Па и нема везе, нама је пресудан однос према косову. Ако желимо да уђемо у ЕУ, мораћемо да прихватимо косово репубљик као суседну државу. Можда нећемо морати да их признамо, али кога брига за мртво слово на папиру, када у стварности ћемо морати да у БГ изградимо шиптарску амбасаду.
Све остало би био извор нестабилности за ЕУ.

znas li ti koja je drzava u posljednjih 60 godina najcesce mjenjala granicu,ali u svoju korist, u slucaju srbije je aman suprotno?

slazem se sa ovim u potpunosti ustvari cak sta vise mislim da cemo morati da ih priznamo zvanicno

gledao sam vesti na b92 info i kaze ona na vest da je merkelova opet kancelar da se ona zalaze da moramo priznati kosovo ako hocemo u EU a da liberali misle da treba da budu popustljiviji .... sve je jasno

Случајно што је то баш Немачка...

evo zasto:

Intervju, Volfram Mas, nemački ambasador u Beogradu

EU i Nemačka Srbiji poklonile 2,7 milijardi evra!

Posle izbora u Nemačkoj neće biti promena u politici prema zvaničnom Beogradu jer i dalje hoćemo da vidimo Srbiju u EU, podržaćemo vas politički, finansijski i kadrovski


Pobeda koalicije kancelarke Angele Merkel i liberala na izborima u Nemačkoj neće doneti nikakve promene u politici prema Srbiji, kaže za Press nemački ambasador u Beogradu Volfram Mas. Upravo danas, na dan velikog nemačkog praznika Dana ujedinjenja, ambasador Mas kaže da će njegova zemlja i dalje podržavati evropski put Srbije.

- Spoljna politika nije bila sporna tema na nedavnim izborima. To važi kako za nemačku politiku u okviru EU, tako i za politiku prema zemljama koje napreduju ka Uniji. Zato i neće biti promene nemačke politike u vezi sa približavanjem Srbije Uniji jer mi želimo da vidimo Srbiju u EU.

Možemo li od nove vlasti u Nemačkoj da očekujemo malo veću podršku, bar onoliko koliko podržavate Hrvatsku?

- Nemačka, ali i EU, već pružaju snažnu podršku Srbiji na putu ka EU. Reč je o političkoj, finansijskoj, materijalnoj i kadrovskoj pomoći. Ako je u protekloj deceniji Srbija od EU dobila dve milijarde evra pomoći, plus 700 miliona evra bilateralne pomoći Nemačke, onda vas pitam ko pruža Srbiji obimniju pomoć?

Prema vašem mišljenju, da li je Srbija ispunila sve uslove za odmrzavanje SSP-a?

- Znate da se odluka o odmrzavanju SSP-a donosi konsenzusom država članica EU, kao što znate šta je prepreka za postizanje tog konsenzusa. Nadam se da će Srbija što je pre moguće okončati saradnju s Hagom. Ali hteo bih da naglasim i sledeće: koliko god da je za vas važno odmrzavanje SSP-a, daleko je važnije da Srbija napreduje u dugačkom zakonodavnom i administrativnom procesu preuzimanja pravne tekovine EU. Jer, na kraju će taj proces odlučiti o brzini vašeg približavanja EU. Vlada, Skupština i administracija na dobrom su putu i znatno su intenzivirali svoje aktivnosti od početka godine.

U novembru Dani Nemačke

- Manifestacijom Dani Nemačke, koji će se u novembru organizovati u Srbiji, Ambasada Nemačke, ali i brojne nemačke institucije i preduzeća prisutni u našoj zemlji žele da ukažu na prijateljske i neraskidive veze dve zemlje. Koncerti klasične muzike, ulični umetnički performansi, konferencije i okrugli stolovi, najnoviji nemački filmovi u bioskopima i TV programima, gostovanja poznatih di-džejeva iz Berlina samo su deo programa koji smo pripremili kako bismo podvukli značaj, širinu i dubinu odnosa koje naše dve zemlje neguju - kaže ambasador Volfram Mas.

Da li ćemo uskoro moći da vidimo kancelarku Angelu Merkel u Beogradu?

- Političke i lične veze između predstavnika vlasti naših zemalja su tesne i česte. U doba modernih komunikacionih sredstava telefonski razgovori na najvišem nivou već su skoro svakodnevica, što dokazuje i razgovor koji su 1. oktobra vodili predsednik Tadić i kancelarka Merkel. Optimista sam da će se nakon formiranja nove vlade u Nemačkoj uskoro ponovo ukazati prilika za lične susrete i razgovore.

Medijski je zanimljivo i to što će novi šef diplomatije biti lider liberala Gvido Vestervele, koji je priznao da je homoseksualac?

- Lični način života svakog pojedinca, time i svakog političara, privatna je stvar i to se mora poštovati. Zato nikada neću davati izjave o tome.

Kad govorimo o homoseksualcima, vidljivo je bilo vaše neoglašavanje o Povorci ponosa u Srbiji?

- U to vreme bio sam u Nemačkoj, ali je naša ambasada u potpunosti podržala stav švedskog predsedništva EU o Povorci ponosa. Žao nam je što parada nije održana.

U Srbiji su zbog Povorke ponosa povećane tenzije, zbog kojih je kasnije došlo i do incidenata huligana, a kulminiralo je ubistvom Francuza Brisa Tatona. Kako gledate na ove događaje?

- Iznenađen sam i zgrožen nasiljem proteklih nedelja, jer otkad sam stigao u Srbiju, ima tome više od dve godine, uvek sam imao osećaj da su vaši građani ljubazni i srdačni. I zato svi koji utiču na javno mišljenje su pred velikim izazovom da rade na stvaranju klime tolerancije. Jer nedopustivo je da nekoliko hiljada ljudi spremnih na nasilje misli da se može iživljavati nad manjinama. Zato se, što je pre moguće, mora stati na put svakoj najavi nasilja protiv neistomišljenika kako ćutanje ne bi bilo tumačeno kao saglasnost.

