Teams of the Decade, #17: Bologna, 2001/02



To include a side on this list whose greatest achievement was to finish 7th one season may seem odd, but the final league table of the 2001/02 season doesn’t do justice to Bologna’s achievements that season – mixing it with the big boys, and only a final day defeat denying them the 4th place which cost them a place in the Champions League, at the expense of Milan – who went on to win the next season’s European Cup.

Their system was based almost entirely around Julio Cruz – a 6’3, awkward-looking Argentinean striker who had scored just seven goals in his opening season in Serie A, after moderate success with Feyenoord in Holland. Indeed, his goalscoring ability was so poor in his first season that he became a figure of fun amongst many observers, similar to how Emile Heskey has often been mocked in England. If Cruz couldn’t score goals, what was he doing playing as a striker?

In fact, Cruz was vital to Francesco Guidolin’s system. Although his goalscoring return improved only slightly – to 10 – in 2001/02, Cruz was magnificent all season, and completely turned around opinion within the space of a year. His job was simply to compete with the opposition centre-backs, to hold the ball up, and lay it off to Bologna’s impressive attacking players, including Giuseppe Signori, Claudio Bellucci, Tomas Locatelli, as well as Fabio Pecchia and Lamberto Zauli breaking from midfield.

Cruz was hardly the first striker who was far from prolific and who specialised in holding the ball up, but Bologna’s success can partially explain the prevalence of one-striker systems towards the middle and end of the decade, particularly as it was so successful against the big clubs – Bologna beat both Inter and Milan at home, and drew with Juventus. It bares a strong similarity to the system Fabio Capello has used with the England side, although Heskey still lacks the acclaim that Cruz eventually received.

The other notable thing about Bologna’s shape was its ability to change completely from game to game, which makes it hard to classify them as playing simply one formation. Guidolin used 4-3-2-1, 4-2-3-1, 3-4-2-1 and 3-4-1-2 (although he favoured a three-man defence) and was happy to adapt his system according to the abilities of the opposition, which was part of the reason why Bologna performed so impressively against the big sides in the league.

As you might expect, there aren’t too many YouTube videos of a scrappy side which nearly came finished 4th eight seasons ago, but this video shows what Bologna did well, at 1:15. Cruz wins the ball, lays it off to a midfield player, Zauli, who chips it through for Signori to exploit the space created by Cruz dropping deep, and Signori scores. Simple football that nearly – nearly – got a very average side a place in the Champions League.

Teams of the Decade #16: Senegal, World Cup 02

In terms of one-off results, Senegal beating France in the opening game of the 2002 World Cup was the biggest shock of the decade. It’s one of those results that has gone down in history, so it’s difficult to set the scene to describe what an upset it was. Here goes…

France were not just the favourites for the tournament, they were the World Champions, the European Champions, featured the best player in the world in Zinedine Zidane, as well as the top scorer in the preceding season in Serie A (David Trezeguet), the Premiership (Thierry Henry) and Ligue 1 (Djibril Cisse). Most of their squad remained unchanged from the one which had lifted the World Cup four years earlier.



Senegal had qualified for their first-ever World Cup, and featured a squad of virtual unknowns. They were 500-1 to win the tournament, and most expected them to finish bottom of the group. As a former French colony, it was even suggested that this was a virtual France B-team – if any of the players were good enough to play on the biggest stage, they would have elected to play for France, as Patrick Vieira (born in Senegal) did.

One thing that worked to Senegal’s advantage was the fact that 21 of their 23-man squad played their football in France (the exceptions were the two reserve goalkeepers), and their coach, Bruno Metsu, was a Frenchman. He focussed on France’s weaknesses, reportedly strongly using video footage to demonstrate how the World Champions were beatable. It should also be noted that he had guided Senegal to the final of the 2002 African Cup of Nations, where they lost on penalties to Cameroon.

Senegal set out with a 4-1-4-1 formation, tirelessly battling in midfield and looking to support El-Hadhi Diouf, the lone frontman. Aliou Cisse played the centre-half role well, winning the ball consistently in midfield and looking for the wide men.

It worked pretty well –  African Football of the Year Diouf’s incredible pace outwitted the ageing Chelsea partnership of Frank Lebouef and Marcel Desailly time and time again, and Senegal constantly looked to send the ball over the top for him to chase – incredibly, he was caught offside twelve times in the game.

