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A napad Aero planino i Batistuta klasicni golgeteri, ekipa vrhunska a tek taktika, a na klupi Kapelo...

Teams of the Decade #9: Arsenal 2001-04

Amongst the universal praise for Arsenal’s incredible unbeaten 2003/04 season, their achievements of two seasons before are often overlooked. In that season they became the first team in modern times to go the whole season unbeaten away from home (equalled, obviously, by themselves two years later), and they also became the only side in history to score in every league game that season. In addition, they won the FA Cup to achieve the double.

They probably should have won the league in 2002/03 – they were the best team that season, but showed the first signs of the lack of resolve that has troubled the side ever since. They made up for it in 2003/04, with an incredible P38 W28 D10 L0 record that seems all the more astonishing six years later, with the big Premiership clubs losing games all over the place.

It was a fairly similar side both seasons. The front four remained intact, and in its own way, this was perhaps an early example of a strikerless formation. Dennis Bergkamp dropped into space whilst Thierry Henry drifted to the left when Arsenal didn’t have possession, making Arsenal incredibly dangerous on the counter-attack. Additionally, the wingers made outside-to-inside runs, with Robert Pires and Freddie Ljungberg almost reinventing the wide midfield role with their incredible goalscoring records. Patrick Vieira was a more dynamic player than he is remembered as – with a more defensive partner in Gilberto, he often looked to join the front players and possessed too many offensive qualities to be regarded as a purely ‘defensive’ midfielder.



The most interesting thing about Arsenal’s defence is that none were defenders when Arsene Wenger first set eyes on them. Ashley Cole was a promising forward in the Arsenal youth system, Lauren was a central midfielder for Mallorca, whilst Kolo Toure was a versatile player who played most often in an advanced midfield position. But Wenger converted all of them to defenders, assuring Arsenal’s ball-playing ability was evident throughout the side.

And equally, Arsenal’s defensive work started from the front. Henry prevented the right-back advancing and always pressed high up the pitch, Bergkamp dropped into a space so deep it took one central midfielder out of the equation going forward, and both Pires and Ljungberg were genuinely excellent at covering their full-back.

Although Wenger described it as a 4-4-2, it was perhaps a lopsided 4-2-3-1 in possession, and extremely difficult to defend against because of the movement from attacking players and full-backs in advanced positions. The left side of Cole-Pires-Henry was probably the strongest ‘flank’ any side possessed all decade, and because opponents were so concerned with that, it was amazing how often Ljungberg found space by cutting in from the right, and how often the underrated Lauren had time to get crosses in.

Finally, it must be said that this side did play wonderful football. It’s become a bit of a cliche to say this about Arsenal, especially when in recent years it’s been prefixed with “Arsenal don’t win trophies but they…” but to go a season unbeaten whilst playing expansive, attacking football is incredible.

A video of a Thierry Henry blockbuster would be most people’s choice to sum up this Arsenal side, but perhaps two incredible team goals finished off by unlikely scorers demonstrates their dominance better.

Teams of the Decade #8: Czech Republic, 2004

It may have been brief, but it was beautiful. The Czech Republic side of Euro 2004 was brilliant, because they had everything in an attacking sense. They had an aerial threat from 6′7 Jan Koller. They had pace upfront from Milan Baros. They had the finest footballer in Europe at the time in Pavel Nedved, and Poborsky and Rosicky who could play either centrally or wide. They had a deep playmaker in Tomas Galasek, and two rampaging full-backs who got up and down the line all day.

When teams are one-dimensional, it’s easy to put in place a system to stop them. When a side like the Czechs have so many options going forward, it’s almost impossible, and that’s why Karel Bruckner’s team were great to watch. Add the best goalkeeper in the World and two strong centre-backs, and the Czechs were incredible.

The reason Bruckner could afford to play two strikers and three attacking midfielders was because none of those midfielders were passengers when the Czechs didn’t have the ball. Rosicky, Nedved and Poborsky were all hard-working players, and therefore the Czechs were never outnumbered in midfield.

This team has the honour of winning the finest game of the decade, a 3-2 win over Holland after the Dutch had led 2-0 after 20 minutes. That night demonstrated Bruckner’s attacking instincts wonderfully. At 0-2 down and the defence falling apart, Bruckner prepared a substitution. The right-back, Grygera, was due to be withdrawn, with a winger, Smicer, set to replace him. As the change was readied, the Czechs scored, to make it 1-2. 65 minutes to go, and only a goal down. Did Bruckner still make the switch? Of course he did.



