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Šestodnevni rat 1967 i Jomkipurski rat 1973

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War

Oružje

Šestodnevni rat



Jomkipurski rat

Izrael i SAD blizu dogovora o zajedničkoj proizvodnji raketnog sistema Dejvid's Sling,firmi Rafael i Rajteon,nazvanog još i "Magični štap"

haaretz

Head of U.S. missile defense agency says sides working on draft of an agreement for co-production of system, expected to go operational next year.

The United States and Israel are only weeks away from reaching a draft agreement on a co-production of Israel's air defense system called David's Sling that the two countries jointly developed, the top U.S. missile defense officer told lawmakers on Thursday.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David%27s_Sling




Propellant    two-stage missile

Operational range 300 km

Flight ceiling    50–75 km

Flight altitude    30–50 km

Speed    Mach 7.5

Guidance system AESA Millimeter 3D Radar + Dual Electro-Optical / (FPA) / Imaging Infrared (CCD/IIR) Seeker + Advanced Asymmetric 360 Degree Multi Seeker Sensor Engagement + 3 Way Data Link With Advanced Real-time Automatic and Manual Re-targeting Capability + Advanced ECCM & IRCCM

Steering system Advanced Asymmetric Kill Vehicle With Advanced Super Maneuverability Steering Capability For Super Maneuver Trajectory During Kill Stage

Odlicni prilozi!   

Flotila 13/Shayetet 13

Silent soldiers: Inside the IDF's elite naval commando unit

Ynet accompanies fighters from Shayetet 13, seen as one of the world's finest elite units, as they spend the day training.

It is noon at the Atlit base, the training center of the Israel Defense Forces’ legendary Shayetet elite naval commando unit. The sun is shining, yet it has started to rain. The commandos we are here to meet are mainly concerned about our photographer, Gadi Kabalo. They want to finish the shooting session as early as possible; to pull two commando teams from a tight schedule is no easy task.

The upheavals in the Middle East of recent years have created multiple challenges for the IDF, and had a direct impact on ongoing operational activities - especially in units such as Shayetet 13.



The unit, whose name translates as Flotilla 13, was formed in 1949, shortly after the creation of the State of Israel. Specialists in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue, its fighters have played a major role in all of Israel's subsequent conflicts, growing more skilled with time, as well as taking part in humanitarian campaigns, such as the airlift of Jews from Ethiopia. It is widely regarded as one of the world's best elite units.



In the absence of an official conflict, IDF activity is based on what is referred to as "war between wars," and the naval commando unit is undoubtedly one of the most influential factors in this arena. In the last year alone, Shaytet 13 has conducted numerous complex operations behind enemy lines, hidden from the eyes of the public.



One tangible example of such missions came last month, when Shayetet 13 fighters made headlines in Israel and all over the world following the capture of the Iranian weapons ship KLOS-C in international waters. All of the 10 fighters we met took part in the operation, dubbed Full Disclosure. Impressive as it was, it was hardly the zenith in the careers of these veteran fighters, who have taken part in operations the vast majority of us will probably never hear about.

 Naval commando fighters endure one of the toughest training courses in the IDF in their bid to win their coveted unit batwings insignia. The 20 months of training includes basic training with the Nahal brigade, further basic training at the unit’s central base in Atlit, which schools the troops in maritime warfare, and advanced training in combat diving, navigation and Shayetet’s unique watercrafts.



At the end of the course, fighters are assigned "professions", and each team specializes in one of three commando roles: diving, raids or above water. The training on display for us comprised of a team of divers and a team of raiders. The divers' team included four experienced divers who finished their training course two years ago.

 Descending into the water, the fighters are roped to one another, symbolizing their mutual dependence. Each team member has a partner, and together they perform their tasks underwater, watching each other's backs.



The fighters traveled from Atlit to the training area by boat, after taking a not insignificant amount of time to upload their specialist equipment. The divers use unique Shayetet 13 wetsuits, which include diving fins, masks, weapons and state-of- the-art breathing apparatus.