The goal demonstrates brilliantly the three things Senegal did well (a) incredibly intense pressing in midfield, giving Djorkaeff no time on the ball, (b) playing the ball into space for Diouf to run onto, and (c) getting men in the box. The phrase ‘counter-attacking football’ is always used to signify attacks launched from deep in a team’s own half, but equally it can simply stem from balls won in midfield, as shown here.



Of course, it wasn’t all about the France result – Senegal went onto become only the second African side in history to make the quarter-final of the World Cup. They picked up draws against Denmark and Uruguay – the latter having been 3-0 up at half-time after an incredible first-half performance, before sneaking past Sweden in the second round.

The goal against Denmark summed the side up best – an incredible counter-attack that went the length of the pitch in fourteen seconds.



They were unfortunate to go out to Turkey on a golden goal, although their performance in the match was very poor, and was bafflingly lacking in the desire they’d shown in their opening four matches.

Metsu left after the World Cup – although not before marrying a Senegalese woman, and converting to Islam. He has spent the past eight years managing in the Middle East, enjoying success throughout, and is currently in charge of Qatar.

Half of the World Cup squad ended up playing the Premiership, the vast majority as journeymen at bottom-half clubs. Senegal failed to qualify for the subsequent two World Cups.

Ево вам још Бразил па ћу касније ставити и остале. Што се тиче наслова, слободно га промјените ако смислите нешто боље, ја нисам могао    Такође, ако може неко мало да уреди тему, тј. да бар направи неки ред што се тиче ових тимова.

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Teams of the Decade #15: Brazil, 2009



The outstanding football article of this year was written by Jonathan Wilson of the Guardian, on Brazil’s formation in the Confederations Cup. Trying to expand on Mr Wilson’s excellent prose would be suicidal, but since the piece came without diagrams – sacrilege – here is a brief summary with visual aids.

In short, European and South American football journalists interpreted the system differently. Europeans saw it as a 4-2-3-1, similar to the style, say, Liverpool play. South Americans believed it was diamond in midfield, with a forward (Robinho) dropping to the left, much as Thierry Henry did in his Arsenal days.

So, here is exactly the same formation in both diagrams, with black lines to signify the different interpretations. The European 4-2-3-1 on the left, the South American 4-4-2 diamond on the right. Which notation is correct? They’re probably as right and wrong as each other in their separate ways, but the important thing is to understand the role of each player, which is hopefully articulated through the arrows depicting movement.

So whilst most spent today’s game disappointed at the fact theEngland team featured just two first-choice players (the reason I’ve ignored England’s tactics), the Brazilian formation provided some entertainment.

Pleasingly, the formation was the same as in the Confederations Cup. There were slight differences in personnel – Elano, who p

rovided the exquisite pass for the goal, would not have played had it been for the energetic Ramires being injured. The scorer, Nilmar, featured because Robinho excused himself, and Lyon’s Michel Bastos, nominally a left-sided midfielder, has come in at left-back and should make the position his own in the next few months.

I have two points to make in addition to Mr Wilson’s:

Both Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo come deep to pick up the ball from the centre-backs (a), and yet both are also given the license to go forward when necessary. Of course, never do the same at the same time. They are able to dovetail in a way, for example, the Lampard-Gerrard combination never could for England when they played 4-4-2. The advantage of having two holding midfield players who can also pass the ball and attack is huge, and I can’t help wondering, and hoping, that Capello will have seen this and considered that playing both Gareth Barry and a fit Owen Hargreaves would be appropriate next summer. (In my book, those two with Steven Gerrard, Frank Lampard, Joe Cole and Wayne Rooney ahead of them would be perfect, but that’s a debate for another day.)

Nilmar’s position today (b) – occupied by Robinho in the summer – is extremely difficult to pick up, especially for a defence like England’s that are used to playing against flat, boxey formations. (1) Brazil’s goal (2) the penalty incident and (3) the closest Brazil came to scoring again (when Brown blocked Nilmar’s header), were because of diagonal balls played in behind the defence towards Nilmar’s run from the left, and in that respect, Nilmar is effectively worrying both the right-back and right-sided centre-back in equal measure.

