodation almost equal to his wishes. Pizarro however had great confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Hinojosa and those who were with him, believing that he might trust implicitly to their vigilance, and refused to follow the measures proposed, as tending to evince too much weakness and want of confidence in the goodness of the cause in which he was engaged. He was besides so puffed up by the victory which he had gained over the viceroy, that he believed himself able to resist any power which could now be brought against him.
   Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that judge and his brother Blas Soto21. Still however this judge retained every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some measure reconciled to the usurper.
   While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms, marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno retired a short space to the other side of the city, taking post on the side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took possession of the tambo of Paria, about a league from the camp of Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal, to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.
   Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched battle, and meaning rather to harass the enemy by means of skirmishes and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon. Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty horsemen to assault the camp of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles; and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.
   Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march, towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo22 Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners. Finding his force daily diminishing, Centeno complained loudly of his officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to endeavour to procure a ship somewhere on the coast, which he was to bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival23. Ribadeneyra fell in with a ship on the coast which was ready to sail for Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for his purpose.
   "In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to pass a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pass, he was confident of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with directions to assail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled, to get beyond the pass in safety. The ambush accordingly remained concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past; after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed multitude of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this unexpected assault, Carvajal continued his march for some time, believing it only a false alarm. The six horsemen therefore continued their assault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the assault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno, and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six horsemen belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal, they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape across the dangerous pass, and even gained considerably in the retreat, as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats, accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno24."
   Centeno arrived soon afterwards at Arequipa, and in less than two days Carvajal arrived there in pursuit. As the vessel procured by Ribadeneyra was not come to that part of the coast, and Centeno had not even received notice of its capture, he determined to dismiss his followers, now reduced to eighty men, that they might endeavour to escape separately, being utterly unable to make head against the enemy who was fast approaching. Centeno, accompanied only by two friends, withdrew, into the mountains, where he remained concealed in a cave till the arrival of the licentiate Gasca, being all the time supplied with provisions by a friendly cacique. On arriving at the coast of Arequipa, Carvajal was informed that Centeno and his people were dispersed; and hearing that Lope de Mendoza was at no great distance with eight or ten of the royalists, he detached one of his officers with twenty mounted musqueteers in pursuit. Mendoza however fled with so much diligence, that although followed for more than eighty leagues, his pursuers were unable to overtake him, and were at last obliged to return. Mendoza continued his retreat beyond the ridge of the Andes, into the eastern plain of the Rio Plata, where we must leave him for the present to continue the narrative of events in Peru.
   Soon after the arrival of Carvajal in Arequipa, the ship which, had been seized by Ribadeneyra appeared on the coast, and Carvajal was informed by some of the soldiers of Centeno who remained at Arequipa of the intention of this vessel, and of the signal which had been agreed, upon between Centeno and Ribadeneyra. Wishing to gain possession of the vessel, Carvajal concealed twenty musqueteers near the coast, and made the appointed signal. Ribadeneyra at first believed that the signal was made by order of Centeno and sent the boat on shore; but having some suspicions of the actual state of affairs, he directed the people in the boat to be extremely cautious against surprize before venturing on shore. They accordingly, refused to land, unless Centeno himself made his appearance; and as this of course could not be complied with, they returned to the ship, with which Ribadeneyra immediately set sail for Nicaragua. As no part of the late force under Centeno remained in the field, Carvajal resolved to take up his residence for some time in the city of La Plata, as he was informed that Centeno and his friends had concealed a large quantity of treasure at that place, and that he might both endeavour to discover that deposit, and might draw as large a sum as possible from the rich mines in that neighbourhood. Carvajal was willing to communicate to Gonzalo a portion of the wealth he expected to acquire in that district, for defraying the expences of the war; but he proposed especially to enrich himself on this occasion, being exceedingly covetous, as has been already remarked. He accordingly went to La Plata, which submitted without resistance, and remained there for a considerable time amassing wealth, till obliged to take the field against Mendoza.
   Lope de Mendoza, as already mentioned, made his escape from Arequipa with a small number of followers, and was pursued for a long way. He for some time followed the line of the coast, and after he had eluded the pursuit of the party sent after him by Carvajal, he and his companions resolved so endeavour to penetrate into the government of Diego de Roias on the Rio Plata, as all the country of Peru had universally submitted to the domination of Gonzalo. For this purpose Mendoza followed the same route which Centeno had formerly taken when retreating from Alfonso de Toro; both because he thought his enemies would not pursue him by that road and because the Indians belonging to Centeno and himself dwelt in that part of the country, and he expected to procure provisions and other assistance from them. While travelling across these deserts, Mendoza met with Gabriel Bermudez, who had accompanied Diego de Roias on his expedition into the country on the Rio Plata. From this person Mendoza was informed of the events which had occurred to the expedition under De Roias, of which the following is an abstract:
   Diego de Roias, Philip Gutierrez and Pedro de Heredia, who went upon this expedition, had to fight their way among hostile Indians, in the course of which De Roias was slain. After his death, violent disputes arose between Francisco de Mendoza who succeeded in the command and the other officers engaged in the expedition, in the course of which Gutierrez was cashiered and banished. They continued after this to prosecute their discoveries all the way to the Rio Plata, receiving information that great riches were to be found in some districts in the neighbourhood, in which there were certain Spaniards who had penetrated into the country by ascending the Rio Plata from the Atlantic, and had formed establishments in the interior. In prosecuting the exploration, of that great river, they had fallen in with some forts which were built by Sebastian Gabota; and reported many other surprizing and wonderful things which they had seen in that country. In the course of their proceedings, Francisco de Mendoza was assassinated by Pedro Heredia, owing to which violent disputes had taken place among them, by which and the smallness of their force they had been rendered unable to proceed in conquering the country, so that at length they had come to the resolution of returning into Peru, that his majesty or the viceroy of that kingdom might nominate a new commander. They were likewise persuaded, when the riches of the country in which they had been came to be known, that they would be able to procure a considerable accession of new adventurers, so as to enable them to atchieve the conquest.
   In the course of their expedition they asserted that they had penetrated six hundred leagues to the eastwards of La Plata, through a champaign country of very easy access, and tolerably abounding in provisions and water. Bermudez added, that within a very few days they had learnt, from some Indians who occasionally traded into the province of Las Charcas, of the revolt which had taken place in Peru, but had been unable to procure information respecting the causes of this insurrection or as to who were chiefly engaged in it; for which reason he had been sent on before to inquire into these circumstances, and had received orders from the captains and other principal persons in the expedition, to offer their services to the party that acted for the royal interests, in which cause they might be of material importance, as they had a considerable number of excellent horses and plenty of arms. After the conclusion of this narrative, Mendoza gave Bermudez an account of all the late events in Peru; on which, in, virtue of the commission with which he had been entrusted, Bermudez promised in the name of all his companions to march against the lieutenant-general.