That gave the Czechs the majority of possession, but they couldn’t score another. And then Bruckner went even further, taking off the holding midfielder Galasek on 62 minutes and putting on Marek Heinz, another forward. And so the Czechs had three forwards, four attacking midfielders, another winger at full-back, and two centre-backs. The most remarkable thing? The Czechs had won their opening game, whilst the Dutch had drawn. This wasn’t do-or-die: a draw would have suited the Czechs fine.

But Bruckner refused to settle for a draw, and his side equalised through Baros. The game of the decade was won two minutes from time, Poborsky unselfishly teeing up Smicer, and the Czechs had qualified from that competition’s Group of Death with a game to spare.

Bruckner changed the whole side for the final game, against a German side needing a win to progress. And, incredibly, confidence in the camp was so high that the Czechs still beat the Germans.

They breezed past Denmark 3-0 in the quarter-finals, before coming up against Greece. And, of course, that was where it all went wrong. Nedved (who was the European Footballer of the Year at the time) having to leave the game through injury after 40 minutes remains one of the most frustrating moments of modern times, for he was the heartbeat of this team.

And, of course, his teammates didn’t get there either. 52% of possession and 16 of the game’s 23 shots was not enough – the Czechs couldn’t score, and the only meaningful ’silver goal’ in history settled the game.

Pretty much the same XI turned up for World Cup 2006, and they started with a convincing defeat of USA, but red cards against both Ghana and Italy were their downfall, and they were sent packing. By Euro 2008 they were over-the-hill. They failed to qualify from the weakest group ahead of the 2010 World Cup, and the 2004 glory team are a distant memory.

On an entirely personal note, this was my favourite team of the decade – watch them coming from behind against Holland in that incredible game that featured 36 shots, 21 of them on target.

Teams of the Decade #7: Spain 2008



It’s hard to place this Spain team on a list which attempts to focus upon tactical innovations as much as success and pretty football – on one hand, the side was so wonderfully fluid and dynamic it was difficult to categorise them into a set formation, on the other it became increasingly clear that their first-choice system, with two strikers, wasn’t working for them.

They’re the obvious star players, but to highlight Xavi and Andres Iniesta’s roles perhaps overlooks the reason why this Spain side were successful. Spain have never been lacking in players like the Barcelona duo – the Valencia partnership of Ruben Baraja and David Albelda, if less spectacular players, were equally effective in the centre of midfield. Juan Carlos Valeron was another player who is the equal of his nearest equivalent, David Silva, in this side. The reason Luis Aragones’ side won Euro 2008 was, of course, the use of a designated holding player in front of the defence. In many ways, Aragones leant from the Barcelona side which failed because it attempted to fit three similar players into the centre of midfield; Xavi, Iniesta and Deco. The need for a more physical, holding player was apparent, and Barcelona’s midfield worked better when first Edmilson and then Yaya Toure filled the position. To emphasise the increased defensive solidarity because of the holding player is obvious, but the key was that it let Xavi and Iniesta go and play.



And of course, a pretty identical thing happened with this Spain side. Although the formation was different to the one used by Barcelona, the use of Marcos Senna meant that Xavi and Iniesta were freed to go forward and create. Their ability to keep possession, to find the forwards and to float around the pitch without losing their defensive shape was magnificent. Spain produce ball-playing central midfielders like no other country, but they’ve always struggled to produce a disciplined, physical player like Senna, a Brazilian by birth.

As mentioned in the introduction, however, there remains a suspicion that Spain function better with only one frontman. They struggled against Italy at the quarter-final stage with both Fernando Torres and David Villa, failing to score. The semi-final against Russia was particularly telling – their awful first-half display with two up top was brought to a close by Villa’s injury. He was replaced by Fabregas, creating a 4-5-1, and Spain went onto win 3-0. The final, where Spain were still without Villa, was a solid if unspectacular dismissal of Germany, thanks to a Torres goal.

It might seem ridiculous to state that the loss of Villa (who won the tournament’s Golden Boot award) helped Spain, but they were without question more effective with just one striker.

Credit should go to the back five, who conceded just two goals in the tournament, none in the knock-out stages. The eagnerness to attack from both Capdevilla and Ramos drew the opposition midfield out of position, opened up space for Xavi and Iniesta, and meant that the relative lack of width on one side (David Silva tended to float from wing to wing) was always solved from forward runs from full-back.

Spain were a tremendously popular side, and fully deserved to win the competition. Their best football came in the 3-0 semi-final win against Russia, producing three superb goals. Worth a watch, if you don’t mind unnecessary Spanish music.