It’s been said that this Brazil side isn’t as attacking, open or exciting than in previous years, but the formation they play compared to 2002 features one fewer centre-back, and one extra attacking(ish) midfield player. The negativity is probably more down to the fact that these players are not household names and the clubs represented in Brazil’s line-up today include relative minnows Sevilla, Villarreal, Panathinaikos and Galatasaray. Nevertheless, this is an excellent Brazil side, and the likes of Bastos, Ramires and Maicon are superb footballers entirely as able as their equivalents from 2002.

The argument that Brazil’s style of play is not free-flowing is negated by the fact that their formation cannot be described adequately with mere numbers. It will be interesting how the Sunday papers depict their shape – the only thing we can be sure of is that none of them will get it right.

A Inter?
Ako je neko takticki uzimao trofeje onda je to Inter...

Grcke 2004 je cista degradacija fudbalske igre,a nigde nema Francuske 1998-2000 dve titule,a moje misljnje je da je Barsa najdominantnija pojava u zadnjih 20 godina

Teams of the Decade #14: Milan 2002-07

Milan will go down as one of the classic teams of the decade, if only for the players that wore the Rossoneri shirts. It featured a true modern legend in Paolo Maldini, as well as Costacurta, Stam, Cafu, Nesta, Serginho, Pirlo, Redondo, Seedorf, Gattuso, Boban, Kaka, Rui Costa, Leonardo, Rivaldo, Ronaldinho, Shevchenko, Ronaldo, Inzaghi, Crespo, Pato…in fact, more true world-class footballers than any club throughout the decade.



Reaching three Champions League finals in five years from 2003-07 was an incredible achievement, although Ancelotti’s time at Milan only brought one Scudetto in eight years, which is why it is relatively far down this list.

The wonderful thing about Milan’s side was that they were able to deploy so many creative players in the centre of midfield, and the key to this was Andrea Pirlo. Not enough attention is given to Pirlo’s remarkable change in position. At the turn of the century, he was held up as the next great trequartista, the new Roberto Baggio, and excelled for Italy’s under-21 side playing just behind the forwards, both creating and scoring goals. Unfortunately, Inter couldn’t find any room for him in their side, and they loaned him out to his first club, Brescia, in order to learn first-hand from Baggio, the master. Carlo Mazzone, however, completely reinvented Pirlo’s game, and deployed him in front of the back four, sitting and creating from deep – using his incredibly accurate long-range passes to great effect.



Milan saw glimpses of how good he could be in a deep role, and bought him from their city rivals for £12m. But his first season at Milan was unspectacular – they spent most of the campaign in 5th or 6th place, and with Carlo Ancelotti knowing he would lose his job if he didn’t qualify for the Champions League, now was not the time for tactical innovations. Pirlo’s creativity was overlooked in favour of the experience of Demitrio Albertini, the reliability of Massimo Ambrosini, or the energy of Massimo Donati, another young Italian central midfielder Milan had bought in 2001. With Fernando Redondo set to come back from injury in Pirlo’s position, his days at Milan looked numbered.

The departure of Albertini in the summer of 2002 coincided with the arrival of Pirlo’s former Inter teammate, Clarence Seedorf. With Manuel Rui Costa also a regular, Milan were playing with two playmakers high up the pitch, and the opposition’s central midfield were forced to play deep, and focus on remaining compact in front of their defence. With Gatusso providing enough energy for two holding midfield players, Pirlo was free to create in front of his own back four – and suddenly Milan had Rui Costa, Seedorf and Pirlo, three classic Number 10s, in the centre of midfield.

Milan won the Champions League that season, with a solid back four and two out-and-out strikers. A fairly standard 4-3-1-2 shape (above left), it was the tireless running of Seedorf and Gatusso that meant Milan’s ultra-central approach worked.



Some sides might have rested on their laurels having won the European Cup, but Milan went ahead and bought a young Brazilian named Kaka. And, with Pippo Inzaghi injured for much of the campaign, Milan went even further in their obsession with central playmakers, often playing Kaka, Rui Costa, Seedorf and Pirlo in central midfield, with Shevchenko upfront on his own (above right), scoring 24 league goals that season. Milan won the league by 11 points.

But whilst their midfield offered numerous points of attack, it was often exposed defensively. This happened twice in the Champions League, in two of the most incredible comebacks in the history of European competition. In 2004, Milan thrashed Deportivo 4-1 at home in the first leg of their quarter-final and appeared to be comfortable, only to suffer a humiliating 0-4 defeat at the Riazor. The infamous episode in the 2005 Champions League final further demonstrated Milan’s problem – they led 3-0 at the break and still fell apart and lost the tie.

