covece ne moze bomba da se otvori ranije a realno nije samo 1 bomba bacena na nis vise je baceno....

Поновићу ти овај мој пост:

Значи да Слоба није попустио дошло би се и до Београда и Новог Сада и тог тепих бомбардовања и ко зна још чега. Постепено се повећава притисак.

Kratko i vrlo jasno. 

Vidi, Slobi uopšte nije bilo važno koliko ima mrtvih, to njega nije dodirivalo, nikada nije izjavio saučešće roditeljima Milice Rakić niti se pojavio na komemoraciji civilnim žrtvama bilo gde (u Nišu, Aleksincu itd.) Nije on popustio zbog toga, već je počeo da se koleba kad su mu roknuli vilu Mir na Dedinju tj. kad je shvatio da je on lično i njegova porodica  postao legitimna meta.

Ne znaš šta je kasetna bomba, a pričaš o tome kao da si je pravio 

Kasetna bomba se sastoji od kontejnera koji sadrži u sebi par stotina bombica. Kontejner posle odbacivanja na programiranoj visini počne da izbacuje bombice i tako se gađa određeno područje. Ako visinomer zakaže, kontejner se otvara na pogrešnoj visini i bombice završe na drugom prostoru.

Ako imaš nekog druga u vazduhoplovstvu ili artiljeriji mogu o tome da ti pričaju, mi imamo iskustvo u korišćenju kasetne municije i protiv Slovenaca i protiv Hrvata i protiv Muslimana. 


 

Realno znam vise od tebe jer pratim druge military forume, ja sada tebi koji si nacisticki opredeljen da objasnim da su namerno gadjali gradjane nisa ne mogu  jer bi ti pre bi okrivio rodjenu kevu  nego nekog Nato generala ili pilota.

hahahaha čekaj čekaj, el mi se to čini ili smo mi to sami krivi za to što su gadjali centar grada kas. bombama???
Ma daaaaj čoveče pa šta vas tera na takvo ostrašćeno branjenje te stoke???

Купљене су нове Ладе... То је највећа набавка војске... 

Али тенкови којима сам опседнут... Хахахаха... Ја сам само исправио земунца који је причао о модернизованим 84-кама... 

У Европи имаш преко 2000 активних Леопарда... Где су ту други тенкови? 

Овде сви причају шббкбб... Тако да не можеш да ми ускратиш право да кажем да би ВЈ нанела веће губитке НАТО-у него ВС...

Сви овде филозофирате како би напали преко Мађарске, бла бла, трућ трућ...
1914. Аустроугарска са свим својим школованим официрима и "напредном западном тактиком" удара на Србију преко планинчуге иако има Београд на домету артиљерије...
То је оно што ви филозофи не капирате код запада... Ту ароганцију и курчевитост је тешко замислити, признајем... 

Весли Кларк је био за инвазију ни мање ни више него преко Албаније и Проклетија... Са све апачима и специјалним јединицама...  (неко је спомињао курчевитост?)

Бомбардовање није давало ефекта и зато су ударали ПОСТЕПЕНО по цивилним циљевима... Опипавали су када ћемо попустити...
Онда је говедо испод липе (као и увек у својој каријери) попустило тотално без икаквог освртања какве су жртве пале до тада... 

Нико нормалан овде не тврди да бисмо победили или да се то већ десило већ само да је она војска била способнија него ова данас за сукоб са НАТО-ом...

Нико такође не прича да је Слоба био одличан. Већ само да оно што је тада пропадало сада је само докрајчено...

Земунац, Лазар је добар за неке ствари али је пун недостатака... Навешћу само окопну заштиту, прозоре и веома слаб мотор. То моће да се види са снимка... Не смем да замислим шта би нашли да се мало позабаве тиме...
Не делим твој оптимизам кад је наша намеска у питању... Ми још увек функционишемо по принципу буџења свега и свачега... Нисмо ми још способни да правимо планско и наменско наоружање...

Чак и оне м2001 (опседнутост тенковима ) нисмо способни да правимо већ само да модификујемо постојеће м84...

Немамо сада могућности да правимо било шта осим пешадијског наоружања и опреме...