Kako ocenjujete akciju države u ovoj borbi?

- Imam poverenje u rešenost organa Srbije da se savlada ovaj problem, ali pri tome država mora da postupa nezavisno od toga ko je u pitanju. Zato me brine što do danas nisu odgovarale osobe koje su prošle godine podstakle i izvršile napad na moju ambasadu.

Može li Srbija da očekuje malo više sluha za ulaganje nemačkih kompanija jer, priznaćete, najznačajnija zemlja EU nije ekonomski baš toliko prisutna kod nas?

- Ekonomski odnosi uvek mogu da budu bolji, ali previđate da je Nemačka danas jedan od najvećih, ako ne i najveći trgovinski partner Srbije. Nemačka je i jedan od najvećih stranih investitora u Srbiju, jer su naša preduzeća od 2000. uložila ovde oko 1,3 milijarde evra. I o nemačkim investicijama ne odlučuje naša vlada, već kompanije, upoređujući investicione uslove širom planete. Zato je jedan od prioritetnih zadataka naše ambasade da tim kompanijama prenese istinitu sliku o Srbiji kao mestu za ulaganje. A važni aspekti te slike su politička stabilnost, vladavina prava, fer i nebirokratski okvirni uslovi.

Gde vidite najveći prostor za saradnju sa Srbijom?

- Spektar je veoma širok. S obzirom na potrebe Srbije, to su oblasti energetike, telekomunikacija i saobraćajne infrastrukture.

Kad kažete telekomunikacije, da li je „Dojče telekom" zainteresovan da kupi naš „Telekom"?

- Nije mi poznata namera Vlade da proda „Telekom", zato ne znam ništa ni o konkretnim razmišljanjima DT u vezi sa Srbijom.

Kako ocenjujete to što je nemačka medijska grupa WAC partner sa Stankom Subotićem, koji se u Srbiji tereti za organizovani kriminal?

- Koliko je meni poznato, medijska grupa WAC nije u partnerskim odnosima sa Subotićem.

Hoće li Nemačka da preispita priznanje Kosova ako Sud pravde oceni da njihovo otcepljenje nije bilo u skladu s međunarodnim pravom?

- Prepustio bih sudu da se pozabavi tim pitanjem i ne bih se bavio spekulacijama.

Primer vodjenja uspesne politike 


Jeste, cak im pretili da ce da uvedu policijski sat i da zatvore pabove u kojima toce Ginis 

Evo sta kaze irska strana koja je protiv sporazuma. Samo zamenite Irish u Serbish svuda i mislim da nema nikakve razlike. Izvinjavam se sto je na Engish al neam vremena sad da prevodim...

13 Facts About the Lisbon Treaty
Anthony Coughlan
The National Platform EU Research & Information Centre
21 August, 2009

Below for your information is a summary of 13 important things the Lisbon Treaty would do if it were to come into force, as well as a longer document which explains these points more fully.

These have been prepared with the help of authorities on Irish constitutional and European law, and you can take it that the facts they give on the Treaty and its consequences are accurate.

Lisbon’s proposal to give the Big States from 50-100% more voting power in making EU laws, while halving Ireland’s voting power to 0.8%, would be economically disastrous for us in face of the economic crisis, as Brussels, Frankfurt and the Big EU States insist on savage cut-backs being imposed on the Irish economy.

Summary of 13 things the Lisbon Treaty would do

    The Lisbon Treaty …

    1. Would be a power-grab by the Big States for control of the EU by basing EU law-making post-Lisbon primarily on population size. This would double Germany’s voting power in making European laws from its present 8% to 17%, increase Britain’s, France’s and Italy’s from 8% to 12% each, and halve Ireland’s vote to 0.8%. How does having 0.8% of a vote in making EU laws put Ireland “at the heart of Europe” ? Taoiseach Brian Cowen’s “guarantees” do not explain how having half as much influence in the EU as Ireland has today would induce the other Member States to listen to our concerns on unemployment and help to resolve the economic crisis in the interest of Irish companies, workers and farmers.

    2.Would copperfasten the Laval and related judgements of the EU Court of Justice, which put the competition rules of the EU market above the rights of Trade Unions to enforce pay standards higher than the minimum wage for migrant workers. At the same time Lisbon would give the EU full control of immigration policy (Art.79 TFEU).

    3. Would permit the post-Lisbon EU to impose Europe-wide taxes directly on us for the first time without need of further Treaties or referendums (Art.311 TFEU).

    4. Would amend the existing treaties to give the EU exclusive power as regards rules on foreign direct investment (Arts.206-7 TFEU) and give the Court of Justice the power to order the harmonisation of national indirect taxes if it decides that this causes a “distortion of competition” in the market (Art.113 TFEU). These changes could undermine our 12.5% corporation profits tax, which is the principal attraction of Ireland for foreign business.

    5. Would abolish our present right to “propose” and decide who Ireland’s Commissioner is , by replacing it with a right to make “suggestions” only, leaving it up to the incoming Commission President to decide (Art.17.7 TEU). Our No vote last year secured us a commitment to a permanent Commissioner, but what is the point of every EU State continuing to have its own Commissioner post-Lisbon when it can no longer decide who that Commissioner will be?

    6. Would give the European Union the Constitution of an EU Federal State which would have primacy over the Irish and other national Constitutions. This post-Lisbon EU would for the first time be legally separate from and superior to its 27 Member States and would sign international treaties with other States in all areas of its powers (Arts.1 and 47 TEU; Declaration 17 concerning Primacy ). In constitutional terms Lisbon would thereby turn Ireland into a regional or provincial state within this new Federal-style European Union, with the EU’s Constitution and laws having legal primacy over the Irish Constitution and laws in any cases of conflict between the two.

    7. Would turn us into real citizens for the first time of this new post-Lisbon European Union, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws in the event of any conflict between the two. We would still keep our Irish citizenship, but it would be subordinate to our new EU citizenship and the rights and duties vis-a-vis the EU that would attach to that(Art.9 TEU).