Teams of the Decade #6: Bayer Leverkusen 2001-02

Ultimately, this Bayer Leverkusen side won nothing; the pressure of challenging on three fronts with a small squad had disastrous results at the end of the season, where they completed the most unwanted ‘treble’ in footballing history – losing the league on the final day of the season, losing in the German Cup final to Schalke, and finally, being defeated by Real Madrid in the Champions League final.

But to dismiss them as ‘Bayer Neverkusen’ ignores the incredible job Klaus Topmoller did at the club. Leverkusen were an unfashionable, unremarkable club, having never won the Bundesliga in their history. Indeed, when the club celebrated their Centenary in 2004, their best-ever XI contained no fewer than seven of this side.

Their Champions League run didn’t receive enough credit in England – probably thanks to the fact that, incredibly, they put out Arsenal, Liverpool and then Manchester United in successive rounds, at a time when English football was desperate for success in European football (and attempting to overthrow the Bundesliga as the third-best league in Europe, and therefore receive a fourth Champions League place), and they were cast as fortunate, scrappy underdogs.

In reality, the 4-1-4-1 formation employed by Topmoller was terrific. Oliver Neuville arguably reinvented the lone striker role, at 5’7 demonstrating that you don’t have to be a target man to play upfront by yourself. He drew defenders out of position, creating space for the runs of Michael Ballack, who scored 17 goals in 29 Bundesliga games (an incredible record for a midfielder, and just one off being the league’s topscorer) and 7 in 15 Champions League games. Alongside Ballack was the equally talented Yildiray Basturk, who lacked Ballack’s pace but provided intelligent, methodical passing from the centre. Bernd Schneider and the wonderful Ze Roberto (one of the most underrated players of the decade) worked the flanks excellently, swinging in crosses and covering their full-backs in equal measure.

Another key feature was Carsten Ramelow, a tall, rugged centre-half who played just in front of the defensive line. He was comfortable dropping deep and taking up a position as a third centre-back, meaning that Placente and Sebescen were free to roam forward.

The loss of captain Jens Nowotny to a serious knee injury ahead of the run-in hit Leverkusen hard, although they were far from outplayed in the Champions League final. In the end, they lost to the goal of the decade, a tremendous left-footed volley from the most celebrated player of his generation, and Leverkusen will probably remain most famous for Zidane’s greatest moment.

All things considered, it’s perhaps not entirely unfair to claim that this Leverkusen side set the tactical tone for the decade – a lone forward who liked to drop deep, a midfield encouraged to make forward runs, a holding midfielder in front of the back four, and attacking full-backs.

In the summer of 2002, both Ballack and Ze Roberto left the club to join Bayern Munich, and Leverkusen struggled with Nowotny out for the entire campaign. They advanced to the second round of the Champions League, but spent much of the domestic season in the relegation zone, and Topmoller was fired in January. They finished one place off relegation.

This season, they currently sit atop the Bundesliga, level on points with Bayern Munich, and still unbeaten. It would be tremendous if they could go onto win their first-ever title, the trophy this great side deserved.

Teams of the Decade #5: Roma, 2007

Some great inventions were the result of years of design and graft, eventually producing something roughly approximating the design brief. Others, like Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin, were an happened upon by complete accident. In that sense, Luciano Spalletti is modern football’s Alexander Fleming, and the 4-6-0 was his great discovery that he never intended on inventing.

An injury crisis upfront was the reason Roma were forced into this highly unconventional shape – a modified version of their standard 4-2-3-1 system – since their attack had no focal point, with no fit player in the squad capable of holding the ball up. The only solution was to play Francesco Totti upfront, but rather than remaining upfront alone and waiting for service, Totti effectively played his usual trequartista role, moving into the gap between opposition defence and midfield and receiving the ball to feet. Perhaps 4-6-0 is an exaggeration, but it was certainly 4-5-1-0.

And this created an entirely new problem for opposing defences (because their centre-backs were suddenly left without anyone to mark) and opposing midfielders (who found Roma effectively playing four players in the centre of midfield, and yet still using two wingers). It was almost impossible for Roma not to dominate possession, and with the midfielders flying forward to exploit the space left by Totti, the Roma side almost played exclusively on the counter-attack, regardless of where the side won the ball.