   Lope Mendoza and Bermudez went after this to meet the troops which were returning from the Rio Plata, which were at no great distance. When they were informed of the situation of affairs in Peru, they received Lope with every demonstration of respect, and confirmed the offers of assistance which Bermudez had already made in their name, declaring their resolution to devote themselves heartily to the service of the king. Lope de Mendoza gave them hearty commendations for their loyalty, and represented to them how honourable and praiseworthy it was to exert their utmost endeavours in the cause of their lawful sovereign; assuring them that they might all depend upon being amply provided for, when the country was restored to obedience. Lope de Mendoza was unanimously received as their chief, and conducted them to the village of Pocona, about forty leagues to the north-east of La Plata; whence he sent some confidential persons to certain secret places where he and Centeno had hidden above a thousand marks of silver under ground. On recovering this treasure, he proposed to divide it among those persons who had so nobly offered to follow his orders; but most of them refused his preferred bounty, either because they were already sufficiently rich, or because hitherto the soldiers who had been engaged in the wars of Peru had been unused to any regular pay, and only accepted money to answer their immediate wants, and to provide themselves with horses and arms. Even the lowest soldier, in those days expected, when the enterprizes of their leaders succeeded, to be rewarded for his services in repartitions or advantageous establishments in the country, by which they flattered themselves to acquire riches, so great was the reputation of the richness of Peru. By means of these men from the Rio Plata, Lope Mendoza found himself unexpectedly at the head of an hundred and fifty well mounted cavalry; all excellently armed and equipped for service. It was a great misfortune to the royal cause, that Centeno was now concealed, instead of having retreated into the interior along with Mendoza as he had done formerly; as if he had now been at the head of the royalists, with this important reinforcement, affairs might have taken a better turn than they actually did.
   While Carvajal was on his way from Arequipa for the city of La Plata, he received intelligence of the success of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, and that all Peru was entirely reduced under his command. He resolved therefore to repair to La Plata, as formerly mentioned, intending to regulate the affairs of the province of Las Charcas, and to collect treasure. On his arrival however at Paria on his way to La Plata he received intelligence of the arrival of the troops from the Rio Plata and of their junction with Lope Mendoza. Being informed at the same time that these unexpected opponents were by no means united among themselves, and that they marched very carelessly in separate and unconnected detachments, most of which refused to acknowledge any one as their commander, he determined to set out against them with the utmost diligence, that he might fall upon them in their present divided state. Being rejoined by the detachment which had pursued Lope Mendoza, and having put his men in order for a fresh expedition, Carvajal set out from La Plata and marched towards the enemy with the utmost possible speed, encouraging his troops by the assurance of an easy and bloodless victory, even asserting that he had received letters from the principal officers among the enemy in which they offered their services to him, so that they would only have the trouble of marching, without any danger of fighting.
   During this march Carvajal was joined by thirty men in addition to his former force, so that he was now at the head of two hundred and fifty men. At length he came in sight of Pocona, which is eighty leagues from Paria, about four o'clock of an afternoon, and made his appearance in good order, on the top of a rising ground within view of Lope de Mendoza, who was then making a distribution of money among such of his new companions as were willing to accept his bounty: Mendoza had already got some intimation of the approach of Carvajal; and as his own force consisted entirely of cavalry, most of whom were persons of some consideration, remarkably well mounted and armed, he drew up his men in good order in a plain at some distance from the village, in which he left the baggage and his money; saying, that he trusted through their bravery to be soon able to recover both, and even to increase their store by that belonging to their enemies. Carvajal immediately descended from the hill he had first taken possession of, and took post in the place which Mendoza had just quitted, which was an inclosare of considerable extent surrounded with walls, in which there were openings in several places. Carvajal chose this as a convenient post for the night, in which the enemy would not be able to attack with their cavalry. On learning that Lope de Mendoza and his men had left their baggage in the town of Pocona, the troops of Carvajal immediately quitted their ranks to go in search of plunder, insomuch that Carvajal was left in his camp with hardly eight men. If Mendoza had availed himself of this opportunity to attack Carvajal, he might have gained an easy victory, and might have boasted of having left his baggage exposed to plunder as a stratagem of war, which on similar occasions had often been the cause of signal victories. On purpose to recall his troops to their duty, Carvajal ordered a false alarm to be sounded, which occasioned the return of the greater part of his men; but so strong was their avidity for spoil that most part of the night was spent before they all returned to the camp.
   At this time there was a secret conspiracy entered into by many of Carvajal's followers, with the intention of putting him to death out of revenge for his harsh and tyrannical conduct towards them, and one Pedro de Avendano, his secretary, in whom he reposed entire confidence was the principal ringleader of the conspirators. To facilitate the execution of this enterprize, Avendano, sent a message by a clever fellow of an Indian to give Mendoza notice of the intentions of the conspirators, and to request he would make an attack upon Carvajal's camp in the course of the night, in the confusion attendant upon which he and the other conspirators might have an opportunity of executing their intended plot. Mendoza had previously determined upon withdrawing about four or five leagues from Pocona, to a level plain in which his cavalry would be able to act with much advantage. But on receiving the message of Avendano, he ordered his men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the camp of Carvajal at the going down of the moon, preferring the obscurity of night in order to avoid the danger of the more numerous firearms of the enemy. At that time he advanced in good order towards the enemy, sending some scouts in advance, who made prisoner of one of Carvajal's soldiers. After interrogating this man, they advanced to the openings of the wall which surrounded the camp, which they found guarded by some musqueteers and pikemen. Mendoza made a brisk attack, but was bravely resisted by the enemy, and so great was the confusion and noise that it was impossible to enter upon any parley, as no one could be heard by reason of the continual firing and the shouts of the combatants.
   Immediately on the alarm, Carvajal used his utmost efforts to get his troops into order and to animate and encourage them to exert themselves against the enemy. At this period, Avendano pointed out Carvajal to a musqueteer who was one of the conspirators, and encouraged him to take a steady aim at the lieutenant-general; but owing to the darkness, the shot missed of its intended effect; and only wounded him in one of his thighs. Finding himself wounded, and being satisfied it had been done by one of his own people, Carvajal deemed it prudent to conceal the circumstance for the present; and retired along with Avendano, of whose fidelity he had no suspicion, on purpose to disguise himself in an old brown coat-and a shabby hat, that he might not be conspicuous, after which he returned to animate his men to defend the camp. Avendano again pointed him out to another conspirator, who fired a second time at Carvajal, but entirely missed his aim. In the meantime the assailants frequently called out to know if Carvajal were dead; but receiving no answer, and finding that all the avenues to the camp were bravely defended, Lope de Mendoza drew off his men. In this night engagement about fourteen were slain on both sides, and several wounded. Carvajal got his wound secretly dressed, so that none of his people knew that such a thing had happened.