    8. Would give the EU Court of Justice the power to decide our rights as EU citizens by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the first time (Art.6 TEU) . This would give power to the EU judges to use their case law to lay down a uniform standard of rights for the 500 million citizens of the post-Lisbon Union in the name of a common EU citizenship in the years to come. It would open the possibility of clashes with national human rights standards in sensitive areas where Member States differ from one another at present, e.g. trial by jury, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, habeas corpus, the legalisation of hard drugs, euthanasia, abortion, labour law, succession law, marriage law, children’s rights etc. Ireland’s Supreme Court and the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights would no longer have the final say on what our rights are.

    9. Would abolish the national veto Ireland has at present by handing over to the EU the power to make laws binding on us in 32 new policy areas, including public services, crime, justice and policing, immigration, energy, transport, tourism, sport, culture, public health, the EU budget and international measures on climate change.

    10. Would reduce the power of National Parliaments to make laws in relation to 49 policy areas or matters, and increase the influence of the European Parliament in making EU laws in 19 new areas (See euabc.eu for the two lists).

    11. Would be a self-amending Treaty which would permit the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to shift most remaining EU policy areas where unanimity is required and a national veto still exists - for example on tax harmonisation - to qualified majority voting on the EU Council of Ministers, without need of further EU Treaties or referendums(Art.48 TEU).

    12. Would enable the 27 EU Prime Ministers to appoint an EU President for up to five years without allowing voters any say as to who he or she would be - thereby abolishing the present six-monthly rotating EU presidencies (Art.15.5 TEU).

    13. Would militarize the EU further, requiring Member States “progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art.42.3 TEU) and to aid and assist other Member States experiencing armed attack “by all the means in their power” (Art.42.7 TEU).

    TEU = Treaty on European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty

    TFEU = Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty

The most urgent task for those of us who want to defend Irish democracy, national independence and our ability to defend our economic interests in face of Lisbon is to take the initiative in adapting the information below and spreading it to our friends and neighbours between now and September, when the big guns of the Government and Yes-side will get going.

Maybe you and your friends and colleagues could set up a small canvassing team and use this material - not in two months time, but this week and next week and the week after that - to get the facts about Lisbon to the people in your area by going to see them and talking to them on their doorsteps? These facts can also be used in letters to the national and local press.

EXPLANATORY DOCUMENT ON LISBON

FACTS ON THE LISBON TREATY

By voting No we remain full members of the EU and of the euro currency based on the existing Nice Treaty, but we reject the proposed Lisbon Treaty as a step too far. Millions of our fellow Europeans who are being denied referendums on Lisbon by their politicians are hoping that we will say No again for their sakes. We can thereby open the way for a better Treaty for a better and more democratic Europe.

The economic crisis: All 27 EU Members are in economic crisis. Ireland is worse than most because of the borrowing binge, housing bubble and Bank bail-outs which were encouraged by the same golden circle of politicians and bankers as are now bringing us Lisbon Two. The crisis makes Lisbon’s model of a deregulated, privatised, let-it-rip EU economy quite out-of-date. Lisbon’s proposal to give the Big States from 50-100% more voting power in the EU, while halving Ireland’s voting power to 0.8% would be economically disastrous for us in face of the economic crisis, as Brussels, Frankfurt and the Big EU States insist on savage cut-backs being imposed on the Irish economy.

We remain full EU members: There is no question of Ireland being sidelined or pushed out of the EU or the euro-currency if we stand by our No to Lisbon. As Ireland’s EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said in Hot Press last December : “There is no provision in the existing treaties to isolate anybody. There is no provision to throw out anybody, unless unanimously all the existing members of the club agreed to throw you out. And I doubt, now or in the future, any Irish Government is going to unanimously agree to throw themselves out.”

Exactly the same Lisbon Treaty: Not a dot or comma of the Lisbon Treaty will be changed for Lisbon Two. If Lisbon comes into force it will be interpreted by the EU Court of Justice and not on the basis of political declarations by the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents. These do not change anything in the Treaty and are not legally binding as part of EU law. Promises of changes to suit Ireland in some future EU Treaty cannot pull back on anything in the Lisbon Treaty once it is in force. The EU Prime Ministers state that they “will clarify but not change either the content or the application of the Treaty of Lisbon “, which only the EU Court can decide on ( Summit Conclusions 19-6-2009). As pro-Lisbon journalist James Downey has written: “The antis are right about one thing, if one thing only. Any guarantees we may get on their concerns will be irrelevant, or worthless, or both.” ( Irish Independent, 21-3-2009)

Overturning the people’s vote: The Lisbon Treaty is the new legal form of the EU Constitution which French and Dutch voters rejected in their 2005 referendums. Irish voters rejected it in last year’s referendum by 53% to 47%. All genuine democrats, including Yes-side voters, should respect that vote as the French and Dutch Governments did. Respecting it would have meant Taoiseach Brian Cowen telling his EU partners that Ireland could not ratify Lisbon because the Irish people had voted No to it, so there was no point in their continuing to ratify it as EU Treaties must be unanimous. Instead Taoiseach Cowen and Foreign Minister Martin told the other EU Governments on the morning of last year’s count to ignore their own people’s vote and to continue with ratifying Lisbon.They persuaded their EU colleagues that they could get the Irish people to overturn their democratic No vote in a second referendum on exactly the same Treaty, if they got enough support from France, Germany etc. in the form of statements about Ireland’s concerns, even though the Treaty is unchanged.

Turning the EU into a State: Lisbon would be a giant step in turning the EU into a supranational Federal-style State, in which Ireland would effectively be reduced to regional or provincial status. It would give Government Ministers and the Big EU States huge new powers, while taking power away from ordinary citizens across the EU, and from the National Parliaments they elect. Because of our Constitution, only Ireland is being allowed a vote on it. Only we Irish can save democracy in the EU by refusing to allow ourselves be pressurised into overturning our rejection of Lisbon in 2008. If we vote No again in Lisbon Two we hold the door open to our fellow countrymen and women in Northern Ireland and give them the chance of having a say in a UK referendum next year.

