Где је бре Звезда који курац?  
А и тактике су до јаја,поготово Сенегал и Грчка...

Upravo tako(receno u kontekstu sa emtpijevim postom od 15:56:42) , da je lista po nekom drugom aspektu Bolonje ne bi bilo tu...
Mozda je mogla biti pomenuta i La Korunja...

Procitaj sta pise ako ne umes imas google translate

Не знам ја шта је то. Ај ми ти преведи.

Teams of the Decade, #20: Sevilla 2005-07

It’s hard to believe that, just two and a half years ago, Juande Ramos had a reputation as one of the most promising managers in Europe. In guiding Sevilla to consecutive UEFA Cups, a Copa del Rey and the Spanish and European Super Cups within two seasons, he oversaw by far the most successful period in the club’s history.

Ramos kept things simple tactically (which is why Sevilla are low on this list) – playing a fairly standard 4-4-2 formation, with a holding midfielder, attacking full-backs, and one forward looking to drop into space.

Ramos’ success was largely down to some excellent signings – Luis Fabiano (right) and Frederic Kanoute were picked up after disappointing spells at Porto and Tottenham, Dani Alves cost next to nothing and emerged as one of the world’s top right-backs, and Enzo Maresca, criminally underused by Juventus, was the perfect box-to-box midfielder to play alongside the disciplined Marti.

He also benefitted from two excellent, pacey wide players emerging from the club’s youth set-up – the tireless right-sided Jesus Navas, and the versatile Antonio Puerta, an excellent left-footed winger, who tragically collapsed and died from a heart attack at the beginning of the 2007/08 season.



Shortly after, Ramos left for Tottenham. Sevilla have kept much of their successful squad together, and have emerged as a top five side, but they’ll struggle to win five trophies in eighteen months ever again.

The 2006 UEFA Cup final win (below left) against Middlesbrough was the highlight, the scoreline being the biggest-ever winning margin in the history of the final.

In winning the trophy the next season, against Espanyol, they became only the second club in history to successfully defend the trophy. Their finest moment was probably on the way to that final, when goalkeeper Andres Palop scored a last-minute header to force extra-time (below right), and Sevilla went onto win the game. Palop also saved three of the four penalties during the shoot-out in the final.

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Teams of the Decade, #19: France, Euro 2004

This side gets in here because of the idea behind it, rather than the actual outcome. France were poor at Euro 2004 – they were outplayed by England in the first game, and were utterly toothless when being dumped out by Greece.



Jacques Santini’s logic was this – he wanted to play two holding players behind Zidane, and he wanted Trezeguet and Henry upfront. He needed width, which was provided from Robert Pires. He also knew he had a left-back with a reputation for getting up and down the line all day, and a forward (Henry) who liked drifting to the left when his team were defending.

So, rather than fielding a standard left-sided midfielder, he came to a compromise. When his side didn’t have the ball, the left-sided width came from Henry. When his side did, the width came from Lizarazu making forward runs, safe in the knowledge that his side had two holding players, and a left-footed centre-back (Silvestre) who was comfortable covering at full-back. Zidane also took up a left-ish role.

Where did it go wrong? To be honest, take your pick. First, France didn’t need two holding players against any of the sides they came up against (with the arguable exception of England). Second, Robert Pires was actually quite uncomfortable on the right-hand side – he may be right-footed, but he couldn’t cut in as he did so effectively for Arsenal, and it broke up the Henry-Pires partnership that worked so well. Third, Bixente Lizarazu was slightly over-the-hill. Not enough to make him an inadequate full-back – far from it – but enough that asking him to play in two positions at once was completely unrealistic, especially in the summer heat of Portugal, and with the games coming thick and fast. (It’s probably no coincidence that the goal which knocked France out of the tournament, in the video below, came from a lazy challenge from Lizarazu). Fourth, when Pires drifted to the left side, as he occasionally did, the team became completely unbalanced because Gallas was reluctant to provide attacking width on the right as Lizarazu could on the left.

Finally – and whisper this quietly – Zinedine Zidane was no longer consistent enough to base a successful team around. He’d just come off the back of an average season where Real Madrid finished a distant fourth place in La Liga, and was used to the easy life of the Galacticos, where it was acceptable to strut around the pitch leaving the defending to the defenders.

In the end, Santini’s admirable attempt to try an unusual system (often needed in international sides) became a classic case of trying to cram your best players into the same team at the expense of balance. France rarely looked like scoring against Greece, simply because they only ever attacked with four players, and Greece defended with eight.

Teams of the Decade, #18: Australia, 2006



It’s fair to say that Guus Hiddink could have had three sides in this list – his 2002 venture to the World Cup semi-finals with South Korea was probably his best achievement of the decade; his 2008 Russia side was probably his best team of the decade.

The team that gets a place in the list, however, is his 2006 Australia team – the first to qualify for the World Cup since 1974. This was, of course, in the days where they had to negotiate a tricky two-legged tie against Uruguay, rather than the easy route to the finals they enjoy today.

Their place here is largely down to the highly unusual formation Australia played throughout the tournament, which seemed to vary from game to game, but always featured two constants – a three-man defence and a lone striker, meaning it was generally noted as a 3-6-1. In reality, it was probably generally closer to a 3-3-3-1 – with two wing-backs and a very deep holding player, and three relatively offensive midfielders looking to support Mark Viduka. But six men in the middle meant Hiddink was able to switch between a defensive shape and an attacking shape fairly easily – which was vital considering the topsy-turvy games against Japan and Croatia in the group stages. Dropping a midfield player into a more defensive role meant a 3-4-2-1, pushing the wide players forward resulted in an adventurous 3-3-1-3.

Hiddink also felt relatively free to move players between positions – aided by the fact that the likes of Brett Emerton, Harry Kewell, Mark Bresciano and Mile Sterjovski were all highly versatile. Only the Schwarzer – Neill/Moore – Cahill – Viduka spine remained consistent.

The main benefit of the 3-6-1 formation was that Australia saw the majority of possession in the games against Japan (55%), Croatia (56%) and Italy (58%). Even against a vastly superior Brazil side famed for their ability to pass all day, Australia saw a decent 47% of the ball.

The shape worked better defensively than it did going forward – they took 85 minutes to break down a poor Japanese side – and the goals against Croatia were hardly well-crafted. Ultimately, they paid the price for not managing to score against an Italy side who were down to ten men and lacking any real width. With ten minutes to go, Hiddink replaced his right-winger with a second striker, and  it is perhaps not a coincidence that Italy’s last-minute goal came from a rare foray forward from left-back Fabio Grosso, who suddenly had no opponent forcing him back.

That said, it was an extremely controversial penalty which sent the Australians out, and Hiddink had at least demonstrated that for underdogs looking to frustrate the opposition and yet see a decent amount of the ball themselves, the 3-6-1 (and its many subtle variations) can be an effective system.

Their finest moment was probably Harry Kewell’s goal against Croatia to put them into the knockout stages, which was a scrappy goal but it demonstrated what Australia did well – using their numerical advantage to work the ball into a wide area, and get crosses in for the attacking four.

Знам, зато те и питам зашто си овако назвао тему?  

Иначе, све ствари са зоналмаркинга вреди прочитати.