   After the cessation of the engagement, one Placentia deserted from Carvajal's camp, and informed Mendoza that all the baggage belonging to Carvajal and his troops had been left at a place which he described about five or six leagues from Pocona, among which was a large quantity of gold and silver, several horses, and some musquets and powder. On this information, Meodoza set off immediately with his troops for that place, guided by the deserter; and marching diligently all the remainder of the night, he arrived quite unexpectedly at the place where Carvajal had secured his baggage; but as the night was exceedingly dark, above seventy of his men lost their way and fell behind. Yet, with such of his people as had kept up with him, Mendoza took possession of the whole without any resistance. After this, being sensible that he was not in sufficient force to cope with Carvajal, Mendoza resolved to retreat by way of the desert in which Centeno had formerly taken shelter, which he did accordingly with about fifty men, all the rest of his troops having fallen behind during the night, as already mentioned. In the prosecution of this plan of retreat, Mendoza and his people reached a certain river about two leagues and a half from Pocona, where they halted to take some rest and refreshment after the excessive fatigues of the past night. Carvajal was soon apprised of the capture of his baggage and the route which Mendoza had taken, and immediately set off in pursuit with about fifty of his best mounted troops; and, using every possible diligence, he came to the place where Mendoza had halted, about noon of the next day, and immediately attacked the royalists, some of whom were asleep, while others were taking food. Thus unexpectedly assailed, and believing that Carvajal was followed by his whole force, the royalists made a feeble resistance, and very soon took to flight, dispersing themselves in every direction. Lope de Mendoza and Pedro de Heredia, with a good many others, were made prisoners and Carvajal immediately ordered these two chiefs, and six or seven other principal persons among the royalists to be beheaded

   On this occasion Carvajal recovered the whole of his own baggage, and got possession of all that had belonged to the enemy, with all of which and the prisoners he had made, he returned to Pocona, engaging to do no injury to those who had escaped from the soldiers in the late attack, and even restored their horses arms and baggage to his prisoners, most of whom he sent off to join Gonzalo Pizarro. On leaving Pocona, he took Alfonso de Camargo and Luis Pardamo along with him, who had formerly fled along with Mendoza, and whose lives he now spared, as they gave him information respecting a considerable treasure which Centeno had concealed under ground near Paria, and where in fact he discovered above 50,000 crowns. After this, he went with his troops to the city of La Plata, where he proposed to reside for some time. At this place he appointed persons in whom he could confide to the offices of judges and magistrates, and dispatched intelligence of the success of his arms over the whole kingdom of Peru. He remained for some time at La Plata, where he collected treasure from all the surrounding country, under pretence of supplying Gonzalo Pizarro, but in reality he retained much the larger share for himself.
   Having thus succeeded, in all his enterprizes and established his authority in the south of Peru on such firm foundations that no opposition remained in the whole country, fortune seemed to determine to exalt him to the summit of his desires by the discovery of the richest mines which had ever been known. Some Indians who belonged to Juan de Villareal, an inhabitant of La Plata, happening to pass over a very high isolated mountain in the middle of a plain, about eighteen leagues from that city, named Potosi, noticed by some indications that it contained mines of silver. They accordingly took away some specimens of the ore for trial, from which they found that the mineral was exceedingly rich in pure silver; insomuch that the poorest of the ore produced eighty marks of pure silver from the quintal of native mineral25, being a more abundant production than any that ever had been heard of before. When this discovery became known in the city of La Plata, the magistrates went to the mountain of Potosi, which they divided among the inhabitants of their city, setting up boundary marks to distinguish the allotments or each person in those places which appeared eligible for workings. So great was the resort to these new mines, that in a short time there were above seven thousand Yanaconas, or Indian labourers, established in the neighbourhood, who were employed by their Christian masters in the various operations of these mines. These men laboured with so much industry, that each Indian, by agreement, furnished two marks or sixteen ounces of silver weekly to their respective masters; and so rich was the mine, that they were able to do this and to retain an equal quantity to themselves26. Such is the nature of the ore extracted from the mineral veins of this mountain, that it cannot be reduced in the ordinary manner by means of bellows, as is customary in other places. It is here smelted in certain small furnaces, called guairas by the Indians, which are supplied with a mixed fuel of charcoal and sheeps dung, and are blown up by the wind only, without the use of any mechanical contrivance.
   These rich mines are known by the name of Potosi, which is that of the district, or province in which the mountain is situated. Owing to the easy labour and great profit experienced by the Indians at these mines, when any of the Yanaconas was once established at this place it was found almost impossible to induce them to leave it or to work elsewhere; and indeed, they were here so entirely concealed from all dangers, and so much exempted from their usual severe drudgery and the unwholesome vapours they had been subjected to in other mines, that they preferred working at Potosi to any other situation. So great was the concourse of inhabitants to Potosi, and the consequent demand for provisions, that the sack of maize was sold for twenty crowns, the sack of wheat for forty, and a small bag of coca for thirty dollars; and these articles rose afterwards to a higher price. Owing to the astonishing productiveness of these new mines, all the others in that part of Peru were speedily abandoned. Even those of Porco, whence Ferdinand Pizarro had formerly procured great riches, were left unwrought. All the Yanaconas who had been employed in searching for gold in the province of Carabaya, and in the auriferous rivers in different parts of southern Peru, flocked to Potosi, where they were able to make vastly more profit by their labour than in any other place. From various indications, those who are most experienced in mining believe that Potosi will always continue productive and cannot be easily exhausted27.