Denying citizens a vote: France’s President Sarkozy and EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy have admitted that if Lisbon were put to referendum in other EU countries their voters would reject it too. Although opinion polls show that people in most Member States want to decide for themselves whether they should be put under an EU Constitution which would override their National Constitutions, the EU Prime Ministers refused to allow referendums. This does not bode well for the future of democracy in the EU.

A UK Referendum: There is now a race in time between the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which would greatly increase the power of the Big States and the Brussels Commission in the EU, and the coming to office of a new Government in Britain by next May. Labour’s Gordon Brown broke Tony Blair’s promise to give the British people a referendum. David Cameron’s policy is to hold a referendum on Lisbon in the UK and recommend a No vote to it to the British people - so long as we Irish do not change our No vote of last year and thereby bring Lisbon and the new undemocratic EU it would create into being for all 27 EU Member States first.

    The main reasons why Lisbon is a bad Treaty for Ireland and for the EU.

    It would:

    1. Be a power-grab by the Big States for control of the EU. At present EU laws are made by a simple majority of Member States (14 out of 27), so long as between them they have a qualified majority of 255 votes out of 345. Under this Nice Treaty system the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7, one quarter of each Big State. Under Lisbon future EU laws would be made by 55% of Member States, i.e. 15 out of 27, so long as they have 65% of the total EU population between them. By basing EU law-making primarily on population size , the Lisbon Treaty would double Germany’s relative voting strength on the EU Council of Ministers from its present 8% of the total votes to 17% on a population basis, and increase France’s, Britain’s and Italy’s by half, from 8% to 12% - while halving Ireland’s vote from 2% to 0.8% (Art.16, Treaty on European Union / TEU). How does having 0.8% of a vote in making EU laws put us “at the heart of Europe” ? Taoiseach Brian Cowen’s “guarantees” do not explain how having half as much influence in the EU as Ireland has today would induce other Member States to listen to our concerns on unemployment and help to resolve the economic crisis in the interest of Irish companies, workers and farmers. (*See Note 1 below on the voting rules for making EU laws)

    2. Copperfasten the Laval and related judgements of the EU Court of Justice, which put the competition rules of the EU market above the right of Trade Unions to enforce pay standards higher than the minimum wage for migrant workers. At the same time Lisbon would give the EU full control of immigration policy (Art.79 TFEU). This combination threatens the pay and working conditions of many Irish people. A Protocol in a new Treaty different from Lisbon would be needed to set aside the recent Laval, Rüffert and other EU Court judgements, but the EU Prime Ministers refused that.

    3. Permit the post-Lisbon EU to impose Europe-wide taxes directly on us for the first time without need of further Treaties or referendums (Art.311 TFEU). This could be any kind of tax - income tax, sales tax, property tax - so long as it was unanimously agreed by EU Governments. If Lisbon were to be ratified, Government Ministers would have every incentive to agree to give the EU much increased ” own resources” by introducing its own taxes to finance the many new functions the EU would obtain under the Treaty.

    4 . Amend the existing treaties to give the EU exclusive power as regards rules on foreign direct investment (Arts.206-7 TFEU) and give the Court of Justice the power to order the harmonisation of national indirect taxes it it decides that they cause a “distortion of competition” in the EU market (Art.113 TFEU). This amendment and the new Protocol No. 27 on the Internal Market and Competition would strengthen the hand of the Court in using the EU’s internal market rules to subvert Ireland’s low 12.5% company tax rat e , which is the principal reason foreign firms come to Ireland and stay here when they come. Compare Germany’s 30% company tax rate. Commission plans for a harmonised tax base in the EU, the precursor of harmonised tax rates, have been put on the back-burner until after Lisbon Two for fear they would alarm Irish voters.

    5. The Commission, which is appointed not elected, has the monopoly of proposing all European laws. The Lisbon Treaty would abolish our present right to “propose” and decide who Ireland’s Commissioner is, by replacing it with a right to make”suggestions” only, leaving it up to the incoming Commission President to decide (Art.17.7 TEU; cf.Art.214 TEC). Our No vote of last year secured us a commitment to a permanent Commissioner, but what is the point of every EU State continuing to have its own Commissioner post-Lisbon when it can no longer decide who that Commissioner will be? Under the present Nice Treaty Ireland would continue to decide who should be our Commissioner, and can continue to have an Irish Commissioner indefinitely as well. (*See Note 2 below explaining how).

    6. Give the legally new EU which it would establish its own State Constitution, which would be superior to the Irish and other national Constitutions. Lisbon would abolish the existing European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and transfer all of its powers and institutions to the new post-Lisbon Union. It would give the European Union its own legal personality for the first time, which would be constitutionally separate from and superior to its 27 Member States, so that it could sign international Treaties with other States in all areas of its powers (Arts.1 and 47 TEU; Declaration No.17 concerning Primacy ). This post-Lisbon EU would have the same name but would be constitutionally very different from the present EU, which was founded by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

    In constitutional terms Lisbon would thereby turn Ireland into a regional or provincial state within this new Federal-style Union, with the EU’s Constitution and laws having legal primacy over the Irish Constitution and laws in any cases of conflict between the two. The EU Court of Justice, as the Supreme Court of the new post-Lisbon Union, would decide such conflicts. Constitutionally and in the eyes of others this would be the end of Ireland’s position as an independent sovereign State in the international community of States. Although we would retain some of the trappings of independent statehood from pre-Lisbon days, in reality we would be more like a regional or provincial state such as Bavaria inside Federal Germany or Massachusetts or Texas inside the USA. From the inside the EU would seem to be based on a Treaty between States, but from the outside it would look like a State itself. The only major power of a State which the post-Lisbon European Union would lack would be the power to force its members to go to war against their will, although they could go to war voluntarily on the EU’s behalf. (*See Notes 3 and 5 below on the constitutional revolution the Lisbon Treaty would bring about)