It’s only by jumping into the water with them that is possible to fully appreciate why the Shayetet fighters are referred to as "the silent men". These fighters move with great stealth; out of the water, it is extremely difficult to follow their submerged location – they don’t make a sound, barely permitting any oxygen bubbles to escape, with movements that make it almost impossible for an enemy to track them.



The Shayetet divers engage in guerilla combat and underwater commando warfare, and are able to reach any port undetected. They are trained in a variety of martial arts, and also undergo training and carry out joint ops with other IDF commando units.

The divers can remain underwater for considerable amounts of time. Without a group of journalists for company, the training would probably have continued for many hours. In the water, they practice combat diving - testing their ability to dive together as a team and accomplish set tasks as one body.



After the training is over, the divers come up to the boat and sail back to the base in the same silence in which they arrived. During the long hours of the training, they didn't set foot on the ground at all - it's almost as if they can live in the water for an unlimited time.

After the divers finish their training, the raiders arrive. The team is comprised of six commando fighters. This is a team that only finished its training a year ago, but has already taken part in many operational activities in far-flung locations, including the takeover of the KLOS-C.

The force carries out a raid from the sea to the beach, aiming to take over a given structure. The fighters rehearse their transition from the sea to the land, all the while carrying some of the army's most sophisticated weaponry.



It's late evening and darkness descends. The base becomes even more active, and it seems that the training day will never end. The training sets them in good stead, for another daring operation we might perhaps only ever hear of via the foreign media.

This is a small and tactical force, with a range of abilities we were allowed to witness first-hand. It is apparent that the fighters are used to getting their uniforms wet without a second thought. They are equipped with the IDF's most up-to-date combat uniforms, designed for their specialized missions.

The training starts once the fighters are in the water, almost impossible to distinguish from large rocks around them. They are able to sit in the same place for hours without even the slightest movement, laying in waiting for the enemy in their camouflaged hiding place.

Opako

Još jedan uspešan test "Strele 3"

reuters

Israel’s upgraded Arrow ballistic missile shield passed a full interception test on Thursday, hitting a target in space meant to simulate the trajectory of the long-range weapons held by Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the Defence Ministry said.

The success was a boost for “Arrow 3,” among Israeli missile defense systems that get extensive U.S. funding. Its first attempt at a full trial, held a year ago, was aborted due to what designers said was a faulty deployment of the target.

“The success of the Arrow 3 system today … is an important step towards one of the most important projects for Israel and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) becoming operational,” said Joseph Weiss, IAI’s chief executive officer.

Arrow 3 interceptors are designed to fly beyond the earth’s atmosphere, where their warheads detach to become ‘kamikaze’ satellites, or “kill vehicles,” that track and slam into the targets. Such high-altitude shoot-downs are meant to safely destroy incoming nuclear, biological or chemical missiles.



The Arrow system is jointly developed by state-owned IAI and U.S. firm Boeing Co. and U.S. officials were present for the test. The earlier Arrow 2 was deployed more than a decade ago and officials put its success rate in trials at around 90 percent.

The United States has its own system for intercepting ballistic missiles in space, Aegis, but a senior Israeli official played down any comparison with Arrow 3.



While it “might be true” that the allies were alone in having such proven capabilities, “Israel is not on the level of the U.S.,” Yair Ramati, head of anti-missile systems at the Defence Ministry, told reporters.

Arrow serves as the top tier of an integrated Israeli shield built up to withstand various potential missile or rocket salvoes. The bottom tier is the already deployed short-range Iron Dome interceptor, while a system called David’s Sling, due to be fielded next year, will shoot down mid-range missiles.

Israel’s strategic outlook has shifted in recent months, given the international deal in July curbing Iran’s nuclear program, the depletion of the Syrian army’s arsenal in that country’s civil war and Hezbollah’s reinforcement of Damascus against the rebels. Israel and Hamas fought a Gaza war in 2014 but the Palestinian enclave has been relatively quiet since.

Nonethless, a senior Israeli official said there was no sign of waning government support or weakening U.S. backing for the various missile defense programs.