(iz @Feanorovog citata)
te price o tenkovima kao nepotrebnim,a bogme i kako Evropa nema 1000 komada su nevidjena lupetanja...
u stvari,sta trosim vreme...?
ko ne shvata znacaj tenka na ratistu,ne shvata ni najosnovnije stvari...
ili mozda samo slusa NATOovska nagovaranja kao-bacite sve tenkove,ne treba vam,evo i mi bacamo,a u stvari ne smanjuju broj.
Boze,kakva lupetanja... 
ovo me podseca na ona bolesna vremena 50ih kada su kompanije raazmisljale da li da uopste nastavljaju enormne proizvodnje kola,kada cemo za 50 godina svi ziveti na Marsu...lupetanja i lupetnja!!! 

I kako je prošla AU u tom eksperimentu??? Potučena je do nogu od 3 puta slabije armje, po svim pokazateljima. Zato se na vojnim akademijama i uči predmet koji govori o istoriji ratovanja.



Niko ti ne uskraćuje pravo da kažeš šta god hoćeš, ovde polemišemo oko tačnosti ili netačnosti toga. Kao što rekoh, to su sve subjektivne procene, jer do invazije srećom nije došlo, pa nemamo konkretne podatke da validno ocenimo snagu i mogućnosti VJ ili NATO-a.



Vesli Klark jeste bio za invaziju, ali koliko se sećam u Albaniju je bilo prebačeno dvadesetak apača, što je nedovoljno za "invaziju". Trupe koje je NATO imao u Albaniji (i Makedoniji) nisu bile adekvatne za invaziju. Pročitaj sledeći tekst iz "Vašington posta", napisan 25. aprila 1999. godine.

Iz ovog teksta se jasno vidi da postojeće snage na terenu (tj. U Albaniji i Makedoniji) nisu dovoljne ni sposobne i kolumnista predlaže dovlačenje masivnih dodatnih snaga iz Amerike.



Objective: Kosovo
How would a ground war work? Here's one scenario.

Robert Killebrew
The Washington Post
April 25, 1999

"You can ask me for anything you like, except time." --Napoleon

The United States' and NATO's miscalculation of Serb intransigence has led the alliance into a strange, one-sided war of attrition, in which Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic stands to win by waiting out NATO's air attacks. NATO's options seem to be: continue bombing and hope that Milosevic capitulates; seek a negotiated settlement; or initiate a combined ground-air offensive in Kosovo to secure the province by force.

There are dangers inherent in all three, but unless Milosevic caves in, ground operations provide the only realistic chance NATO and the United States have of winning this war.

Pundits have decried the time it would take to deploy effective ground forces to the region and to do the job. Some estimates amount to "months." But the estimates are wrong.

Despite difficulties in establishing ground operations--notably distance, terrain and weather--my experience in more than 20 years of planning and executing rapid force deployment operations tells me that NATO could get the right forces there in weeks, not months, and that its combined air-ground campaign could defeat decisively the estimated 40,000 regular and irregular Yugoslav forces now in Kosovo as well as reinforcements from elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Sadly, American and other NATO casualties will be unavoidable as combat soldiers enter the risky world of face-to-face war.

NATO has no shortage of rapidly deployable, tough and lethal ground units. If NATO decides to use them, land operations should resemble the lightning U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 rather than the massive armored juggernaut of Desert Storm in 1991. In fact, a protracted Persian Gulf War-style buildup would be counterproductive, allowing time for the Yugoslav army to entrench further.

First, however, NATO forces need a clear mission. For starters, a NATO objective to establish a broad and comprehensive settlement across the Balkans, one that leads to security and peace for its inhabitants, would give military commanders the scope and authority they need to plan and conduct a winning campaign in and around Kosovo.

Second, once NATO enters a ground war, the combined air-ground campaign must employ overwhelming power to force a rapid and decisive conclusion. That has not been the case thus far in the air war for many reasons, but primarily because although air power can sometimes prompt negotiation, it is never decisive on its own.

The list of available Western forces already in the Balkans is impressive. Britain, France and Germany have around 12,000 troops in Macedonia. They have some very effective helicopter-borne units, and enough British Challenger, German Leopard and French AMX-30 tanks there to form a significant armored force on Kosovo's southern border, along one of the few feasible tank routes into the area. The United States has deployed an Apache antitank helicopter unit and rocket artillery to Albania, along with a contingent of infantry for local security. Military engineers from other NATO countries--soon to be deployed to support refugees--could also build and maintain ground supply routes and resupply points around Kosovo's periphery that would support combat forces.

