Bulava missile test: insistent mistake making?

14/11/2008 15:09 MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Russian military plan to resume tests of the Bulava missile at the end of this year, a Navy Headquarters officer said.

The new ICBM is expected to enter service in 2009 along with the new submarine designed to carry this missile, the Borei-class Project 955 nuclear-powered undersea cruiser Yury Dolgoruky.

It is nevertheless clear that the Bulava, also known as R-30 in the Russian navy, 3M30 in the Main Missile/Artillery Directorate of the Defense Ministry, RSM-56 on the START treaty and SS-NX-30 NATO designation, hasn't met expectations so far, with four of the seven test launches failing and the last one "partly successful" according to official reports.

Specialists name a number of reasons for the trouble, which occurred in different phases of the missiles' flight, from the first minutes after the launch to the warhead dispensing, which indicates that the missile's components need further improvement. The initial cause is said to be that the Bulava development project was handed over to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which had never dealt in sea-based missiles.

The Bulava's defects can probably be eradicated, but this would take up to three years and 12 to 14 test launches, and therefore delay the entering into service of the Project 955 submarines, weakening Russia's strategic nuclear force, as seven Project 667BDR ballistic missile submarines will be decommissioned until mid-next decade. The latter were earlier scheduled to be gradually replaced by Project 955 submarines.

Meanwhile, the Russian navy maintains the 667BDRM submarines built in late 1990s and early 1990s and currently undergoing repairs and upgrades, with R-29RM missiles being replaced by R-29RMU2 Sineva ICBMs. The recent successful test-firing at a record distance of 11,547 km proved the high potential of the Makeyev Design Bureau, traditionally specializing in ballistic missile development.

As for the Sineva and Bulava missiles, it is clear that switching the naval missiles development to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology had been a mistake. The dubious advantage of unification with Topol-M missiles, which in fact is impossible neither in size, weight or appearance, set the development back years and led to huge spending, which is not sure to produce any significant effect. The Bulava's only advantage over Sineva is a shorter boost phase, which makes enemy interception more difficult.

The Sineva, however, has a significant advantage in throw-weight at 2,800 kg compared to the Bulava's 1,150 kg, and is also fitted with a more advanced penetration system. Additionally, a longer range of fire enables the submarines stay far away from NATO naval and anti-submarine aircraft bases.

A possible solution is to modernize the already afloat Yury Dolgoruky and its sister ships still in production and to equip them with Sineva missiles, whose diameter allows them to be fired from Bulava silos. The Sineva, however, is longer, which would require slightly higher silo enclosures installed.

A more serious obstacle could be that the Bulava is launched via a "dry start" with solid-state pressure accumulators, while the Sineva requires a preliminary filling of the launch tube with off-board waters.

This problem could be solved, however. Some sources say, the Makeyev Design Bureau has developed a Sineva version, which uses the "dry start" technology. If this version passes tests in the near future, the first Project 955 submarine armed with Sineva ICBMs could enter service in 2010.

Another advantage of the Sineva is its production maturity, enabling the manufacturer to launch its production fast and therefore replace the Project 667BDR submarines in time.

It is probably time to rectify mistakes.

Lessons The Russian Bulava Missile submarine Program Part One

Washington (UPI) Dec 10, 2008
The troubled history of the Russian Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile program is a textbook example of the problems that can plague an ambitious weapons program -- and how they can be overcome.

As respected Russian military analyst Nikita Petrov wrote for RIA Novosti two months ago, "Russia's navy pins great hopes on the Bulava, which has been plagued by problems for 15 years. The missile is also the focus of intrigue, with some designers wishing it good luck and others good riddance."

In building the Bulava, Russia's top Defense Ministry experts made the same kind of mistake to which the U.S. Department of Defense has been prone. They gave a major military engineering job to a large, well-established and respected organization that had a first-class track record but little or no experience in the actual field it was now being asked to master.

As Petrov pointed out, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology -- also referred to as the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering -- had never built submarine-launched ballistic missiles before for the Russian navy.

The MITT got the job after the Makeyev Design Bureau in the city of Miass, which specialized in designing submarine-launched ballistic missiles, produced its own prototype Bark SLBM that failed in three out of three test launches. The job of designing a new long-range SLBM that could be fired from Russia's ambitious new Borey-class Project 955 submarines therefore was handed over to the MITT, which had just produced a winner in the mobile, land-based, single-warhead Topol-M. But the MITT solution proved to be a bigger headache than the previous unsuccessful project it was designed to replace.