   Carvajal did not fail to take advantage of this favourable discovery, and immediately set about the acquisition of treasure for himself by every means which his present uncontroulable power afforded. In the first place, he appropriated to his own use all the Yanaconas, or Indian labourers in the mines, which had belonged, to such of the inhabitants as had opposed him, or to those who had died or fled from the province. He likewise appropriated to his own use above 10,000 Peruvian sheep, belonging to the Yanaconas of the crown or to individuals, which were employed in transporting provisions for the miners. By these means, he amassed in a short time near 200,000 crowns, all of which he retained to his own use. His soldiers were so much dissatisfied with his conduct, as he gave them no share of his exactions, that they plotted together against him. Luis Pardamo, Alfonso de Comargo, Diego de Balsameda, and Diego de Luxan, with thirty others, who had entered into this conspiracy, had determined to put him to death about a month after his arrival in La Plata from his expedition against Mendoza; but, owing to some obstacles, they had been induced to deter the execution of their enterprize to a future period. By some unknown means the circumstances of this plot came to the knowledge of Carvajal, who put to death the before-mentioned leaders of the conspiracy, and ten or twelve others, and banished all the rest. By these merciless executions, in which he indulged on all occasions, Carvajal inspired so much terror that no one dared in future to make any similar attempt; as he not only punished in the severest manner all who evinced any intention of revolt, but put people to death on the slightest suspicion. Owing to this the loyal servants of his majesty may assuredly be exculpated from the blame which has been imputed to them, for not putting Carvajal to death: In reality, there were many persons sufficiently anxious to have done so, on purpose to escape from the cruel tyranny under which they groaned in secret; and four or five conspiracies were entered into for the purpose, which were all discovered, and occasioned the destruction of at least fifty individuals. By these means every one was terrified from attempting any thing against him, more especially as he gave high rewards to all who communicated any intelligence of the kind, so that all were forced to temporize and to wait in anxious hope of some favourable opportunity to deliver them from his cruel tyranny. Carvajal continued to remain at La Plata, frequently publishing accounts of the successes of Gonzalo Pizarro, to whom he often sent large remittances; derived from his own resources, from the royal fifths which he appropriated, and from the confiscated estates of those whom he put to death, all of which he seized upon, under pretence of supplying funds for prosecuting the war.
   From the 18th of January 1546, the day on which he defeated the viceroy, Gonzalo Pizarro continued to reside at Quito till the middle of July of that year, accompanied by a force of about five hundred men, occupied in almost continual feastings and revelry. Various reasons were assigned for his long residence in that place; some alleging that it was on purpose to be more at hand for receiving early intelligence from Spain; while others attribute it to the great profits he derived from the gold mines which had been recently discovered in that neighbourhood; and others again alleged that he was detained by attachment to the lady formerly mentioned, whose husband he had procured to be assassinated by Vincente Pablo. That woman was delivered, after the death of her husband, of a child which was put to death by her father; for which inhuman action he was ordered to be hanged by Pedro de Puelles.
   During his residence in Quito, Gonzalo Pizarro sent off several detachments of soldiers to different places, giving commissions and instructions to their commanders in his own name as governor of Peru. Among these, the lieutenant Benalcazar was sent back to his former government; having been pardoned and even taken into favour by Gonzalo. A reinforcement was also sent to Pedro de Valdivia who commanded in Chili, under the command of Captain Ulloa, whom he had sent to ask assistance to enable him to continue and maintain his conquests in that country. Other officers and soldiers were sent to other parts, which are unnecessary to be particularized. At length Gonzalo determined to leave Quito, and to establish his residence in Lima; and it has been alleged that he was principally induced to take this step from suspicion of the fidelity of Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant at Lima, who was so much beloved by all the inhabitants of that city as to be almost in condition to have revolted to the royal cause. Gonzalo is said likewise to have been somewhat suspicious of his lieutenant-general Carvajal, being afraid lest he might be so puffed up by the many victories he had gained, and by his immense distance, as to be induced to set up for himself. He accordingly left Quito under the command of Pedro de Puelles, whom he appointed his lieutenant and captain-general in that province, with a force of three hundred men, having great confidence in his attachment ever since he had succoured him when in straits on his march from Cuzco to Lima, and when his army was on the point of abandoning him. He reposed so entirely on Puelles, that he believed, if the king were to send any force against him by the route of the province in which Benalcazar commanded, that Puelles would prevent them from being able to penetrate into Peru.
   While on his progress from Quito towards Lima, Gonzalo assumed in everything the deportment and authority of governor of Peru, and was treated in every respect as such by all the inhabitants of the country. He seemed to believe that his authority was so well and firmly established that he had nothing to fear from the attempts of his enemies, and that even the king would be obliged to grant him any terms he might require. All his officers soldiers and dependents obeyed and respected him entirely, as if satisfied that they were always to be subject to his authority, and to depend upon him alone for advancement and reward. In the exercise of his usurped authority, he made many grants or repartitions of lands and Indians, all of them for long periods, which every one considered as secure of being continued. He and his principal officers pretended that they frequently received letters from some of the highest of the nobles in Spain, praising his conduct and approving of every thing he had done, which these pretended letters justified on account of the infringements which had been made on the rights and privileges of the colonists. In these letters likewise, the pretended Spanish grandees were made to engage their favour and credit at court to support his interest and authority with the sovereign. The well informed among the followers of Gonzalo Pizarro saw clearly that these letters were mere fabrications to impose upon the vulgar, and had no foundation whatever in truth.
   On his arrival at the city of San Miguel, Gonzalo learned that there were a considerable number of Indians in that neighbourhood who had not been reduced under subjection; for which reason he gave orders to establish a military post in the province of Garrochamba28, the command of which he conferred on Captain Mercadillo, with a force of an hundred and thirty men, and gave him instructions for completing the conquest of that district, and for dividing the lands and Indians into repartitions like the rest of the country. At this time likewise, he detached Captain Porcel with sixty soldiers to complete the conquest of the Bracamoros. In these proceedings, he wished it to be believed that his sole object was for the advantage of the colony; but his real purpose was to keep his troops on foot and in employ, in case of needing them at a future period for his own defence in support of his usurpation. Before leaving Quito, Gonzalo sent off the licentiate Carvajal by sea with a party of soldiers, in the ships which Juan Alonzo Palomino had brought from Nicaragua after his pursuit of Verdugo. Carvajal was ordered to proceed along the coast towards Lima, and to settle all the maritime towns in his way in good order.
   The licentiate Carvajal after executing the before-mentioned orders, came to Truxillo to meet Gonzalo Pizarro, whence they went together to Lima, accompanied by a force of two hundred men. On approaching Lima, there was a diversity of opinions among the followers of Pizarro, respecting the ceremonies with which he should be received into the capital of Peru. Some of his officers were desirous that the magistracy should come out to meet him with a canopy, under which he should make his entry after the manner usually practised with kings. Some even proposed that a breach should be made in the walls, and some of the houses of the city thrown down, so as to make a new entrance on purpose in memory of his victory over the viceroy, as used to be done anciently in Rome for the reception of triumphant generals. In this, as in all other important affairs, Gonzalo was guided by the advice of the licentiate Carvajal, and entered the city on horseback, preceded by all his captains on foot leading their horses by the bridles. On this occasion he was accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, and the bishop of Bogota, who had come into Peru by way of Carthagena on purpose to receive consecration. He was likewise accompanied by Lorenzo de Aldana, his lieutenant-governor of Lima, and by all the magistrates and inhabitants of the city; no one daring to remain at home lest they might be suspected of disaffection. The streets were all ornamented with green herbs and flowers; all the bells of the churches and monasteries were kept ringing; and the cavalcade was preceded by a numerous band of trumpets kettle-drums and other warlike instruments of music. In this pompous manner, Pizarro was conducted in the first place to the great church, and thence to his own residence.