The best-suited U.S. ground forces available for a Kosovo intervention come not from Europe, but from the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, which is frequently the "tip of the spear" of U.S. military power. Its four U.S.-based infantry divisions (roughly 14,000 to 18,000 troops in each) deploy quickly: It conducted the fast-moving Operation Just Cause in Panama, and it led the U.S. initial ground defense of Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf crisis.

The size and design of the corps' infantry divisions allow them to be moved rapidly in Air Force transport planes, particularly the new C-17, designed specifically for airdrops or landing on crude airstrips. Once in the battle area, the infantry of the 82nd and 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions would speed around the battle area in Humvees or low-flying Blackhawk helicopters. The corps' aviation and artillery, teamed with NATO aircraft flying close support, would provide crushing firepower, and its highly trained infantry are prepared for the grim business of killing or disarming paramilitaries. Its heavy punch is the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, composed of M1A2 main battle tanks and mechanized infantry. This division, and its supporting cargo ships, maintain constant readiness to load combat-ready armored forces on short notice and steam at more than 25 knots from Savannah, Ga., to distant ports. They are days, not weeks, from the Balkans.

Campaign planning for Kosovo must take into account the area's relative isolation, as well as its rugged terrain, poor roads and rotten weather. If Greece permits, the use of its ports and roads from Greece through Macedonia would considerably ease the movement of supplies. Geography would restrict the rapid deployment of large armored formations into Kosovo. Fortunately, the Adriatic Sea is nearby, raising the possibility of ship-to-shore support to forward bases in Albania.

The Yugoslav army and paramilitaries are not impressive. This is an outdated, Soviet-style force whose only recent exercise has been shelling civilians. Knowledgeable former Yugoslav military men have low opinions of the fighting ability of the present crop of city-bred Serbian conscripts, and think NATO could prevail with fewer troops than the standard three-to-one ratio of attack to defense.

Last Thursday, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana authorized the alliance's military command to review plans for the possible use of ground troops in Kosovo. I have operated with some of these forces, I have seen them in action and studied the results of their campaigns. Their methods are well-known, and the scenario that follows reveals nothing that would compromise their mission or aid their enemy. Based on my experience and on publicly available information, here's one theory of how a combined air-ground NATO campaign might unfold:

The campaign would likely consist of three distinct phases. In the first 48 hours of an assault, NATO forces would attack hardened Yugoslav positions, armor and forces that could offer serious resistance.

In the second phase, NATO forces would secure the avenues of approach to Kosovo from the rest of Yugoslavia. NATO infantry would seek out and destroy or disarm paramilitaries and police. This phase would last considerably longer, perhaps several weeks.

The third phase would bring a gradual return of law and order to the province, the return of refugees and begin the process of reconstruction. NATO forces would secure the border, suppress terrorism and conduct peace operations. This phase would continue indefinitely.

The Scenario Begins

A campaign designed to destroy the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo quickly actually begins weeks before the fighting starts. Troops and their antitank and transport helicopters are airlifted into Albania or elsewhere in the region. These deployments will be unavoidably public, since movements of this size cannot be completely hidden. But once in field locations, operational and tactical secrecy is possible, given the rugged and isolated terrain in the Balkans. Yugoslav forces in the field would be unaware of the extent of the NATO force buildup in Albania, particularly if their communications and intelligence systems are destroyed by NATO action.

The Airborne Corps' 3rd Mechanized Division's equipment puts to sea. At the same time, NATO special forces infiltrate Kosovo to pick up intelligence on enemy troops, and NATO troop commanders scrutinize intelligence on their positions and prepare to attack.

Day One

Intensified air attacks crash down on enemy forces along the Albania-Kosovo and Macedonia-Kosovo borders on the first day of the NATO strike. Yugoslav forces near the borders are driven underground or destroyed. Other strikes hit Yugoslav forces anywhere in Yugoslavia that could reinforce their forward forces or react against a NATO incursion. Under cover of darkness, special units secure the summits of key peaks overlooking Kosovo's long valleys.

Simultaneously, brigade-size task forces of 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers and their equipment launch into Kosovo in darkened Blackhawk helicopters. Wearing night-vision goggles, the pilots fly fast and low across the jagged terrain, bypassing Yugoslav positions and striking deeply into rear areas. British, German and French armor, supported by air power, attack north from Macedonia toward Kosovo's capital, Pristina. Since Kosovo is relatively small, much of NATO's logistic support remains in Albania or Macedonia, to be called forward as required.

