Teams of the Decade #2: Barcelona, 2008/09

What more can you say about this Barcelona side? European champions, La Liga champions and Copa Del Rey winners, all in the first season under the charge of Pep Guardiola. And they didn’t do it by merely winning games, they did it by winning in style, making them perhaps the most universally respected side of the decade.

The most astonishing thing about their La Liga performance was how utterly convincing they were in defeating the sides around them at the top of the table. Real Madrid (2nd) were beaten 6-2, Sevilla (3rd) were beaten 4-0, Atletico (4th) were beaten 6-1, Valencia (6th) were beaten 4-0, Deportivo (7th) were beaten 5-0, Malaga (8th) were beaten 6-0. That is dominance on an unprecedented fashion – only 5th-placed Villarreal were spared a thrashing. These high-scoring victories resulted in the front three of Lionel Messi, Thierry Henry and Samuel Eto’o netting 100 goals between them throughout the season.

Their run to the Champions League final was slightly less assured – in truth, Guardiola was outwitted by Guus Hiddink in the semi-final, and Chelsea really should have won the tie. But their performance against Manchester United in the final was superb – after withstanding ten minutes of pressure when United characteristically came out of the blocks quickly, they went ahead through Eto’o and then dominated the rest of the game.

Tactically, Barca generally stuck to a 4-3-3 shape throughout the season, playing high up the pitch and pressing from the front. Henry stayed wide on the left, with Messi having more license to come in off the right wing, knowing that the energetic Dani Alves would be providing width. In midfield, Iniesta played furthest forward, Xavi was the calm, methodical ‘link’, whilst Yaya Toure sat deep infront of the centre-backs.



Of course, there were further subtleties to the system, both in defence and attack. Upfront, it was not unusual for Guardiola to switch the positions of Eto’o and Messi, especially late in the season. But with Messi a tricky playmaker and Eto’o a natural striker, the formation altered significantly. Messi played in a false nine position, whilst Eto’o played high up the pitch on the flank, with he and Henry significantly more advanced than Messi, but troubling the full-backs rather than the centre-backs. What formation did this create? A version of Roma’s strikerless shape? A 4-3-1-2? Either way it caused problems for the opposition in a similar way to that Roma 4-6-0, although it focussed upon pressuring high up the pitch, rather than breaking from deep.

The alternative shape was tried against Chelsea in the semi-final to little effect, but caused Manchester United real problems – Eto’o opened the scoring from a wide right position, Messi sealed the victory from a centre-forward position, and Barcelona dominated possession.

At the back, the most notable feature was how willing the two centre-backs were to spread to the flank when Barcelona were in possession (particularly when Victor Valdes had the ball), making sure the pitch was as wide as possible. The gap in the centre of the defence was covered by Yaya Toure dropping into a centre-back role to create a temporary three-man defence, giving the full-backs license to go forward, in a similar fashion to the current Brazil side.

This meant that Barcelona were flexible both in defence and attack, whilst possessing perhaps the two best ball-playing midfielders around in Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta. They won every competition they entered – and all this after an opening day defeat to Numancia.

The 2-6 win at the Bernabeu in early May was the season-defining victory – two for Henry, two for Messi, but Xavi was the star of the show, running the midfield and having a hand in almost every Barcelona goal:

Teams of the Decade #1: Greece, Euro 2004

This Greek side achieved perhaps the most astonishing thing in the history of international football. There have been one-off shocks, games that went against the favourites because of a particular set of circumstances. USA 1-0 England in 1950. Senegal 1-0 France in 2002. But those things can happen; shocks in football happen because it’s such a low-scoring game, and dominance doesn’t always equal goals.



But never before has a team so unfancied gone onto win a major international tournament. Available at odds of up to 250/1 and having never won a tournament game in their history, Greece’s march to wining Euro 2004 was unquestionably the tactical achievement of the decade.

Remember them as negative, defensive, cycnical and unimaginative if you like, but it’s interesting that this only became the prevailing mood when Greece actually looked like winning the thing. In the opening game, where they beat Portugal, they were widely praised for their football. Slick passing, plenty of players attacking and generally positive play, the first game upset was treated like the Senegal victory two years previously, a great start to a tournament.

Admittedly, Greece didn’t play quite such wonderful football in the knock-out stages. But you have to marvel at quite how effective their strategy was:

Quarter-final against France (the holders) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing cross.

Semi-final against Czech Republic (the best team in the tournament) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing corner.

Final against Portugal (the hosts) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing corner.

To beat the holders, the best team and the hosts in successive rounds – by the same scoreline, by scoring in the same way – doesn’t happen by accident. It happens through immense tactical wisdom and careful deployment of tactics to suit each game.

Cast your mind back to 6th October 2001. In the 93rd minute at Old Trafford, David Beckham sent a majestic free-kick over the ball and into the net to secure England’s place in the World Cup Finals at the expense of Germany. Depending on your memory, you might remember that England were playing Greece, and you might remember that actually, England played awfully, struggling to create chances and being outplayed for the entire game.

You probably won’t remember this, but that was Otto Rehhagel’s first game as the manager of Greece. The side was in crisis, but that game showed Rehhagel had an idea of how Greece could beat better teams, by playing a strict man-marking system. They may have only got a draw, but for a team in such an awful situation, it went down in Greece like a victory.