“Everyone knows that you have to prepare with an eye well beyond the horizon, especially as the enemy’s capabilities improve all the time,” the senior official told Reuters.

In the coming months the Defence Ministry and Israeli military will discuss a possible schedule for deployment of Arrow 3, Ramati said, adding that further tests of the system were expected.

israeliweapons.com







Historical Background
 
The War of Independence was, in effect, an infantry war. Operations of both Israel and the enemy were waged by infantry formations. The few tanks deployed played no decisive role. Israel at that time had 15 tanks, and the Arabs had 45. Mobile and armored forces in the War of Independence were mainly equipped with half-tracks, armored personnel carriers, and armored vehicles with light guns. Israeli forces had 280 half-tracks and 20 armored vehicles with guns. Arab forces had 620 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, of which 180 carried guns.

The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was characterized by mobile, armored warfare. Israel deployed 200 tanks in Sinai, versus 150 tanks deployed by the Egyptians.

Since the Sinai Campaign, the land war between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations has become a war of highly mobile and armored formations. A total of 2,500 tanks were deployed during the Six-Day War by Israel and the enemies. 6,200 tanks engaged in combat during the Yom-Kippur war. Since the Sinai Campaign, thousands of tanks have been destroyed in battle.

Today, the tank is central to the art of war, and is considered the primary decisive factor on the modern land battlefield.

Prior to the Sinai Campaign Egypt received, within the framework of the "Czechoslovakian Arms Deal", 300 Soviet tanks and tank destroyers, including the Stalin-3 and T-34 tanks and SU-100 tank destroyers. This was considered an impressive addition to the Egyptian armored fleet, which at that time numbered some 430 western armored vehicles, of various types.

Within the scope of the Middle-East arms race, Israeli weaponry was always inferior in both qualitative and quantitative aspects. We acquired Sherman tanks and AMX-13 tanks (not really tanks but rather light tank destroyers), while the Arabs obtained, with no problems, new and modern tanks from both east and west. We were forced to be satisfied with "junk": old and inoperable tanks, second world war vintage Shermans, British Centurions and American M48's (Magach).

Not a single country agreed to sell new tanks to us. It is still not clear why some countries did allow us to occasionally buy new and modern means of battle, such as jet fighter planes, but persisted in their refusal to sell us new tanks.

Given the need, we were forced to learn the technologies of armor, in order to rehabilitate the obsolete metal hulks, which we had purchased through programs of rebuilding, regunning and engine replacements.

The race between ourselves and the Arabs now became a direct confrontation between new Western and Soviet MBT's fielded by the Arab armies and old, rebuilt and improvised tanks fielded by Israel.

In the 1960's the Arabs were about to obtain T-62 tanks from Soviet Russia. This was the most modern operational Main Battle Tank (MBT) of its time, equipped with a high-powered 115-mm cannon. It. was clear that no improvisations or rejuvenation to tanks of the 1940s and 1950s would suffice to ensure the continued security, and indeed the existence, of the State of Israel.

At that time, in 1966, Britain came forward with a dramatically historic proposal. The British needed money in order to complete the development of their new tank of the future, the Chieftain, with its 120-mm cannon. This tank was designed to be the strongest and most modern in the west. In view of their financial constraints they proposed a "package deal". According to this deal, we would buy hundreds of obsolete Centurion tanks. They, in exchange, would allow us to participate in the final stages of Chieftain development, would sell us Chieftains, and would help us build, in Israel, an assembly line for Chieftains. This was seen as an ideal solution to the unacceptable predictions regarding the middle-eastern armor balance from both quantitative and qualitative points of view.

Our cooperation with the British lasted for about three years. Two prototypes of the Chieftain tank were delivered to Israel. Israel invested heavily in the improvement and final development of the Chieftain in close cooperation with British officers and engineers, who worked with us in Israel.

However, Arab states intervened. They threatened Britain with sanctions, with pulling their monetary reserves out of British banks, and other actions. Demonstrations were held in Arab capitals and British embassies were attacked. In November 1969 Britain withdrew from its Chieftain deal with Israel.