   From this time, Gonzalo Pizarro conducted himself with much more pride and haughtiness than formerly, conceiving high ideas of his own importance from these public ceremonials of respect, as usually happens to men of feeble minds on any sudden elevation. He had a guard for his person of eighty halberdiers, besides several horsemen, who acompanied him wherever he went. No person whatever was permitted to be seated in his presence; and there were very few persons whom he designed to honour so far as to return their salute. By these haughty manners, and still more by his frequent disobliging and even abusive manner of speaking, he displeased every one and became universally disliked. It must likewise be mentioned, that the soldiery, to whom he owed everything, became exceedingly discontented with him, as he gave them no pay. All this had a powerful influence on his downfall in the sequel; though for the present every one concealed their real sentiments, waiting for a more favourable opportunity.
   * * * * *
   "Following Garcilasso de la Vega and other authors, the Historian of America29 alleges that Gonzalo Pizarro was urged by several of his adherents, and in particular by Carvajal, to assume the sovereignty of Peru; to attach the Spaniards to his interest by liberal grants of lands and Indians, and by the creation of titles of nobility similar to those in Europe; to establish military orders of knighthood, with privileges distinctions and pensions, resembling those in Spain, as gratifications to the officers in his service; and to gain the whole body of natives to his service, by marrying the Coya, or Peruvian princess next in relation to the reigning Inca. Thus at the head of the ancient inhabitants of the country and of the colonists, he might set the power of Spain at defiance, and could easily repel any force that might be sent from Spain to such a distance. These counsellors who urged Pizarro to adopt this plan, insisted that he had already gone too far to expect pardon from the emperor; and endeavoured to convince him that all the founders of great monarchies had risen by their personal merit and their own valour, without any pretensions to ancient lineage or valid rights of sovereignty; and that, besides, his family had a strong title to the dominion of Peru, founded on the rights of discovery and conquest. But the inferior talents of Gonzalo circumscribed his ambition within more narrow bounds, and confined his views to the obtaining a confirmation of the authority which he now possessed from the emperor; for which purpose he sent an officer of distinction to Spain, to give such a representation of his conduct and the state of the country, as might induce the court, from inclination or necessity, to continue him as governor of Peru for life. Although Garcilasso de la Vega gives full warrant for this account of the proposals of the insurgents, Zarate, who was then resident in a public character in Peru, makes no mention of any such plan having been agitated, which could hardly have happened without his knowledge: It is probable therefore that these additional circumstances were invented by the enemies of Gonzalo after his fall, on purpose to blacken his memory by the imputation of even deeper crimes than those he was actually guilty of."-E.

SECTION VI. History of the Expedition of Pedro de la Gasca, the Death of Gonzalo Pizarro, and the Restoration of Peru to Tranquillity
   While these things were transacting in Peru, the emperor Charles V. was residing in Germany, where he had gone on purpose to overthrow the party of the Lutherans and others who had separated from the church of Rome. The emperor was desirous to receive an account of the disturbances in that distant and valuable colony from Diego Alvarez Cueto, the brother-in-law of the late viceroy, and Francisco Maldonado the messenger of Gonzalo Pizarro, both of whom went into Germany for that purpose. At this time, however, though acquainted with the revolt of Peru, the imprisonment of the viceroy, and the usurpation of the government by Pizarro, the court necessarily remained ignorant of the death of the viceroy. Frequent deliberations were held for devising proper remedies to restore tranquillity to Peru; but the matter lay over for some considerable time, in consequence of the absence of the emperor from Spain, and because he was at this time frequently attacked by illness. At length it was determined to send over into Peru the licentiate Pedro de la Gasca, at that time a counsellor of inquisition. The prudent and intelligent character of this man was already well known, from the skill and success with which he had already conducted several affairs of consequence with which he had been entrusted, and particularly by the excellent dispositions and preparations which he had made, only a few years before, to defend the kingdom of Valencia against an expected invasion of the Turks and Moors, and in various matters respecting the new converts in that kingdom, which he took the management of while occupied in some of the affairs of the holy office on which he had been sent thither by the emperor.
   The title granted to Gasca on occasion of going into Peru, was only that of president of the royal court of audience. But, by his commision, he was invested with full powers in every thing respecting the government of the country; to pacify the troubles and restore peace; and to pardon as he might see proper all crimes, whether committed before his arrival or during his residence in the country. Along with Gasca, the licentiates Ganas and Renteria went out to Peru, as judges or oydors of the supreme tribunal or royal court of audience. Gasca was likewise furnished with full powers to raise troops in case of necessity, and to do every thing that the exigency of affairs might require, without waiting for orders or instructions from Spain. His powers and orders however were kept secret, as it was wished to attempt the restoration of order by gentle means; for which reason nothing was spoken of but pardon and indemnity, and he was desired to endeavour to restore the colony to peace and tranquillity by means of clemency if possible.
   Gasca embarked from Spain in the month of May 1546, on purpose to quell the formidable rebellion which had long subsisted in Peru, without either money or troops, and merely accompanied by such servants and officers of his household as were requisite to support the dignity of his office as president of the high court of audience. On arriving at St Martha, he received information of the defeat of Melchior Verdugo, formerly mentioned, and that Verdugo waited for him at Carthagena with the small remnant of his men who had escaped on that occasion. Knowing that Hinojosa and his people were exceedingly irritated against Verdugo, Gasca resolved to go by way of Nombre de Dios, to prevent the insurgents from entertaining any suspicions of his pacific intentions, as he believed they would prevent him from having any access into the country if he held any intercourse with Verdugo, and still more if he were joined by that obnoxious person. Gasca cast anchor in the harbour of Nombre de Dios on the 27th of July 1546, where Hernan Mexia had been posted by Hinojosa with an hundred and eighty men, to protect that place and neighbourhood against Melchior Verdugo. The president sent on shore Alfonzo de Alvarado, who had accompanied him from Spain, to notify his arrival and the purposes of his mission to Mexia. After some conference, they separated without communicating their real sentiments to each other, as both were suspicious and kept up much reserve. On the return of Alvarado to the ship, Mexia sent to request the president to disembark, which he did accordingly. On this occasion Mexia went to meet him, in a barge attended by twenty musqueteers, leaving the rest of his troops drawn up on the beach. Mexia immediately left his own barge, and accompanied the president in his boat to the shore, where he caused him to be received with every mark of respect, under a salute from the troops.
