"Until recently, use of Russian military equipment abroad was rarely openly discussed in the media. However, it is a fact that Russian combat planes, land and naval military equipment was actively used in combat in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, and other of the world’s hotspots.

MiG-15 against the "Sabre"

The pause in combat use of fighter aircraft lasted for only five years. The historians were still analyzing the past war, when the new war begun in the skies over Korea. This war was the first of many large-scale local conflicts to shake the world in the decades to come.

Many experts regard these wars as a kind of testing grounds for the new combat equipment. This would be quite true in regard to the Korean war that started in November of 1950. For the first time jet fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-bombers tested their capabilities in combat. Particular attention was paid to the competition between the Soviet MiG-15 and the American F-86 "Sabre."

During the three years of the Korean war, pilots of the 64th IAK (Istribityelno Aviatsionny Korpus, or Fighter Aviation Corps) flew 1,872 combat sorties and shot down 1,106 US-made aircraft, of which 650 were "Sabres."Some 335 MiGs were lost during the war.

The MiG-15 and the "Sabre" represented the first generation of jet fighters and had very similar combat capabilities. The MiG-15 was 2.5 tons lighter (take-off weight of 5,044 kg), however, "Sabre’s" extra weight was compensated by the higher thrust of its engine (4,090 kgf compared to MiG-15's 2,700 kgf of thrust). The two aircraft had a very similar thrust-to-weight ratio: 0.54 for the MiG-15 and 0.53 for the "Sabre" and the identical maximum speed near the ground: 1,100 km/h. At high altitudes the MiG-15 had a better acceleration and could gain altitude faster, while the "Sabre" had a better maneuverability at low altitudes. The "Sabre" also had longer flight endurance thanks to the 1.5 tons of "extra" fuel.

The use of jet engines in the aircraft designs incorporating the latest advancements in aerodynamics, enabled to extend the operational flight envelope into the speed range approaching the speed of sound. The fighter aircraft now were able to operate in the stratosphere (the operational ceiling for the "Sabre" was 12,000 m and for the MiG-15 - 15,000 m).

The only area, where the two aircraft differed considerably, was their armaments. The MiG-15 had one 37-mm and two 23-mm cannons, while the "Sabre" was armed with six 12.7-mm machine guns (later in the war late-model "Sabres" were armed with four 20-mm cannons). Not even the most experienced of experts could have determined the potential winner by looking at the technical characteristics of the two aircraft. The answer could be obtained only through actual combat.

The first combat encounters showed that the art of aerial combat experienced no substantial changes in form or substance since the age of propeller fighters, despite of many predictions to the contrary. Aerial combat retained all the traditional elements of the past. It remained close, maneuverable, close combat.

The main reason for that was the relatively unchanged armaments of the fighters. The same machine-guns and cannons migrated from the propeller fighters of the Second World War-era onto the new jet fighters. This meant that the "kill" range and the attack envelop remained essentially the same. The relative weakness of a single attacking aircraft was compensated by the large number of aircraft participating in the attack.

The tree-time Hero of the Soviet Union, division commander during the Korean War, Ivan Kozhedub wrote: "The main thing is to master the piloting and shooting skills. If the pilot’s attention is not entirely consumed by the process of piloting the aircraft, he will be able to perform the right maneuver, to quickly approach the enemy, and to launch a precision attack."

The MiG-15 was created for the aerial combat, this means the aircraft fully corresponded to its single task. The MiG-15's designers retained the ideas first incorporated in the MiG-1 and the MiG-3: high speed, acceleration, altitude; an approach which allowed the pilot to assume highly aggressive tactics. There was never any doubt among the Soviet pilots that their fighter is the best in the world.

One of the MiG-15' strongest sides was the high destructive potential of its armaments, allowing the aircraft to gain early victory during the main part of any aerial combat - the initial attack. However, for a successful attack the pilot had to gain the information and positional advantage during the previous stages of the attack.