The system worked so well that even when Roma’s fit forwards returned, Totti continued to be deployed as the furthest forward central player, with Mirko Vucinic – a striker in any other team in the world – converted to an outside left to ensure a goal threat from the wings. But whilst Totti is perhaps not natural a ’striker’ per se, that does not mean he is not comfortable operating there. His 26 goals in 2006/07 were enough to win him the European Golden Boot, and his position on the all-time Serie A goalscoring table proves what a fine finisher he is.

Initially Daniele De Rossi was given the ‘holding’ role in midfield, although later on it became David Pizarro charged with this task, whilst Mancini ocassionally operated on the left, with Rodrigo Taddei coming in on the right.

Roma perhaps lacked the quality across the pitch to make it work consistently, and it’s fair to say that the system was a sporadic success rather than a consistent one. The astonishing 6-2 Coppa Italia Final defeat of Inter (who won the league by 22 points that season) demonstrated its ability to completely outwit opposing managers (and flat-footed centre-backs) but the crushing 1-7 defeat to Manchester United in the Champions League demonstrated the danger of the system self-destructing.

Oddly enough, it was the first leg of that tie that demonstrated how effective the system was, and was heavily drawn upon by Sir Alex Ferguson for United’s shape the next campaign. Rio Ferdinand and Wes Brown were baffled about who they were supposed to be picking up, as a system with four or five Roma midfielders constantly running at the opposition defence was genuinely a revelation in tactical terms. Quite why it failed so spectacularly in the second leg remains unclear.

But the system will go onto be the most influential system of the decade. That the shape was adopted and improved upon by the side who won the Champions League the next two seasons (Manchester United and Barcelona) illustrates the potential in the 4-6-0, and it could well dominate football for the next ten years.

Roma’s 4-6-0 was at its best in that 6-2 against Inter. In fairness, none of the goals really show the system in operation that well, but you don’t win 6-2 in a Cup Final every season.



And for an individual moment to show off the counter-attacking ability of that team, look no further than Mancini’s legendary goal away at Lyon.

Teams of the Decade #4: Porto, 2002-04

Almost six years on, it’s slightly difficult to describe what an incredible job Jose Mourinho did at Porto. Looking across this side and seeing names such as Deco, Ricardo Carvalho, Maniche and Costinha, the first reaction is to think, ‘Ah, it was a team packed full of good players’.

But before Mourinho, these were mostly nobodies – either run-of-the-mill players in a decent Porto side, or players plucked from unfashionable clubs in the Liga Sagres – Nuno Valente was signed from Leiria, Paolo Ferreira from Vitoria de Setubal.

It’s a credit to Mourinho that, for two seasons, those two were amongst the best two full-backs in Europe. Since coming to England, both have been exposed as relatively mediocre defenders, but at Porto they were genuinely spectacular, bombing up and down the flanks like Roberto Carlos and Cafu, with the safeguard of three holding midfielders to cover for them.

Aside from that, this was a relatively basic team tactically. Generally setting out in a 4-3-1-2 system, there was nothing tactically innovative about this side. However, they were without question the most well-drilled club side on this list. The defensive line was incredibly effective at catching opposition forwards offside, often playing high up the pitch and using a frankly aggressive offside trap that continued to bamboozle opposition forwards. The midfield worked as a unit rather than a collection of individuals, and Mourinho used different forwards according to the opposition at hand.



This team was often painted as a defensive side, but in reality Mourinho had a flexible approach, and the side would play in completely different ways for individual circumstances. In the quarter-final of the winning Champions League run, Porto trounced a much-fancied Lyon side 4-2 on aggregate in a tremendously open two-legged tie. Then, in the semi-final they produced the most amazing display of defensive football imaginable, to run out 1-0 winners over two legs against Deportivo La Coruna, with the winner coming from a penalty away at the Riazor, where Depor had an incredible record.

The final against Monaco was a great ocassion for football – two unfancied sides with talented young managers doing battle in a wonderful new stadium. Monaco were unlucky in losing skipper Ludovic Giuly to injury, forcing them to change fro ma 4-3-3 to a 4-4-2, and this played into Porto’s hands, as they then dominated the central midfield area. Carlos Alberto’s snapshot came from nothing to put Porto 1-0 up, but in the second half they were incredible, sticking seven men rigidly in front of their keeper, and attacking only with three players at time. And twice they counter-attacked and scored, through Deco and Aleynichev.

Who knows when the next side from a ’small’ footballing country will become champions of Europe again? It’s not unrealistic to say that this might be the last side to ever achieve this. The dominance of the ‘Big 4′ along with Barcelona and Milan in recent years has made for a less interesting competition, and hopefully Michel Platini will continue to try and address the inequality within European football in the next few years.