   After landing, the president, in a private conference, gave Mexia an account of the object of his voyage to Peru; on which Mexia expressed his determined resolution to yield implicit obedience to the royal orders, and to devote his services accordingly to the president. He declared, that he had long and anxiously waited the arrival of some person possessing authority to put an end to the troubles; and that, fortunately, circumstances were now extremely favourable for this purpose, without any one to oppose, as he was now the sole commander of most of the troops belonging to Gonzalo Pizarro in that neighbourhood, the greater part of which were now in Nombre de Dios. Mexia said farther that, Hinojosa and the other captains having gone to Panama, he found himself at liberty to declare himself openly for his majesty, if that were judged proper by the president; and that they might then go in company to Panama, where they would easily become masters of the fleet in that port, by means which he explained; and that he was likewise convinced that, when Hinojosa and the other captains were informed of the powers and intentions of the president, they would receive him with all submission. The president thanked Mexia for his good intentions, observing that it was necessary to use lenient measures on this occasion, as his majesty was very desirous to restore the country to peace and good order, without having recourse to warlike measures, if it could possibly be accomplished. As it was obvious to every one, that the chief cause of the disturbances was owing to the inflexible rigour of the late viceroy, he wished, therefore, that it might be known by all, that his majesty wished to remedy all grievances in the most gracious manner; and he trusted, therefore, when it was publickly known that all might expect safety and pardon by returning to their duty, that all the colonists would evince their respectful loyalty by tendering their services, rather than continue in rebellion against the sovereign. The president concluded by declaring his resolution to refrain from any endeavour to use force, till all the colonists were apprized of his intentions as now expressed.
   Mexia assured the president, that he was ready to obey his orders in all things; yet considered it proper for him to observe, that although he was now able to command the soldiers then at Nombre de Dios; matters might assume a very different aspect on proceeding to Panama, where the soldiers would be under the orders of Hinojosa. The president expressed his determination, however, to proceed in his enterprize, to which Mexia consented; and they mutually agreed to keep their intentions secret till affairs should take a favourable turn, as will be seen in the sequel.
   When Hinojosa, who acted as general under Pizarro in the Tierra Firma, learnt the reception which the president had met with from Mexia, he was much dissatisfied, both because he was ignorant of the orders and instructions under which the president acted, and because Mexia had not communicated his intentions. Hinojosa wrote therefore to Mexia in a harsh and peremptory manner, reflecting bitterly on his conduct, and, at the same time, some friends of Mexia, who were then resident in Panama, wrote to dissuade him from coming to that place, as Hinojosa was much irritated against him for the friendly reception he had given to the president. Notwithstanding this, it was agreed upon in a conference between the president and Mexia, that the latter should go immediately to Panama to confer with Hinojosa, lest the minds of the soldiery should take any adverse turn by delay. Despising the dangers with which he was threatened, and the suspicions that had been endeavoured to be instilled into his mind, Mexia set out for Panama, confiding in the friendship which subsisted between him and Hinojosa, and in his knowledge of the character and dispositions of that officer. In an interview with Hinojosa, he fully explained the reasons of his conduct in receiving the president; adding, that whatever party they might choose ultimately to favour, all that had hitherto been done could do no harm. Hinojosa was entirely satisfied with this explanation, and allowed Mexia to return to Nombre de Dios.
   After the return of Mexia, the president went across the isthmus to Panama, where he held separate conferences with Hinojosa and the different captains, which he conducted with so much prudence and secrecy, that he gained them all over to the royal cause, without any of them having any communication with the others on the subject, so that he was soon in condition to speak with them publickly on the objects of his mission, having brought them all over to his sentiments and engaged them to second his intentions. By supplying the soldiers with every thing of which they were in need, he brought them all easily into his measures, believing that the most effectual means of succeeding in his mission, was by acting gently and in a conciliating manner with every one: yet in all this he acted without meanness or servility, constantly preserving the dignity becoming his rank and authority. In all his negociations, the president was ably and faithfully seconded by his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado, who was exceedingly serviceable on every occasion, both in consequence of having many friends among the officers, and because those even who were not among the number were much influenced by his authority and character. At first Hinojosa hesitated about declaring for the president, and even notified his arrival to Gonzalo Pizarro. Some of the captains and other principal persons at Panama had likewise written to Gonzalo, even before the arrival of the president at Panama, giving it as their advice that he ought not to be allowed to enter Peru; but in the sequel these persons changed their opinion by the persuasion of Gasca. During his residence at Panama, the president contrived to manage so judiciously with Hinojosa, whom he frequently visited, that he procured his consent to send Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, a gentleman who had accompanied him from Spain, with letters to Gonzalo Pizarro apprizing him of his arrival in Tierra Firma, and the object of his mission. Among these letters was one from the king, to the following effect:
   THE KING, TO GONZALO PIZARRO.
   "Gonzalo Pizarro, from your letters and the information of other persons, we have been informed of the commotions and disorders which have arisen in all the provinces of Peru, since the arrival of the viceroy Blasco Nunnez Vela and the judges of the royal audience. We are convinced that these troubles have been produced by endeavouring to establish and enforce, in their utmost rigour, the new laws and regulations which we had judged proper for the government of that country, and for insuring good treatment to the native inhabitants. We are satisfied that you, and those who have acted along with you during these troubles, have not been actuated by any disinclination to your obedience and loyalty towards us, but merely in opposition to the extreme rigour and inexorable obstinacy of the viceroy, who refused to listen to the supplications and remonstrances which were made to him on the new regulations."
   "Being well informed in regard to all these affairs, and having heard every thing that Francisco Maldonado had in charge to say on the subject from you and the inhabitants of these provinces, we have thought proper to send over as our president the licentiate De la Gasca, a member of our council of the holy inquisition, to whom we have given full power and authority to do every thing that he may deem proper and necessary for restoring tranquillity and good order in the country, to replace its affairs on a proper footing, and to introduce such regulations as may tend to the good of our service and the glory of God, and the advantage of the country and its inhabitants, both such as are our natural subjects and the original inhabitants. For this reason we will and command, and expressly desire, that you may be punctually obedient to every thing which the said Gasca shall order you in our name, in the same manner as if his commands were from ourselves; and that you give him every assistance in your power in every thing which he may require, and which may be necessary for executing the orders which we have given him, according as he may inform you, or shall require in our name, conform to the confidence we repose in your fidelity. On our part, we assure you that we entertain a just estimation of the services which you and your brother the marquis have done, and that we shall reward the same in time and place convenient to his children and brothers by effective marks of our good will. Given at Venlo, this sixteenth of February in the year of grace one thousand five hundred and forty-six."