Major weapons systems do not grow on trees. A vast amount of engineering know-how and experience, on the individual and institutional levels, is required to design and then develop such ambitious engineering projects. The MITT engineers were not used to working with salt water, and they quickly found that "virtual" solutions that worked wonderfully on computer screens and in software programs were a lot more difficult to deal with when they were turned into enormous steel missiles with solid fuel-powered engines that had to be launched below the surface of the sea through salt water. Again and again, the new Bulavas emerged from the ocean at awkward angles, wrecking the accuracy of their ballistic flight trajectory.

As Petrov noted, "Sea water is 800 times denser than air and always has been a challenge to a missile launched from a running submarine."

Weapons systems can appear "brilliantly" conceptualized and invulnerable in their computer screen simulations. But they still have to cope with the unforgiving realities the elements express through the relentless laws of chemistry and physics.

Weapons systems ultimately also have to be built by lots of human beings -- specially trained, experienced and skilled ones. And such expertise is usually never available in the numbers and reliability that is required. That was another problem the Russian industrial plants discovered when they worked on building the Bulava-M SLBM prototypes.

Will Russia get the Bulava?

27/02/2009 16:05 MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Problems besetting tests of the Bulava - a promising intercontinental ballistic missile for the navy - have long been in the focus of discussion.

Bulava abortive launches are putting at risk the re-equipment of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces, which badly need replacements for aging Soviet-built missile-carrying submarines and missiles.

Russia has inherited two classes of strategic missile submarines from the Soviet Union. One is Project 667, now represented by six 667BDRM submarines built in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and five older 667BDRs. The other is Project 941, developed as a response to Ohio-class submarines that were designed in the United States.

But, with Russia lagging behind the U.S. in sea-launched solid-propellant missiles, the Soviet rocket proved far heavier: 90 tons against the 32-ton Trident-1 and the 58.5-ton Trident-2. They also differed in dimensions: the R-39 had a length of 16 meters and a diameter of 3.4 meters, while the Trident-2 being 13.4 meters long had a width of 2.11 meters and the Trident-1 was smaller still: 10.3 meters long and 1.8 meters wide.

This difference in size translated into a difference in size between the submarines. The Ohio submarine displaces 24,000 tons under water, while Project 941 submarines approach 50,000 tons, surpassing most battleships and aircraft carriers in this respect.

The operation of submarines of this class, their maintenance and keeping in combat readiness cost the navy a lot of money. So, following some unsuccessful launches of the advanced Bark missile, which was to have replaced R-39 missiles in the silos of Typhoons (the name given in the West to the largest Soviet missile submarine), it was decided to develop a lighter missile, called the Bulava. It is intended for a new submarine of Project 955, which is far smaller than Project 941.

The job of developing the Bulava was given to the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT), which specializes in solid-propellant missiles (incidentally, it was MIT that developed Topol and Topol-M missiles). Out of nine Bulava launches, only two were successful.

The most likely causes of failures are production defects plaguing the new missile. Hundreds of components are required to assemble a missile, and all of them are made at different industrial plants, which leave much to be desired in the way of quality.

On the other hand, the Bulava is not the only option. A likely replacement could be the 29RMU Sineva, an upgraded rocket of the R-29 family, a product of the Makeyev Design Bureau.

A way out might be the upgrading of the launched Project 955 parent submarine and the re-engineering of its sister ships still on the ways to use Sineva ballistic missiles. Fortunately, the Sineva's diameter allows it to be used from silos intended for the Bulava. True, the Sineva is a bit longer, which, however, is no insurmountable obstacle.

This arrangement also solves the problem of launching two different types of missiles - according to some sources, the Makeyev Bureau has developed a Sineva version using pop-up techniques from a dry launch tube.

Should this version prove capable of being tested, there is a chance of commissioning the parent Project 955 submarine in 2010 by equipping it with Sineva missiles. The Sineva has another important advantage: the well-oiled machinery of its batch production makes it possible to get off to a quick start without delaying the commissioning of new submarines, thus eliminating any gap that might be left by retiring 667BDR-class submarines.

It will not be long before we know the decision - tests have been scheduled for March. Any misfiring of the Bulava could put an end to its career.