    7. Turn us all into real citizens for the first time of this new post-Lisbon European Union, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws in the event of any conflict between the two. One can only be a citizen of a State. and all States must have citizens. Article 9 TEU would give us an “additional” EU citizenship, on top of our Irish citizenship. This would be a real EU citizenship for the first time, with associated citizens’ rights and duties, and would be quite different from the notional or symbolical EU “citizenship” of today. We would still retain our Irish citizenship, but it would be subordinate to our EU citizenship in any case of conflict between the two, as is the case with citizens of such Federal States as Germany, the USA, Switzerland, Canada . The EU Court of Justice would decide on any such conflicts. (*See Note 4 below)

    8. Give the EU Court of Justice the power to decide our rights as EU citizens by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the first time (Art.6 TEU ). The Charter includes such rights as free speech, the right to fair trial, the right to life, the rights of the child, the right to strike, property rights etc. - all of them rights we already have under the Irish Constitution, but which it would fall to the EU Court of Justice, not Ireland’s courts, to interpret and decide for people in their capacity as citizens of the post-Lisbon EU if Lisbon should be ratified. This would enable the EU judges to use its case-law to lay down a uniform standard of rights for the 500 million citizens of the post-Lisbon Union in the name of a common EU citizenship in the years and decades to come. It would open the possibility of clashes with national human rights standards in sensitive areas where Member States differ from one another at present, e.g. trial by jury, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, habeas corpus, the legalisation of hard drugs, euthanasia, abortion, labour law, succession law, marriage law, children’s rights etc. Ireland’s Supreme Court and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg would no longer have the final say on what our rights are.

    9. Ireland would lose the national veto it has at present by handing over to the EU the power to make laws binding on us in 32 new policy areas, including public services, crime, justice and policing, immigration, energy, transport, tourism, sport, culture, public health, the EU budget and international measures on climate change (Art.191 TFEU). The Dáil and Irish voters who elect the Dáil would no longer decide laws or policy for the areas transferred . (*See Note 6 below on the respective law-making powers of the EU and its Member States after Lisbon.)

    10. Reduce the power of National Parliaments to make laws in relation to 49 policy areas or matters, and increase the influence of the European Parliament in making EU laws in 19 new areas (See euabc.eu/Heeger II for the two detailed lists). Lisbon would entitle one-third of the National Parliaments or 1 million EU citizens to request the EU Commission to propose a new EU law or to abandon a proposed law, but the Commission need not accede to any such request (Art.11.4 TEU; Protocol No. 2 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality). Lisbon underlines the implicitly subordinate role of National Parliaments in the institutional structure of the post-Lisbon Union by laying down that “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” by various means that are set out in Art.12 TEU. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who at present are “representatives of the peoples of the Member States brought together in the Community” (Art.189 TEC), would under Lisbon become “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14 TEU). This change illustrates the constitutional revolution Lisbon would bring about.

    11. Be a self-amending Treaty which would permit the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to shift most remaining EU policy areas where unanimity is required and a national veto still exists - e.g. on tax harmonisation - to qualified majority voting on the Council of Ministers, without need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.48.7 TEU). In addition, the so-called “Flexibility Clause”, which allows the EU to take action and adopt measures to attain one of the EU’s objectives even if “the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers,” would be extended by Lisbon to all areas of the Treaty and not just the internal market rules as before (Art.352 TFEU). This would open the floodgates to more political integration, i.e. centralisation, by means of this article, which is already widely used.

    12. Enable the 27 EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to appoint an EU President for up to five years without allowing voters any say as to who he or she would be - thereby abolishing the present six-monthly rotating EU presidencies (Art.15.5 TEU). Appointment rather than democratic election to this and other top EU jobs, such as the proposed EU “Foreign Minister”/ High Representative (Art.21.3 TEU), typifies the undemocratic nature of the proposed Lisbon Constitution. It is the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the Big States who would have the key say in these appointments because of the big increase in their voting power under Lisbon.

    13. Militarize the EU further, requiring Member States “progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art.42.3 TEU) and to aid and assist other Member States experiencing armed attack “by all the means in their power” (Art.42.7 TEU).

Explanatory Notes

*Note 1: Voting to make EU laws: When Ireland joined the then EEC in 1973 Germany, France, Britain and Italy had 10 votes each in making European laws and Ireland had 3 - one-third that of the Big States. Under the present Nice Treaty the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7 - one quarter of the Big States. Under Lisbon Germany’s votes would be 20 times Ireland’s, for it has 80 million people as against Ireland’s 4 million, and France, Britain and Italy, with their average populations of 60 million, would each have 15 times more votes than Ireland. Germany and France between them have one-third of the EU’s population of near 500 million. Under the Lisbon rules they would need only two small countries to vote with them to block any EU law they did not like. (The present voting rules are set out in Art. 205 TEC and the Declaration on EU Enlargement. The Lisbon rules are in Art. 238 TFEU).

*Note 2: Keeping Ireland’s Commissioner under Nice: The Nice Treaty requires the number of Commissioners to be fewer than the number of Member States from 2009, without specifying a number, and any change must be agreed unanimously (Art.4, Protocol on Enlargement ). This can be done by reducing the number of Commissioners from 27 to 26, which would mean Ireland would lose its Commissioner once every 135 years. Alternatively, the country whose national is given the job of EU Foreign Minister could be represented by that person on the Commission. So there would be no need for any country to lose a Commissioner under Nice, unless they were compensated by having one of their nationals given this more important job instead.