   I THE KING. By order of his Majesty, FRANCISCO DE ERASO.
   Along with this letter from the emperor, the president wrote to Gonzalo Pizarro, dated on the 26th of September 1546 from Panama, and addressed to the illustrious senior Gonzalo Pizarro, in the city of Lima, of which the following is the substance.
   "I have delayed sending the letter of his imperial majesty, which accompanies this present communication, till now, in the hope of being able to set out for Peru immediately after my arrival in this country, and because it appeared more conformable to the respect and obedience which I owe to his majesty to have delivered his royal letter in person than to allow it to be preceded by any writing from myself. Finding, however, that my voyage is necessarily delayed, and being informed that you have called a meeting of the colonists at Lima to consult upon the past transactions, and on what may be proper in the present situation of affairs, I have thought it improper any longer to delay sending his majestys letter, together with this from myself which I transmit by Pedro Hernandez Paniagua, a person of honour and merit, who professes to be your friend and servant."
   "After the most mature and careful deliberations respecting all that has occurred in Peru, since the arrival of the late viceroy in that country, his majesty is satisfied that the commotions have not been excited by a spirit of rebellion and disobedience in the Spanish inhabitants, but through the inflexible rigour with which the viceroy endeavoured to enforce the regulations, in spite of the supplications of the colonists and their appeal to his majesty, by which they were justified in defending themselves against so great severity, at least until they should learn the royal will on the subject in answer to their remonstrances. All this appears from the letter which you addressed to his majesty, in which you declared that the principal reason which had induced you to accept the situation of governor of Peru, was that it had been given to you by the royal audience, in the name and under the seal of his majesty; by the acceptance of which employment you were enabled to do good service to the royal interests, which might otherwise have suffered much prejudice; and as you have declared these to be your motives for assuming the government, until his majesty might think proper to issue his commands, which you were ready to obey like a good and loyal subject."
   "Therefore, his majesty, having seen and duly considered all these things, and heard the opinions of his councillors thereupon, has sent me for the express purpose of restoring peace, tranquillity, and good order to the country, by the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, with full power to extend his royal pardon for all that has already occurred, and to take the opinion and advice of the colonists upon those measures that may be most proper and advantageous for the royal service, the glory of God, the good of the country, and the benefit of its inhabitants. In respect to such Spaniards as cannot be provided in the country with repartitions of lands and Indians, I have orders to employ them in new discoveries, where they may acquire honour and riches, as has already been done by so many other persons. I earnestly entreat you therefore, as a Christian, and a wise and prudent gentleman of honour, to reflect seriously on all these things. As you have hitherto always evinced much affection and attachment to the welfare of the country and its inhabitants, you certainly have great reason of thankfulness to the Almighty, that in so important and delicate an affair, neither his majesty nor his councillors have been disposed to consider your past conduct in the light of revolt and rebellion against the legitimate authority of the sovereign, but have rather been pleased to view it in the light of a just and necessary defence of your own rights, and those of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, until the decision of his majesty upon your supplications and remonstrances might be made manifest. Therefore, since his majesty has been graciously pleased to grant to you and the other colonists all that you required by your supplications, by abrogating the obnoxious regulations, it is incumbent upon you, as an obedient and loyal subject, to evince a respectful and prompt obedience to the royal orders30."
   "I have represented all these things to you, that you may not flatter yourself by a false confidence of being able to resist the power of his majesty, who is able if it should so please him to employ irresistible force in repressing the commotions and disorders of Peru, instead of those measures of clemency, which it has pleased God that he should now resort to; and that if reduced to the necessity of using force, it will be necessary for his majesty to take care not to ruin the country by sending too great a number of troops, instead of being under any difficulty as to sending a sufficient power to overcome all possibility of resistance. You ought likewise to reflect that matters will necessarily take a quite different turn than they have hitherto done. Hitherto your followers have been influenced by their own self-interest, not only considering the late viceroy as your enemy and your cause as good, but all of them looked upon him as their personal enemy, who wished to deprive them of their properties, and to put to death every one who opposed his designs. Under these circumstances your followers were necessarily impelled to adhere to your party in the defence of their own lives and properties. But as both are now secured, by the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, and the amnesty granted by his majesty, the Spanish inhabitants of Peru have now their legitimate sovereign as their friend and protector, to whom we all owe the most entire loyalty and obedience. I entreat you to reflect seriously on these things, and to consider that, in the present situation of affairs, and the turn which they must assuredly take in the sequel, you cannot count upon the adherence of any one, if you unfortunately choose to follow wrong measures. By contributing your assistance to put an end to the commotions which have distracted the kingdom of Peru, the whole inhabitants of that country will remain indebted to your exertions for the maintenance of their rights and privileges, in having opposed the execution of the obnoxious regulations, and having procured a favourable attention to their supplications and remonstrances; insomuch that his majesty has been pleased to send me with an express commission to listen to and redress all grievances. Should you unfortunately resolve upon refusing submission to the royal authority, you will obliterate all the merit you derive from your past conduct; as by endeavouring to continue the troubles and commotions, you will shew yourself actuated by motives of personal interest and ambition, instead of any regard for the good of the public. Instead of serving the interests of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, you will become the cause of infinite injury to all, and will be considered as the enemy of the kingdom, by perpetuating the troubles, and occasioning the destruction of the lives and fortunes of your friends and adherents. You ought likewise to consider that, by continuing the war, you will render it necessary to bring over a numerous army into Peru, so that you will become accountable to God and man for all the miseries and disorders which may follow, and for the entire ruin of the country and its inhabitants, by which you will incur the hatred of all the principal colonists, merchants, and other rich persons."
   "To conclude, I pray God to take you and all your followers under his most holy protection, and that he may inspire you with proper sentiments on this occasion, for the good service of his majesty, the eternal welfare of your souls, and the preservation of your lives, honours, and estates; and I remain; illustrious Sir, yours, &c.
   PEDRO DE LA GASCA."