The group leader could take the initiative and to dictate his conditions to the "Sabres," if he was the first to gain the necessary information about the enemy. Available free time was used to outline the battle plan, to assume an advantageous initial position, and to establish the correct flight formation. The pilot received help from a ground control center, which was equipped with early detection systems. Before the visual contact with the flight of "Sabres" was established, the control center informed the group leader about the current situation and the location of all detected targets. The MiG-15 used its better acceleration rate at high altitudes to quickly approach the enemy. Stealth of the approach was provided by the camouflage: a "terrain" paint scheme on the top and a "sky" scheme on the bottom. The tactical situation demanded that the pilots use the sun and clouds to maintain the element of surprise, as well as to be able to quickly change the density of the attack formation.

A level flight in a straight line, combining a head-on approach to the enemy fighter and the attack, became possible only in about thirty years, after the fighters were equipped with radars and medium-range missiles. The MiG-15 combined its approach with a sharp maneuver into the real semi-sphere of the enemy fighter. If the "Sabre" detected the MiG at a safe distance, then it tried to force the MiG into a maneuverable combat (especially at low altitudes), which was not in the MiG’s best interests.

Even though the MiG-15 somewhat lagged behind the "Sabre" in horizontal maneuverability, this was not enough of a problem to prevent the pilot from relying on such maneuvers, when it was necessary. The active defense of a pair of MiGs was based on the mutual experience of the two pilots and the correct performance of "the sword and the shield" tactical principle, when the first aircraft attacked the enemy, while the second aircraft covered the first one. Experience showed that connected and well-balanced actions of a pair of MiG-15s made the two aircraft invulnerable in close combat.

In a three-element flight structure the pair or the group had an additional multipurpose function: build-up of forces, acting as a reserve, and performing free maneuvers. This pair of fighters stayed above the rest of the flight and had a good view of the situation, which allowed it to deflect a sudden attack as well as to render assistance to either "the sword" or "the shield" groups. During the Korean War the Soviet pilots came up with a new attack group structure, which consisted of six aircraft with a separation of roles as in an entire squadron. This approach was later adopted and successfully used by Syrian pilots flying MiG-21s during the October of 1973 war in the Middle East.

During the Korean War Soviet ground control centers were the real participants of any aerial combat. The ground control center would usually send the fighters into action after detecting the enemy at the limit of the effective range of it radars located mainly in China. The navigation officer used the radar data to guide the fighters to the initial attack position. The flight leader was first given general information about the enemy and, later, specific orders for an attack. The control center’s goal was ensure the best possible tactical position for the MiG-15s before visual contact with the "Sabres" was established. After the "Sabres" were sighted, the flight leader assumed all control of the situation, leaving the control center with the task of providing any additional information that may be useful in combat.

The particular attack sequence depended on the the distance to the enemy and the distribution of enemy forces. "Sabres" rarely followed conventions and frequently changed their flight formation. This meant that usually the best attack sequence - strike, cover, reinforce - could be a losing tactics. The attackers had to be able to modified their attack plans nearly instantly, for there was not much time left to think.

After the MiGs broke through the formation of the "Sabres," the combat would continue between separate groups and, later, between pairs of aircraft. The squadron commander, being preoccupied with his own target, was no longer able to control the actions of his subordinates, which led to a deliberate decentralization of control. Group commanders had a right to make their own decisions depending on the situation. The ground control center informed the MiGs about any approaching enemy reserves, tracked the remaining fuel, and had the authority to withdraw the fighters from combat. Additional forces could be directed to the combat zone to provide cover during a withdrawal.

It is important to mention, that all of the division commanders and most of the fighter regiment commanders fought in the Second World War and had considerable tactical command experience. "Experience never becomes outdated, it only being re-evaluated and adapted to the current situation," - wrote famous Soviet ace, A.I. Pokryshkin. Re-evaluating the tactics did not take long. The "bookshelf" flight formation was adopted from the aerial engagements over Kuban in 1943, retaining all the functions of the squadron’s groups. Principles of a group combat also remained unchanged.