*Note 3: Ireland’s proposed Constitutional Amendment: The first sentence of the proposed Constitutional Amendment which Irish voters rejected last summer and which they are being asked to change their minds on in October, recognises that Lisbon would establish a legally new European Union which would have the same name but would politically and constitutionally be very different from the present Nice/Maastricht Treaty-based EU : “The State may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on the 13th day of December 2007, and may be a member of the European Union established by virtue of that Treaty . No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by membership of the European Union, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred to in this section, from having the force of law in the State .” (emphasis added )

*Note 4: EU Citizenship : Under the present Nice Treaty EU citizenship is stated to “complement” national citizenship (Art.17 TEC). This is purely notional or symbolical, for the present EU is not a State, and one can only be a citizen of a State. Neither does the present EU have legal personality, so that it cannot have individuals as members. All that would change with Lisbon, which would make citizenship of the constitutionally new Union “additional to ” national citizenship (Art. 9 TEU). This would be a real Federal citizenship with associated rights and duties vis-à-vis the new EU, with all the implications of that. In classical Federations such as the USA or 19th century Germany, both sovereignty and dual citizenships are divided between the federal and the regional / provincial levels.

*Note 5: Lisbon’s Constitutional Revolution: The Lisbon Treaty proposes to “constitute” or establish a legally new European Union while retaining the same name, by amending the two existing European Treaties rather than by replacing these completely with a formally titled “Constitution”, as the Treaty which the French and Dutch rejected in their 2005 referendums sought to do (See the first sentence of the Irish Constitutional Amendment above and Arts.1 and 47 TEU for proof of this). When the French and Dutch rejected this Constitutional Treaty, the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents decided to get a Federal-style EU Constitution through indirectly rather than directly without using the word “Constitution”, for they realised that talk of EU Constitutions alarmed people and made too obvious the constitutional revolution being proposed. The result is the Lisbon Treaty.

Because the Lisbon Treaty consists of a long series of amendments to the two existing European Treaties, one can only understand what it would do by referring to the latter Treaties as they would be if amended by Lisbon. This document does that. The Constitution of the proposed post-Lisbon European Union would therefore be the two existing European Treaties as they would be when and if they are amended by the Lisbon Treaty. These would be the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU). The two Treaties would have the same legal value (Art.1 TEU). The second of these, the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union , would be the new name for the present second Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), for Lisbon would abolish the existing European Community which Ireland joined in 1973.

In legal content and effect the Lisbon Treaty is virtually 100% the same as the Constitutional Treaty which the French and Dutch rejected. Both Treaties would abolish the existing European Community and the Nice/Maastricht-based European Union and establish in their place a constitutionally new European Union with its own legal personality, which would be legally separate from and superior to its Member States for the first time. Lisbon, like its predecessor, would then confer a real “additional” EU citizenship, with accompanying EU citizens’ rights and duties, on the 500 million citizens of the 27 Member States, without most of them being aware of it or being allowed any direct say on it. At the same time the same name , “The European Union” , would be retained for the post-Lisbon EU as for the existing Nice/Maastricht-based EU, even though the new Union’s constitutional-political character would be fundamentally changed.

Those pushing this great deception hope that the media and ordinary citizens in the 27 Member States will not notice the constitutional revolution which Lisbon seeks to bring about - for the EU itself and for its Member States - until after it is accomplished. People are to be sleep-walked into becoming citizens of a Federal-style EU without knowing it. Hence the decision of the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents in 2005 to avoid referendums on this proposed constitutional/political revolution at all costs, in case people might be alerted and protest.

* Note 6: EU powers and Member State powers: In some policy areas the EU has exclusive powers to make laws for its Member States, so that they can no longer legislate for those areas (Art.3 TFEU). These areas are the customs Union, competition rules for the internal market, interest rate and exchange rate policy for the eurozone countries, fisheries conservation, the common commercial policy and trade treaties. In most policy areas the EU exercises shared powers with its Member States. These areas are the internal market, some areas of social policy, economic, social and territorial cohesion, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, and common safety concerns in public health as defined in the Treaty. In these areas of shared law-making it is the EU, not the Member States, which decides what can be done. The Lisbon Treaty lays down: “Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence” or ” to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence” (Art.2 TFEU). The EU also has independent powers in relation to research, technological development, space, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, without the right to inhibit Member State activity in these areas (Art. 4.3 TFEU). Lisbon also confers on the EU supporting, coordinating or supplementing powers in relation to the actions of Member States in protecting and improving human health, industry, culture, tourism, education, youth, sport and vocational training, civil protection and administrative cooperation (Art.6 TFEU). In addition the EU has its Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (Arts.21-46 TEU). It is safe to say that there is no area of State law-making or public policy that would not be either decided, influenced or touched by the EU’s powers after Lisbon. It is unsurprising therefore that the EU now decides the majority of legal acts for its Member States each year. ( For a full list of the specific powers transferred to the EU level see euabc.eu - legal analysis by Klaus Heeger, II) * * *

This document has been prepared by The National Platform EU Research and Information Centre, 24 Crawford Ave., Dublin 9; Tel: 01-8305792; Web-site: nationalplatform.org; Director Anthony Coughlan. It has been checked for legal accuracy with authorities on European and Irish constitutional law.

Please feel free to use and adapt it as you see fit, without any need of reference to or acknowledgement of its source. Please photocopy it and distribute it to others so as to inform people how Ireland’s pro-Lisbon politicians - some wittingly, some unwittingly - are out to do profound damage to our political and economic interests in the EU by seeking to overturn last year’s Lisbon Treaty referendum result.

We are an entirely voluntary body and depend on citizens’ donations for our work. To help this, and to enable us spread this information more widely, please send what donation you can to our address above, making cheques out to Bank of Ireland Account No. 30081817.

For useful non-partisan material on the Lisbon Treaty and all aspects of the EU, see the Dictionary/Lexicon of EU terms and associated data and linked internet items at euabc.eu

Последњи референдум

Десило се очекивано. Ирци су, након неуспелог покушаја прошле године, на референдуму прихватили Лисабонски споразум. Није ни могло другачије, суверена воља грађана исказана на првом референдуму је одбачена, и бирачима је пружена прилика да исправе своју „грешку“. Такав однос Уније према народној вољи – до недавно познатој под називом „демократија“ – није нов. Сетимо се, устав ЕУ је одбачен на референдумима у Француској и Холандији пре него што је преименован у Лисабонски споразум и прогуран без референдума у парламентима држава чланица. Након резултата у Ирској будућност Европе зависи од тврдоглавости добро познатог евроскептичара Вацлава Клауса, чешког председника, и његове способности да одоли притисцима још 8 месеци до следећих избора у Уједињеном Краљевству.