Within 24 hours of the ground attack, tank-killing Apaches, Marine Cobras from ships off Albania and infantry teams fan out across the province by day and by night, searching for Serb units, positions and headquarters already located by satellite and aerial reconnaissance. Apache and Cobra attack helicopters, supported by NATO firepower from the sky and from ground-based artillery, seek out surviving Yugoslav army armored forces as a first priority and strike them from outside the tanks' effective gun range. Infantry troops, either moving in assault helicopters or across country in Kevlar-hardened Humvees with machine guns or rapid-fire 40mm grenade launchers, clear villages of Yugoslav forces, while covered by armed helicopters in the distance.

Week One and Beyond

As the days pass, large urban areas are cut off and bypassed by combat forces. Psychological warfare units and military police concentrate on coaxing out civilians and remaining enemy troops. House-to-house fighting is a last resort.

American casualties are minimized as the troops operate mainly at night, capitalizing on their superior night-fighting techniques and training. As forces flow into the area behind the infantry, civil affairs units and support personnel arrive to begin opening the way for humanitarian organizations and medical personnel to address the remaining traumatized population of Kosovo. NATO fighter and bomber aircraft with their precision weaponry and sophisticated communications are always overhead. Other early arriving armored forces unload in Greece and drive north to Macedonia.

Within a week or two, fighting between large units begins to wind down. Most Yugoslav forces have been taken or destroyed. The campaign, however, moves toward its truly critical stage--scattered infantry fights that continue for weeks and months against snipers, drive-by assassins and paramilitary thugs, all of whom are aided by the difficult terrain. The scale of the war diminishes from large-scale combat to scattered small-unit actions and then to terrorism. NATO forces face the complex challenge of restoring the rule of law, rebuilding a civil society and beginning to return the refugees to their homes, many of which would be rubble. And as the seasons change, NATO also faces the threat of worsening weather. This final phase will be long, dangerous and difficult, but we should not be put off by the difficulty. Kosovo is not Vietnam, and the paramilitary thugs are not the Viet Cong.

Aftermath

We should make no mistake that there will be casualties. If this becomes a ground war, U.S. infantrymen will be facing it the old-fashioned way, across rifle sights, amid the snap and crack of incoming small-arms fire. American and NATO infantry are the best there is, though, and recent experience in Panama, Iraq and Mogadishu clearly shows that they can beat any opposition, and with the fewest possible losses.

For NATO's military, even the best "end state" of a Kosovo operation will be wearying and difficult. Long-term NATO peacekeeping garrisons will be established in the Balkans. Since we are now relearning--for the third time this century--that the peace and stability of Europe is necessary for our own security, garrisoning the Balkans will be a small price to pay for having drifted so close to anarchy and the threat of a wider war. But even under the most favorable conditions, we're there for the long haul.

Bob Killebrew retired from the U.S. Army as an infantry colonel in 1997. He writes and speaks on defense issues. Sizing up the enemy: Some former Yugoslav military men think the outdated Serb forces and their conscripts would be no match for NATO forces in a decisive ground war.


Vrlo zanimljiv scenario, pisan u jeku rata, ali je činjenica da Vesli Klark nije imao potrebne snage za kopnenu invaziju, jer koliko ja znam ni 82. ni 101. vazdušno-desantna divizija nisu bile prebačene u Evropu, a takođe ni 3. oklopno-mehanizovana divizija naoružana tenkovima M1A2-Abramsima. Da su oni dovukli sve ove impresivne snage, ta invazija bi vrlo kratko trajala, bilo bi tu bežanije na sve strane, po mom subjektivnom mišljenju. 




Čak i da se složim sa tobom, pitanje je zašto mi nemamo mogućnosti da pravimo bilo šta, osim pešadijskog naoružanja. Možda zato što je kod nas namenska industrija državna, a na zapadu je to privatni biznis koji posluje strogo tržišno i gde je država (tj. armija) samo klijent-naručilac, a ne tutor i vlasnik. Još kad je država u manjku sa lovom, kao naša, pa naravno da će da se škrtari na svemu, pa i na oklopnoj zaštiti, lošem motoru i ostalim nedostacima koje si uočio kod Lazara.

Da je Lazar projekat privatnih kompanija zainteresovanih za profit, tu bi kao kod kupovine kola imao opciju da biraš paletu motora, nivo oklopne zaštite, pa čak i enterijer vozila, klima uređaje, možda bi unutra ugradili i kožna sedišta ako kupac to želi.