   Gonzalo had only been a few days in Lima on his return from Quito, when he received letters from Hinojosa informing him of the arrival of the president. He was much disturbed by this intelligence, which he immediately communicated to the captains and other principal persons of his party, and with whom he consulted upon the steps necessary to be taken in this conjuncture of affairs. Some were of opinion that it was necessary to get rid of the president, either openly or by secret assassination; while others recommended that he should be invited into Peru, where it would be easy to oblige him to agree to all their demands; or where at least they could draw their negociations with him to a great length, by insisting on convening an assembly of deputies and procurators from all the cities of the kingdom at Lima, to deliberate on the subject of his reception, and to determine whether he should be received or not; and, as Peru was of vast extent, it would be easy to put off the meeting of that assembly for two years, during which period the president might be kept in the isle of Puna under a confidential guard, by which he might be prevented from writing to Spain that the country was in rebellion; more especially as they could keep him in continual suspense, by representing that the general assembly could not meet sooner on account of the vast distance of some of the cities. Even the most moderate were for obliging the president to return into Spain.
   In this council of the leaders of the insurrection, it was likewise proposed to send deputies from all parts of Peru to his majesty, to explain the state of the colony, and the events which had occurred; and particularly to exculpate their conduct in regard to the battle of Quito in which the viceroy was slain, by throwing the whole blame upon him as the aggressor. It was likewise proposed that these deputies should humbly implore his majesty to invest Gonzalo Pizarro in the government of Peru, for which especial purpose they should be so instructed and empowered by all the cities. They were also to be instructed, during their residence at Panama on their way into Spain, carefully to learn what were the powers and instructions of the president; and to endeavour to prevail upon him to delay proceeding to Peru, until they had informed his majesty of the true state of the kingdom, that ulterior orders might be issued in consequence. It was proposed at the same time, if the president persisted in coming into the country, to take him into custody. Some even proposed to put him to death during the journey, while others proposed to have him poisoned at Panama and likewise to put Alonzo de Alvarado to death. Many other proposals of a similar nature and tendency are said to have been made at this time; but as all these transactions took place in the secret meetings of the chief of the insurgents, it is difficult or impossible to ascertain the precise nature of their deliberations. It was besides resolved, that the messengers who were to be sent to the president should be charged to deliver him letters from the principal inhabitants of Lima, strongly urging him to refrain from coming into Peru, even in terms of insolence and implied threatening.
   After long deliberations respecting the persons who should be sent into Spain to lay their representations before the emperor, Don Jerom de Loyasa archbishop of Lima, Lorenzo de Aldana, Friar Thomas de San Martino provincial of the Dominicans, and Gomez de Solis were chosen for that purpose. The provincial was much suspected by the insurgents of being inimical to their party, by several expressions of his opinion, both in his sermons and in private conversations: Yet they thought proper to employ him and the others in this commission, although they were almost equally suspicious of the rest; both to give weight to their representations through the respectability of their messengers, and because no other persons of any consequence in the country dared to appear before his majesty on this occasion, being afraid of punishment for the share they had taken in the past commotions. They considered likewise, if these deputies should declare against them while in Spain, as they actually suspected, that it was better to have them out of the country; as, if matters should assume an unfavourable aspect for Gonzalo and his adherents, these persons might have done them much injury by remaining, as they were much respected in Peru, both on account of their rank and character. Gomez de Solis, who was major domo to Gonzalo Pizarro, was the only one of these commisioners in whom he reposed confidence; though indeed some alleged that he was only intended to proceed to Panama with a supply of money and provisions for Hinojosa and his troops, while others believed he was to have accompanied the other deputies into Spain. Besides these persons, the bishop of St Martha was likewise requested to accompany the deputation; and they were all supplied with the necessary funds for the expences of their voyage.
   Lorenzo de Aldana set off by sea for Panama in all haste, while the other deputies were making preparations for their voyage, being commissioned by Gonzalo to send him intelligence as quickly as possible as to the true state of affairs in the Tierra Firma. As Lorenzo set out from the port of Lima in October 1546, Gonzalo confidently expected to receive dispatches from him from Panama by the ensuing Christmas, or early in January 1547; and for this purpose, he appointed a set of couriers to remain in waiting all along the coast of Peru to the northward of Lima, to be in readiness to forward the dispatches as quickly as possible. The two bishops and the provincial embarked a few days after Aldana, and all of them arrived safely at Panama.
   Vela Nunnez, the brother of the late viceroy, who had long remained a prisoner at large, being allowed to go out on hunting parties, and to ride about unarmed, yet under strict injunctions to take care of his conduct, was drawn about this time into a private engagement with a soldier named Juan de la Torre, by means of which he lost his life. De la Torre was one of those who had deserted from the viceroy to Gonzalo, along with Gonzalo Diaz and others, when on the expedition against Pedro de Puelles and the inhabitants of Guanuco. He had afterwards the good fortune to discover a concealed treasure of gold and silver in the valley of Hica, which had been consecrated by the Indians to their idols, and which was said to have contained to the value of 60,000 crowns in the precious metals, besides a great quantity of emeralds and turquoises. De la Torre placed all this treasure in the hands of the father guardian of the Franciscans; to whom he one day revealed in confession that he wished to return into Spain, that he might enjoy his riches in quiet; but, having followed the party of Gonzalo, and consequently incurred the displeasure of his majesty, he wished to be able to perform some acceptable service to the king before his departure, on purpose to merit pardon for his past offences. For this purpose, he intended to embark with his treasure from the port of Lima for Nicaragua, where he proposed to enlist a party of soldiers, and to fit out one or two vessels with which to cruize for some time along the coast of Peru against Gonzalo and his confederates, by landing, and pillaging in such places as were unprovided with troops: But, as he had not sufficient knowledge or experience for conducting such an enterprize, he wished to find a person properly qualified to act as commander on this occasion, and had a strong desire to induce Vela Nunnez to undertake the direction of the enterprize, as a gentleman experienced in war, and who was besides in a great measure bound to seek an opportunity of being revenged upon Gonzalo for the death of his brother the viceroy and many others of his friends and relations. With this view, therefore, it was his intention to place himself and his treasure at the disposal of Vela Nunnez, whom he wished to consult on this subject with some adherents of the late viceroy who dwelt in Lima, that these persons might likewise be induced to join in the enterprize. De la Torre, therefore, requested the father guardian to converse on the subject with Vela Nunnez.
   At first Vela Nunnez was on his guard, lest it might be a false confidence devised for his ruin. But De la Torre satisfied his doubts in presence of the father guardian, by a solemn oath on a consecrated altar, and Vela Nunnez agreed to take charge of the enterprize, immediately using his endeavours to engage the adherents of the late viceroy in the plot. It is not known how this affair came to be divulged, which it certainly was to Gonzalo, who immediately caused Vela Nunnez to be arrested and brought to trial as a traitor and rebel against the king, and had him publickly beheaded. Vela Nunnez was a brave and honourable gentleman, much esteemed by all, and was exceedingly regretted by the whole inhabitants of Peru.31