Незадовољни Британци

Кампања уочи референдума била ја високог интензитета и неукусно једнострана. Као и први пут, све значајне политичке партије осим националистичког Шин Фејна су биле за ратификацију споразума. „Велики бизнис“ – тајкуни по нашки – се умешао са великим парама у кампању за споразум такође. Председник Комисије ЕУ запретио је Ирцима да би поновно гласање против угрозило њихово право да имају комесара (право које ће иначе фактички губе споразумом), упропастило економију, искључило Ирску из „Европе“ и слично. Аналитичари су наравно, по принципу шаргарепа и штап, предвиђали талас запошљавања у случају позитивног исхода. Медији, одлуком ирског РАТЕЛ-а, за разлику од свих претходних референдума овог пута нису били у обавези да обезбеде подједнако време за обе стране већ само да обезбеде платформу за главне политичке партије, дакле за оне који подржавају споразум. Тако се синдром српских изборних кампања, са грандиозним обећањима запошљавања и будућег благостања, медијском једностраношћу и неоснованим претњама „шта ће бити ако они победе“, појавио и у Ирској. Народ – суочен са најтежом рецесијом од 70их година прошлог века – је попустио.

Сам референдум је обиловао сумњивим одлукама, као што је била забрана анкетирања током дана референдума и бројање гласова следећег дана уместо исте вечери као на претходном гласању. Јасно је да се комесарима Европске уније журило, знали су да би даља одуговлачења сахранила пројекат европске супердржаве.

Иако је ратификација Лисабонског споразума завршена у парламентима свих држава чланица, пољски и чешки председници су одбили да потпишу споразум док се неке ствари не разјасне. Сада је извесно да ће Пољаци ускоро потписати јер су чекали позитивно изјашњавање Ираца, док чешки председник чека одлуку свог Уставног суда о приговору чешких сенатора против споразума. Главни разлог за журбу су предстојећи избори у Великој Британији, очекивани средином следеће године.

Велика непопуларност британске владајуће Лабуристичке партије најављује скоро извесну победу опозиционих конзервативаца Дејвида Камерона, који су недавно напустили федералистички блок Европских народних партија у Европском парламенту и основали свој, евроскептичарски, десничарски блок са савезницима из источне Европе. Једно од главних обећања конзервативаца је расписивање референдума у Британији – чији резултат би сигурно оборио ратификацију споразума – али само под условом да споразум још није ступио на снагу.

Наде већински евроскептичне Конзервативне партије су положене у спорост чешког уставног суда и истрајност Клауса који сада стоји сам против силне моћи европске бирократије да казни чешки народ због непослушности њиховог председника. На несрећу конзервативаца, Клаус је већ изјавио после резултата у Ирској да Британци не могу од њега очекивати да сам изнесе тај терет и да су закаснили ако су желели нешто да промене.

Сада су све очи уперене у Камерона, чија странка ове недеље одржава годишњу скупштину, у исчекивању званичног става партије. Да ли ће, упркос чињеници да ће споразум вероватно ступити на снагу, расписати референдум са „ретроактивним“ дејством? Овакав исход, који има гласну подршку многих истакнутих конзервативаца укључујући градоначелника Лондона Бориса Џонсона, је мало вероватан јер би де факто представљао референдум на даље учешће Велике Британије у пројекту ЕУ и наишао би на удар свих политичких елита европе (и „естаблишмента“ у самој Британији) које су се добро ухлебиле у мегабирократији Брисела.

Извесно је да ће овај устав Европске уније, под другим именом, ипак ступити на снагу и са њим ново доба у Европи. Доба несмењивих политичких елита, неизабраних владара (као што је нови председник ЕУ, највероватније Тони Блер), доба социјализма за богате а капитализма за сиромашне, доба без референдума и незгодних одлука „неупућеног“ народа.

Лисабонски споразум конституише европску супердржаву, даје јој правно лице, председника, органе спољне политике, држављанство, војску и најважније од свега право на измене постојећих и будућих споразума без потребе сагласности народа и држава као до сада. Сасвим је вероватно да ће референдум који је одржан у прошли петак бити и последњи референдум у ЕУ.

Народи европе су се олако одрекли не само државног суверенитета, него и личних слобода за које су прошле генерације животе дали. Будућност Европе одавно није изгледала лошије.

СН

Reformski dokument EU čeka ratifikaciju Poljske i Češke
Klaus ne žuri da potpiše Lisabonski sporazum
Autor: N. Vlačo | Foto:AFP | 09.10.2009. - 05:00


Fredrik Rajnfelt, premijer Švedske, države koja predsedava EU, danima je uzalud pokušavao da telefonom stupi u kontakt sa Vaclavom Klausom, češkim predsednikom, kako bi saznao kada evroskeptični državnik planira da potpiše Lisabonski sporazum nakon što je pozitivni ishod irskog referenduma stvorio pretpostavke za to. Kada ga je najzad dobio Klaus ga je obavestio da želi da se na dokument doda fus nota od dve rečenice koja se odnosi na Povelju EU o osnovnim pravima.
 