These embarrassments convinced Ancelotti that he needed more bite in midfield, with Seedorf and Gattuso getting older, and not able to cover as much distance as previously. Therefore, another holding midfielder, in Massimo Ambrosini was inserted, with Seedorf pushing further forward and Kaka playing off a lone striker (left). The decreased threat from the centre of midfield was compensated with two attacking, pacey full-backs, meaning Milan offered the same level of attacking threat whilst remaining solid defensively, and they regained the European Cup in 2007.

Teams of the Decade #13: Chelsea 2004-06

Everyone knows that Arsenal went unbeaten in 2003/04, but it’s worth pointing out that Chelsea only lost one game the next season, a surprise 0-1 defeat away at Manchester City. OK so, Jose Mourinho had inherited a great squad, which had been added to over the summer with the likes of Cech, Drogba, Carvalho and Ferreira, but to take charge of a side and lead it so convincingly to the title (they won it by 12 points) should be commended. That season’s Chelsea side also hold the record for the fewest goals conceded in a Premiership season – just 15 in 38 games, whilst 25 clean sheets is also a Premiership record.

Chelsea retained the title the next season, losing four more games, but boasting a near-100% home record, a draw against Charlton the only occasion they didn’t win at home all season. They were less dominant in the league, but probably played more expansive, attacking football (although they scored the same number of goals as in the previous campaign).

Mourinho played a 4-3-3 system that worked so well because most English teams were still fixated on playing 4-4-2, which Chelsea’s system worked brilliantly against.

As Mourinho has said,

‘Look, if I have a triangle in midfield – Claude Makelele behind and two others just in front – I will always have an advantage against a pure 4-4-2 where the central midfielders are side by side. That’s because I will always have an extra man. It starts with Makelele, who is between the lines. If nobody comes to him he can see the whole pitch and has time. If he gets closed down it means one of the two other central midfielders is open. If they are closed down and the other team’s wingers come inside to help, it means there is space now for us on the flank, either for our own wingers or for our full-backs. There is nothing a pure 4-4-2 can do to stop things’.



It perhaps seems foolish to try and expand on that, but Mourinho also had the luxury of a striker who could worry two centre-backs at the same time, crucial in creating the ‘extra man’ he speaks about in midfield.

Chelsea were yet another side who focussed on getting their full-backs forward to support the attacking players, who generally looked to cross the ball rather than get into goalscoring positions themselves. The wide players became adept at drawing the full-backs infield in order to create space, which would then allow the full-backs room to pick out a cross for Drogba.

Another feature of Mourinho’s side was his willingness to play Eidur Gudjohnsen, a striker, as the additional midfield player alongside Frank Lampard at times. This created a formation closer to 4-1-4-1, and it’s interesting to note that Frank Lampard played well even when he had a more attacking player alongside him. Mourinho was also keen for his wingers to frequently switch wings, which Arjen Robben and Joe Cole did to better effect than Damien Duff or Shaun Wright-Phillips – the Dutchman in particular being almost unplayable at times.

This video sums up the football they played in 04/05…

Teams of the Decade #12: Brazil 2002

It’s easy to forget what a mess Brazil were in just months before the 2002 World Cup. They had their worst-ever qualification campaign for the tournament, and Luiz Felipe Scolari only took over in June 2001, with Brazil sitting outside the qualification places. Scolari struggled through – he lost his first game, but Brazil sealed their place in Japan and Korea by just three points.

The odd thing about this World Cup-winning side is that, were it not for a bizarre injury to Emerson days before their first match, their central midfield pairing (and therefore overall shape) would have been completely different. The plan had been to field the captain, Emerson, as a holding player, alongside Juninho Paulista, who would be given more license to roam. That all changed when Emerson dislocated his shoulder whilst playing as a goalkeeper in a training session, and was forced out of the tournament. Kleberson was called up to replace him, whilst Gilberto Silva (himself a surprise inclusion in the squad) became Brazil’s first-choice holding midfielder, with Juninho alongside him.