The development, design and planning efforts of three years were wasted - and we were back at square one, with time lost which could not be retrieved.

In view of this development, we considered the possibility of developing and manufacturing "made-in-Israel" tanks.

It was clear that a weapon system of primary importance was at stake, vital to our security, but which had been refused, to Israel by all nations. No change in this attitude was foreseen.

The question, which arose therefore, was not whether we should engage in development and manufacture of a homemade tank, but whether we would be capable of achieved the high levels of industrial and technological expertise required to succeed in such a project. To this was added the question of whether we would be capable of doing so at a reasonable price and without disrupting the Israeli economy.

In order to answer these questions, it was decided to conduct a study, presided by Major General Israel Tal. The study was conducted by experts of the Ministry of Defense and of the Ordnance Corps, and was designed to answer two essential questions:

1. Would Israel be capable of planning, designing and manufacturing a Main Battle Tank from the point of view of technological know-how and industrial infrastructure?

2. Is there any economic sense in such a project - does it ensure economic viability in the broad sense, to the economy of Israel?



Findings
 
Findings of the study were positive. Israel would be capable of developing and establishing an infrastructure for the manufacture of tanks, which would be economically feasible from the point of view of the national economy. In addition, the proposed Israeli tank would compare favorably with others, would meet the specific requirements of the IDF and the specific needs of the middle-eastern theatre of war. In 1970 the decision was taken that the State of Israel would develop a tank for the IDF and for export in the future.
 
Organization and Method of Development and Manufacture
 
The original plan was for the development of a tank to be based primarily an existing systems and assemblies. But even from the first years of development the need arose, in view of know-how restrictions, technological reasons and operational requirements which developed over time, to develop an entirely new tank which would be based on both original and new assemblies. The development task was modified accordingly.

The need to shorten development time gave rise to an abbreviated development process, while knowingly taking risks, which later became known as the "telescopic development" process. This method is characterized by the start of serial production, based on prototypes, before completion of all development and demonstration stages. This is prior to the finalizing of production files.

In order to reduce the investments needed for the establishment and management of a tank, manufacturing industry, we decided not to form double organization, with the backup services required for such a project (procurement, inventories, legal and economic service units, etc.). It was decided that the Project Administration would utilize existing MOD/IDF infrastructures such as Equipment Center facilities, spare part inventories, procurement and manufacturing controls, MOD legal advisor staff, MOD economic advisor staff, and others.

It was further decided to utilize the industrial infrastructures existing in the IDF, the civilian and governmental military industries, and to expand the manufacturing potential of existing plant where necessary. To the extent possible inflated bureaucracies or the creation of new industries would be avoided. It was now decided that the existing IDF basic tank depot would be utilized as the tank's final assembly plant. In addition, two hundred industrial plants would be upgraded with new knowledge and capabilities, as required for the manufacture of the thousands of parts, assemblies and systems, needed for the Merkava tank.

A policy of regional distribution of manufacturing facilities throughout Israel was evolved, including development regions, with maximum utilization of civilian enterprises and no monopoly for the military industries.

It was decided that any technological knowledge, which was lacking would be acquired in part from abroad, and in part self-developed within the defense establishment, the industrial establishment and by Israeli research institutes.
 
The Merkava Generations








The first Merkava Mk. 1 tanks were supplied to the IDF in April 1979, nearly nine years after the decision to produce the Merkava Mk. 1 tank was taken. The Merkava Mk. 1 tank has been designed in accordance with experience gained from IDF armored battles in all Israel's wars since the Sinai Campaign (1956).

The Merkava Mk. 1 is unique in its basic concept, common to all generations of the Merkava Mk. 1, according to which armor and survivability of the tank are its basic features. The tank's protection is based on all-round spaced ballistic armor, and deployment of the tank systems around the crew, thus utilizing basic elements and systems of the tank to protect the crew and ammunition, in addition to their specific functions. The most striking example of this concept is placement of the power pack (engine and transmission) at the front of the tank.