But Porto’s run was not just about the Champions League. Mourinho also won the UEFA Cup the previous season, the league twice, the Portuguese Cup once (and once runner-up) and the Portuguese SuperCup.

Most importantly, it introduced us to a man who will go down in history as one of the all-time managerial greats. A man who never played professional footballer in his life, a man whose first major job in football was working as an interpretor for Bobby Robson at Sporting Lisbon, and a man who is now presiding over an 130-game unbeaten home record at Porto, Chelsea and Inter. Mourinho will be around for a long time yet, and his story as a manager is probably only in its infancy, but he will never achieve something as amazing as this Champions League win ever again.

Teams of the Decade #3: Manchester United 2006-09

Unlike most sides on this list, Manchester United have not used a specific formation in their amazingly successful last three seasons. Sir Alex Ferguson has used a variety of formations – 4-3-3, 4-4-2, 4-5-1, 4-2-3-1, 4-4-1-1 – and probably a few others.



With so many different formations, a rigurous squad rotation system and key players bought and sold during this time, it would be difficult to sum up the side simply by giving a diagram of eleven players, and saying “They played this way for three seasons”.

The side they won the Champions League with in 2007/08 seems the best XI to describe in detail, however. Always featuring a back four with two relatively deep central midfield players, Ferguson generally used an additional midfield player, with a fluid front three of Cristiano Ronaldo, Wayne Rooney and Carlos Tevez.

The reasons Ferguson could afford such a loose shape in the final third were that (a) Ronaldo, Rooney and Tevez were all highly versatile, happy to play either on the wing or through the middle, (b) The three had a wonderful understanding in and around the penalty area, meaning Ferguson could effectively hand out three ‘free roles’ and sit back and witness the results and, crucially (c) All three understood their defensive responsibilities.

Of course, the key feature of the side was, in a move often described as being influenced by Luciano Spalletti’s Roma side, United featured no permanent frontman. Ronaldo was primarily a winger, who developed his game both technically and physically to become both a goal threat from the wing, as well as a powerful presence upfront when needed – whilst Rooney and Tevez were small, creative forwards who liked dropping deep and were both extremely hard-working.

The fluid front three were not always all used, however. In away European games that season, one of them (Tevez) would sometimes be sacrificed for a hard-working midfield player, such as Park Ji-Sung. United’s win that season away at Roma will go down as one of the great away performances in Europe by an English club. Rooney played wide on the left in a fairly flattish midfield five, whilst Ronaldo was given the lone striker role. Whereas Francesco Totti invented the ‘false nine’ role by dropping deep into central midfield areas, Ronaldo played it by both dropping deep and drifting into the wide areas, creating a dilemma for the now-redundant Roma centre-backs. When he dropped deep, one of Park or Rooney would become the highest player up the pitch. United won 0-2, with the first goal a brilliant, towering, ‘classic centre-forward’ header from Ronaldo.



But the versatility of the front three meant Ferguson could easily change his system against different opponents. Whereas Ronaldo played upfront against Roma with Rooney on the left, against Chelsea in the final the positions were reversed, with Ronaldo deployed on the left to terrorize Michael Essien, out-of-position at right-back. Indeed, it was Ronaldo’s aerial dominance over Essien that resulted in United’s goal. Their ability to change individual player roles without compromising the overall shape or understanding of the team is largely what has made them such a success.

There is a perception amongst some journalists that Ferguson is not a great tactician, but the more time that passes, the less this seems true. Away in Europe over the past couple of years, United have been devastating, and the way United set out against Arsenal at the Emirates this season will turn out to be one of the most influential games of the decade in terms of tactics.

Today, Ferguson continues to vary between 4-3-3 (and variants) and a 4-4-2 (and variants). Within the squad, Ferguson seems to have players that are specifically used in one of the two systems. Park Ji-Sung is brilliant in a 4-3-3 as a defensive wide attacker, whilst Anderson is most effective at the head of a fairly defensive three-man midfield. On the other hand, Berbatov doesn’t appear to fit into the 4-3-3 and is solely used in the 4-4-2. Ferguson’s key central midfield players – Darren Fletcher, Paul Scholes, Michael Carrick and (when fit) Owen Hargreaves can all play slightly different roles whether in a midfield three or four.

By no means the first great Manchester United team Sir Alex Ferguson has created, but certainly the one that owes most to tactical innovation.

The game away at Roma was the most interesting game United have played tactically in the past few years.