That’s how it stayed for the first few games, with Gilberto playing the role Dunga had fulfilled in the 1994 and 1998 tournaments, and Juninho linking with the front players. Midway through the second round match against Belgium, however, Scolari replaced Juninho (who had been Brazil’s best player in that game) with Denilson (an even more attacking player) and Brazil went on to win.

Quite what convinced Scolari to then drop Juninho and insert Kleberson, another fairly defensive midfield player, alongside Gilberto Silva remains unclear. The England midfield of Beckham-Butt-Scholes-Sinclair hardly necessitated another anchorman, but Brazil won, and Kleberson remained in the team until the end of the tournament, and was probably Brazil’s best player in the final. Perhaps Scolari had decided that Gilberto was not as mobile as Emerson would have been, or perhaps he was worried by Belgium’s dominance in midfield.



Elsewhere, the team was a joy to watch, in a free-flowing 3-4-1-2ish formation that saw as wonderful an attacking trident as the tournament has ever seen in Ronaldo, Rivaldo and Ronaldinho. Ronaldo was the spearhead, with Rivaldo remaining in close contact, and Ronaldinho dropping deepest to collect the ball.

The wide players, Cafu and Roberto Carlos, had the luxury of playing as wing-backs rather than as full-backs, meaning they scampered forward more than ever.

Brazil’s three-man defence also worked wonderfully despite possessing the awful Roque Junior. One of the other two defenders, usually Edmilson, played as a sweeper with license to bring the ball forward from the back, which produced this wonderful goal against Costa Rica.



It was far from a classic tournament, and this is far from the greatest Brazil side of all time. But, somehow, Scolari managed to create a truly wonderful side from a squad of players lacking any direction or discipline just twelve months previously. The misconception amongst the British media is that Brazil are at their best when they possess as many creative players as possible – far from it; they have always been their best when they play a relatively rigid shape defensively that allows two or three flair players to express themselves without the worry that their failings will cost the team defensively. Ominously, that’s exactly how Dunga has them playing at the moment.

Here are Ronaldo’s two goals in the final – the first may have been fortunate, but the second was beautifully crafted:

Teams of the Decade #11: Valencia 2001-04

There’s some debate about who first used the 4-2-3-1 formation that became so popular across Europe in the 2000s. It probably started its development in the mid-90s, and some would point to Manchester United of 1994 as a forerunner, and perhaps Arsene Wenger’s Arsenal side and Real Madrid under John Toshack have claims to this award as well.

But the difficulty in describing these shapes as 4-2-3-1s comes from the fact that they were all effectively converted 4-4-2s, with holding midfielders, advanced wingers and a forward who liked to drop off into space. They were formations that became 4-2-3-1 when play developed, whereas Rafael Benitez’s side genuinely lined up with four bands, and a clear ‘three’ behind a lone frontman.

The key difference was in the player immediately behind the forward – whereas the aforementioned sides used Eric Cantona, Dennis Bergkamp and Raul respectively, Benitez used Pablo Aimar, a slender, enigmatic ‘next Maradona’ who was without question an attacking midfielder rather than a deep-lying forward. And therefore, there were five midfielders.

The 2001/02 was, frankly, as boring a side as won a domestic league title in the whole decade. A return of just 51 goals scored in 38 games is a laughable total for a Championship-winning team (no other top 5 team scored less than 64) – but Valencia were incredibly well-organised, and masters of the 1-0 win. The key was the fact that Valencia effectively played three central midfielders at a time when the rest of Spain was only fielding two. They rarely lost possession, and when they did, they were quick to get nine men behind the ball. Goals were in short supply from around the team, but Mista (a player Benitez had brought through the Real Madrid youth team) had an excellent season, and always deserved more recognition than he received.

Ruben Baraja and David Albelda were arguably the best midfield partnership of the decade – both intelligent passers and both positionally excellent in front of the back four – Baraja was probably the one who had more license to go forward and possessed a decent shot, but generally they left the attacking to the front four.



The side changed very little in terms of personnel for their second league title in 2003/04, a season when they also won the UEFA Cup. They did, however, demonstrate that the 4-2-3-1 was not merely a defensive shape, and credit must go to Benitez for the attacking shift - they conceded the same number of goals as they did in 01/02 (27) but managed to score twenty more goals, only one fewer than the league’s top scorers, Real Madrid. Mista became even better and Vicente added the goalscoring ability that was so clearly lacking when he first joined the club, and Valencia were without question the best side in Spain. Their run to the UEFA Cup final was less spectacular, and they won a poor final 2-0 against Marseille, effectively decided by one incident in the first half (Fabien Barthez bringing down Mista, being sent-off, and Vicente converting the resulting penalty). Mista added a second and that was that – both for the game and for Benitez’s time as manager.