Other factors contributing to the Merkava Mk. 1's survivability are:

    Low profile when in firing position
    Elimination of flammable materials from the crew compartments
    Storage of main gun ammunition under the turret ring, well to the rear of the hull, in heat-resistant containers

The Merkava Mk. 1 tank participated with a high degree of success in Lebanon War (1982) when the war started Israel had 200-300 Merkava Mk. 1 tanks. The Merkava Mk. 1 proved superior to the Syrian T-72 MBT (then the Soviet's newest tank).

Production of Merkava Mk. 1 continued up to 1983, when the IDF Armor Corps began to receive the
Merkava Mk. 2 tanks.

Lessons learned from the operation of the Merkava Mk. 1 tanks were applied to the Merkava Mk. 2 tanks, mainly in the following:

    Improved mobility
    Improved fire control system
    improved special armor
    Internal 60mm mortar

The production of Merkava Mk. 2 tanks continued until the end of 1989, at which time Merkava Mk. 3 tanks started to come off the production line.

The Merkava Mk. 3 entered service in the IDF at the beginning of 1990. It is a sophisticated tank. The difference between the Mk. 3 and the Mk. 2 is in essence and not in degree. All systems and assemblies were new, and except for the engine, are of Israeli design and production.

Among the prominent features of the Merkava Mk. 3 were the new and unique suspension system, the high powered engine, the powerful main gun, and, especially, a new and unique concept of armor. Ballistic protection is provided by special armor modules, which are attached to the tank by bolts. These can be easily replaced whenever better ballistic technology is introduced. Thus, the tank will remain "young" forever.

During the Merkava Mk. 3's years of production, a number of modifications have been introduced, the major ones being a modern fire control system with an automatic target tracker ("Baz") and significant improvements in ballistic protection.

The production of the Merkava Mk. 3 lasted until 2002, whereupon the Merkava Mk. 4 was first fielded to the Armor Corp.

Izrael dobio petu nuklearnu podmornicu INS Rahav iz Nemačke

newsweek

Visoko sofisticirana podmornica predstavljena je kao najskuplje oružje u izraelskoj vojsci. Nove podmornice bi mogle da budu opremljene nuklearnim krstarećim raketama


Foto: Reuters, Benjamin Netanijahu na podmornici koja je iz Nemačke stigla u Izrael

U Izrael je danas stigla peta podmornica naručena u Nemačkoj zbog čega je priređena svečanost kojoj je prisustvovao izraleski premijer Benjamin Netanijahu, javile su svetske agencije.

Podmornica, nazvana "Rahav" po biblijskom morskom čudovištu, stigla je danas u luku Haifa, na severu Izraela posle 26 dana putovanja.


AP, Podmornica naručena u Nemačkoj stigla u Izrael

Visoko sofisticirana podmornica predstavljena je kao najskuplje oružje u izraelskoj vojsci. Poseduje poseban pogon koji joj omogućava brži povratak na površinu.

Čega se svet najviše plaši: Poljaci Rusije, Izrael Irana, a ostali...

Netanijahu je rekao da je podmornica deo oružja "odvraćanja" potencijalnih neprijatelja.


Reuters, Benjamin Netanijahu drži govor povodom podmornice koja je iz Nemačke stigla u Izrael

"Naše podmornice će delovati kao meta odvraćanja neprijatelja koji želi da nas uništi. Oni (neprijatelji) treba da znaju da je Izrael u stanju da udari svom silom ako neko želi da ga napadne", rekao je Netanijahu.

Prema stranim vojnim izvorima, te podmornice bi mogle da budu opremljene nuklearnim krstarećim raketama.


Reuters, Benjamin Netanijahu

Iako Izrael nikada nije zvanično priznao da poseduje nuklearno oružje, mnogi vojni stručnjaci su naveli da ta zemlja ima oko 115 bojevih nuklearnih glava.

Izrael je naručio i šestu podmornicu od Nemačke koja treba da bude isporučena za dve do tri godine.

(Beta)