Petar Macinka iz Klausovog odeljenja za odnose s javnošću za „Blic“ kaže da predsednikov potpis na Lisabonski sporazum zavisi od presude Ustavnog suda Češke, koja se očekuje u narednih nekoliko nedelja.
„Proces po žalbi 17 senatora na Lisabonski sporazum pred ovim sudom mogao bi da potraje nekoliko nedelja ili mesec dana, a pre presude Ustavnog suda predsednik ne može da potpiše taj dokument, niti da ga komentariše“, kazao je Macinka.
On tvrdi da Klaus nije uticao na ovu inicijativu senatora, iako se zna da je većina njih iz Građanske demokratske partije, koju je Klaus osnovao i vodio do 2002, kada je napustio tu funkciju da bi postao predsednik Češke. Teoretski, sudski proces mogao bi da potraje i celih šest meseci, što bi Klausu dozvolilo da potpis na Lisabonski sporazum odloži do izbora u Velikoj Britaniji, na kojima se očekuje pobeda konzervativaca. Dejvid Kameron, lider torijevaca, protivi se takođe Lisabonskom sporazumu, ali je nedavno naveo da u slučaju pobede na izborima ne planira da raspiše referendum o tom dokumentu kojim se reformiše EU.
Glavni argument 17 čeških senatora koji su žalbu na Lisabonski sporazum ovog puta podneli na dokument u celini, a ne samo na njegove delove kao u novembru 2008, jeste da ovaj sporazum od EU stvara „superdržavu“ koja će zemljama članicama oduzeti nacionalni suverenitet. Senator Jirži Oberfalcer kaže da ukoliko sud utvrdi da EU ovom reformom preuzima suverenitet Češke, sledi da se Lisabonski sporazum kosi sa češkim Ustavom i zato ne sme da bude ratifikovan.
Sesilija Malstrem, švedska ministarka za evropska pitanja, u sredu je boravila u Pragu kako bi od premijera Jana Fišera i drugih čeških zvaničnika pokušala da sazna koliko ozbiljnu prepreku predstavlja odbijanje Klausa da potpiše sporazum koji su još proletos usvojila oba doma parlamenta. Švedska kao predsedavajuća EU ne može da počne konsultacije o novoj Evropskoj komisiji, dok ne bude jasnije da li će u Češkoj ratifikacija Lisabonskog sporazuma biti okončana i kada.
Češki premijer Fišer je, nakon što su senatori 29. septembra podneli žalbu Ustavnom sudu, izjavio da se u inostranstvu oseća narastajuća nervoza u pogledu Češke, ali i naveo da vlada nema nameru da Ustavnom sudu podnese žalbu protiv Klausa što ne obavlja predsedničke dužnosti. Premijer Fišer je u sredu na video konferenciji sa Briselom ipak izrazio uverenja da EU nema potrebe da brine. „Pitanje Lisabonskog sporazuma nije pitanje da li će biti ratifikovan ili neće, nego kada“, rekao je Fišer.
Česi bi, prema anketama, prihvatili Lisabon.

Rafitikacija u Poljskoj
Leh Kačinjski, evroskeptični predsednik Poljske, najavio da će svoj potpis na reformski dokument EU verovatno staviti 10. oktobra i tako okončati njegovu ratifikaciju u Poljskoj. Prema tvrdnjama njegovog pomoćnika Aleksandra Ščigla, na svečanost tim povodom pozvan je i Žoze Manuel Barozo, predsednik Evropske komisije, Fredrik Rajnfelt, premijer Švedske, kao i Ježi Buzek, predsedavajući Evropskog parlamenta. Ali predsednikov brat Jaroslav Kačinjski, čelnik opozicione partije „Pravo i pravda“, demantovao je te informacije kao „medijske spekulacije“.


Sudija na odmoru
Vlastimil Getinger iz Ustavnog suda Češke kazao je za „Blic“ da bi proces po žalbi senatora mogao da potraje barem nekoliko nedelja. Slučaj je 30. septembra dodeljen sudiji Jiržiju Muhi, koji je na odmoru nekoliko nedelja. Iz tog razloga slučaj je potom dodeljen sudiji Pavelu Rihetskom, predsedniku Ustavnog suda, koji je žalbu na Lisabonski sporazum uputio u hitnu proceduru.

Izvor: Blic

Kačinjski ipak potpisuje Lisabonski sporazum
Autor: Tanjug | Foto:AFP | 08.10.2009. - 20:17


Poljski predsednik Leh Kačinjski potpisaće Lisabonski sporazum i tako završiti njegovu ratifikaciju u Poljskoj u subotu, 10. oktobra u podne, na svečanosti kojoj će osim poljskog državnog vrha prisustvovati i najviši zvanični EU.

Ceremoniji će prisustvovati šef Evropske komisije Žoze Manuel Barozo, premijer Švedske, predsedavajuće EU Frederik Rajnfelt i predsednik Evropskog parlamenta Ježi Buzek, objavila je večeras zvanično kancelarija poljskog predsednika na svom sajtu.
 
Potvrdi iz kancelarije prethodile su oprečne izjave poljskih zvaničnika o tome da li će predsednik konačno potpisati dokument. Njegov pomoćnik Aleksander Ščiglo izjavio je jutros za poljski televizijski kanal TVN 24 da će Kačinjski održati datu reč i potpisati Lisabonski sporazum u nedelju, 11. oktobra, ali je nedugo zatim predsednikov brat blizanac Jaroslav to opovrgao.

Buzek u Varšavu putuje iz Praga gde će prethodno u petak, kao jedan od retkih evropskih zvaničnika, imati posle dužeg vremena priliku da razgovara o ratifikaciji Lisabonskog sporazuma sa poslednjim ko ga u Evropi blokira - predsednikom Češke Vaclavom Klausom.
Evroskeptični češki predsednik potpuno je iznenadio i evropske partnere i češku političku scenu, kada je danas u telefonskom razgovoru sa Rajnfeltom zatražio da Lisabonski sporazum dobije dopunu, dve rečenice koje bi se odnosile na Povelju osnovnih prava.
Izuzetke iz primene Povelje osnovnih prava uspele su tokom pregovora o Lisabonskom sporazumu da za sebe izdejstvuju Velika Britanija i Poljska, a Kačinjski je označio to kao jedan od uspeha poljskih pregovarača.

Klaus nije želeo švedskom premijeru da kaže kakve dopune traži, samo je rekao da će sve precizirati kada dobije presudu Ustavnog suda Češke o žalbi 17 konzervativnih senatora da je Lisabonski sporazum u suprotnosti sa češkim Ustavom.

Izvor: Blic