This summed up Valencia when they were good in the attacking third – one-touch passing and good movement combining for one of the great Champions League goals:

Teams of the Decade #10: Roma 2000-01

Into the top ten we go! And to start the top ten, it’s the oldest side on this list, the superb Scudetto-winning Roma side of nine years ago. Roma played wonderful football, had a XI packed with really likeable, talented players, and a manager (Fabio Capello) who consistently got his tactics spot on. And it was the best side in the final season Channel 4 showed live games on Football Italia.

In one sense, there was no secret why Roma suddenly became title challengers – spending £50m on a new spine for the team – Samuel, Emerson and Batistuta – is always going to improve your side considerably. But, although these three had wonderful seasons, the real reason Roma became title winners was because others stepped up and became truly top-class players. Vincent Candela went from being an average left-back to a rampaging wing-back, Damiano Tomassi and Cristiano Zanetti had the seasons of their careers, and Francesco Totti became truly world-class.

Indeed, it was Tomassi and Zanetti who were Roma’s first-choice central midfielders until the new year, thanks to Emerson picking up a serious injury early on in the season. Both were unfussy, unspectacular and unfancied players, but their discipline allowed Francesco Totti the license to create without having to worry about leaving the centre of the pitch open for counter-attacks.

The wing-backs were a joy to watch all season. Cafu was just Cafu – motoring up and down the right wing for 90 minutes, acting both as a right-back and a right-winger, tackling and crossing equally well. The afforementioned Candela did a less spectacular but equally important job on the left.

Upfront, Batistuta was in his last great season as a footballer, but he was superb. 20 goals in 28 games at a new club is pretty special, and most sides simply weren’t able to deal with the tridente Roma played. Against a 4-4-2, this side worked brilliantly. The three centre-backs marked the opposition forwards with a man to spare, the Roma 4 sat deeper than the opposition 4 in midfield, and negated their ability to counter. Totti played inbetween the lines – with two strikers upfront, the opposition could only mark him with a holding midfielder, which then created room for Tomassi or Zanetti. It did leave the opposition full-backs free, but they were effectively playing against two full-backs playing high up the pitch (Cafu and Candela) who were both defensively very aware. The three-man defence worked because if one wing-back got bypassed on the flank, the centre-back closest to him was comfortable covering in a wide area, and the wing-back on the opposite side would tuck in, to make a back four. So if Candela got beaten on the overlap, Samuel would come to meet the winger, Aldair/Zago and Zebina would cover in the centre, and Cafu would defend the back post.



The only real debate in this side concerned Batistuta’s partner. Marco Delvecchio was the tall, gangly targetman who rarely scored but supposedly did a great job for the team; Vincenzo Montella was the small, pacey poacher with an incredible scoring record. Capello favoured Delvecchio for the first half of the campaign, protesting that his all-round game was better for the rest of the side, but in the end Montella simply scored so often as substitute that Capello couldn’t leave him out. And then, with a tridente of Montella, Batistuta and Totti, Roma had as lethal an attacking three as any club has had in the decade.

It was a rare appearance of a back three in a successful club side, and the key was that the three were all suited to their roles. Samuel was left-footed and therefore happy to play on the left-side of a three; he and Zebina were the physical man-markers, whilst either Brazilian, Zago or Aldair, was the spare man and the one who distributed the ball forward.

The final word must go to Totti – at 24, the captain of his hometown club, and the best player in their first title campaign since 1983. He had the most wonderful season imaginable for a player in his position, and contributed so well both in terms of goals and assists. He has a reputation as being overrated in Britain, and at 33 that’s unlikely to change, but he is a truly remarkable footballer – and quite possibly the most consistently brilliant attacking player throughout the decade. This might not even have been his best season, but it will probably prove to be his only league title.

There’s a relative lack of YouTube footage of Roma’s victorious season, but that side’s finest moment probably came the next campaign in their astonishing 5-1 derby victory over Lazio, with Vincenzo Montella scoring four, and Totti rounding it all off with a stupendous chip.