For a side painted as rigid and boring, Greece did brilliantly to adapt their shape to suit different opposing formations – the only constant was to make sure they had a spare man at the back. Against France they set out with what almost a cross between a three- and four- man defence. France played two forward players, and therefore Greece used two man-markers with a sweeper. Trezeguet played centrally and was marshalled by Kapsis, Henry tended to move to the left and therefore the right-back, Seitaridis, stuck to him throughout. The left-back, Fysass, was free to venture forward, whilst the right-sided width came from Zagorakis.  Interpretation of the formation the newspapers the next day varied between a three- and four-man defence – but in a way, that was the point. Greece’s system used strict man-marking and was therefore dependent upon the movement of the France players. Since France’s side was so lopsided, Greece’s defence was too.

Meanwhile, playing four relatively central midfielders restricted France’s ability to keep possession. The shape effectively used seven defensive players, but the runs of the Fysass and Zagorakis created their best goalscoring opportunities and meant they attacked with five men, and it was no surprise when Zagorakis provided the cross for the only goal of the game.

They kept a similar shape for the game against the Czechs, who also featured two upfront. Although they were overrun by the Czech’s attacking threat early on, they pulled off the same trick again – Dellas heading home a Silver Goal.



Then, they faced a completely different challenge against Portugal in the final. Portugal played 4-2-3-1 with Pauleta as a lone forward, meaning that had the Greeks kept to a three-man defence, they would have had a surplus of centre-backs and been weak either in midfield, or in wide areas, where the Portuguese full-backs looked to get forward. And so Rehhagel switched to a more traditional four-man defence, retaining a spare man at the back. The full-backs marked Figo and Ronaldo relatively high up the pitch. They matched Portugal 3 v 3 in midfield, with Basinas and Katsouranis sitting deep and Zagorakis providing some kind of attacking presence – although the Greeks missed the real quality on the ball of the suspended Georgios Karagounis and rarely threatened in open play.

Further forward, Vryzas played the lone striker role and held the ball up – and was supported by two players; Stelios Giannakopoulos, a fairly traditional winger who stuck to his flank and forced back the dangerous Portuguese right-back Miguel. The opposite full-back, Nuno Valente, was less of a threat, and so Angelos Charisteas (more of a forward) was fielded tending to play towards that side of the pitch, although he became a forward when Greece had the ball, and right-sided width came from the excellent Seitiaridis.

Could they do it again? Of course they could. Charisteas was again the hero, and Portugal rarely looked like breaking the Greek defence down. For the final 15 minutes, Giannakopoulos was replaced with Stelios Venetidis, a left-back – and Greece effectively sat with eight defenders in front of their box. Felipe Scolari, the Portugal manager, never looked to challenge Greece’s determination of having a spare man at the back – a switch to two forwards may have asked questions, but he brought Nuno Gomes on for Pauleta, rather than changing Portugal’s shape.

Not many teams switch between a three-man and four-man defence so easily, and most managers would have stuck to the “Don’t change a winning team” theory having put out France and the Czechs. But you should change a winning team if the circumstances require it, and Rehhagel believed that as the underdogs, Greece should let their shape be dictated by that of the opposition.

Rehhagel stuck to the two key components of any successful tactical deployment:

Firstly, he played to his own side’s strengths. They had solid, reliable defenders and a hard-working midfield, with little attacking talent. To play open football would have been suicidal. They defended solidly, then countered at speed with numbers – and their set-piece organisation was superb.

Secondly, he changed his team to nullify his opponent’s strengths, and to stifle their main threats. The system against the France and Czechs wouldn’t have worked against the Portuguese, and vice-versa.

He maximised Greece’s strengths and nullifed his opponents’ strengths, to produce the biggest shock in international football history – and that is why this Greece is at #1 on this list.

Kakav su bunker Grci igrali...
Protiv Francuza su se koliko toliko otvorili ali protiv Portugala deep defensive line ...
Ali kako god, druge ekipe nisu znale na koji nacin da to probije i u tom slucaju bravo za Grke.

Ali Roma na 5. mestu aj razumem to sto su davali dosta golova bez napadaca, to je fenomen... ali 5. mesto sunce ti...




Bitno je da su ovde stavili Marcenu a da Djukica nema u sastavu...

A ionako im je smesna cela lista.


Poslednja decenija se gleda, nema '98

Pa druze, si video ti neku ekipu koja je tako cepala celu sezonu bez klasicnog napadaca, oni su bili u vrhu, zavrsili kako drugi u ligi, lepo gurali u Evropi jeste da ih je Man Utd unakazio ali ta ekipa Man Utd je bila vrhunska ima prilozeno gore i njihova taktika iz tog perioda, tako da ta taktika Rome zasluzuje to mesto...Uzgred i Inter je pocepan 6-2...

И даље не могу прежалити ту утакмицу Роме и Манчестера. Баш добро се сјећам како је почела и је Рома била далеко опаснији у почетку ал' јбг тај први гол их је скроз сјебао. 

Били су и у реваншу баш добри, неизвесна утакмица скроз, штета стварно.

Sta sjebao ? Unistio...
Toliko sam se bio razocarao, fudbal nisam pratio nekoliko dana, nisam mogao da verujem, od kad pratim Romu a to je negde sa pocetka decenije niko ih nije toliko unistio...

Чекај, у којој су добили 8 комада?

Колико се ја сјећам то је био реванш?

У реваншу је било 7-8:1  Мислим да их је Алан Смит начео