Success of the MiG-15 pilots was determined by:

the equipment, which fully corresponded to the requirements of combat

the use of the available weapons to the maximum of its capabilities

rational tactics (in both theory and practical applications of combat)

close cooperation between pilots and the ability of commanders to control all available resource in the air

It is also important to mention the reasons for combat losses. Out of 335 MiG-15s shot down during the war, pilots of over fifty percent of the downed aircraft successfully ejected. Almost all of the pilots later returned into active service with a very high opinion about the reliability and simplicity of the MiG-15's ejection system.

A large percentage of losses was sustained by the MiGs during landing. The frontline airfields (Andun, Dapu, Myaogou) were located near the sea and the MiGs were not permitted to fly over the sea. That’s exactly where the "Sabres" gathered specifically to attack the MiGs over the airfields. During landing the MiG-15 was flying at a low speed in a straight line with its flaps and gear extended. This was a position when the MiG could not deflect an attack or escape from it. The quality of the aircraft and all the training of the pilot were quite useless in such situations.

Most MiG-15s downed in actual combat were single aircraft that got separated from their group and were left without cover. Statistics shows that about fifty percent of all losses among pilots account for the first ten combat flights. Thus, survivability of the pilot in combat directly depended on his experience.

Close evaluation of the past experience, adaptation of everything useful that did not lose its value in the jet age is the distinctive quality of the approach to aerial combat taken by out fighter pilots in Korea."



"The MiG-15 came as a surprise to the Allies during the Korean War, where it was a match for any fighter it met, including early versions of the United States' famed North American F-86 Sabre. Fast, agile, and reasonably well armed, the MiG-15 was a dangerous foe when flown by an experienced, aggressive pilot. During the course of the Korean War, the telling difference between the performance of the MiG-15 and the F-86 was attributed to pilot training and the more advanced weapon system of the American aircraft. The first mass-produced Soviet jet fighter, the MiG-15 was powered by a Klimov turbojet developed from the Rolls-Royce Nene engine. Today, some MiG-15s continue to serve in several of the world's air forces, nearly a half-century after the prototype's first flight."

(source: Knowledge Adventure)

evo jos slika

i jos slika

protivnici

Najbolja vojna tema postavljena ovde u zadnje vreme  Svaka cast covece 

Hvala eto resih da postavim nesto dobro na svoj rodjendan a i dugo me nije bilo na forumu

btw...srecan rodjendan 

Ziv bio 

Srecan ti rodjendan, btw i meni je danas, isto

Bravo za tekst.
Srećan rođendan colossus1167 i ramon23
Sve naljepše vam želim.

Znas kako- imam spisak svih asova i to iz casopisa "Krila Rodjini" pa da nadjem i turim ovde

odlicno

Eh ovo spada u onu domenu nikada necemo znati. Sovjeti su tvrdili jedno, Ameri nesto sasvim trece, tako da sto se tice broja oborenih aviona, tesko da ce se prava istina ikada saznati, a tehnicka razlicitost aviona je manje vise zanemariva. Dakle bolji pilot je odnosio pobjedu u ovom slucaju.

evo novih slika

Stizem i ja... 

Malo je zeznuto da odgovorim na ovu anketu jer crno na belo Sejbrovi ispaddose bolji ali njih su leteli iskusni piloti iz drugog svetskog rata dok su vecinom Koreanci bili neiskusni. Ako je oko ista uradio onda su to sovjetski piloti. U prilogu mog odgovora prilazem dve strane iz casopisa "Avijacija i Kosmonautika", broj pet iz 1991 godine. Tu postoje podaci za ovaj rat. Naravno druga strana sadrzi i spisak pilota. Tu su dve fotografije Sejbrova iz Koreje i one su iz Photo credit- USAF Obratite paznju na sliku coveka pored MiG-15. To je Hugo Hofman, cuveni holandski istrazivac koji je nesto posle prebega korejskog pilota bio u SAD i imao prilike da vidi taj avion i cak i da se slika pored njega. To je bilo gotovo nemoguce uto vreme. Slika se po prvi put objavljuje!!! Molim da se ne prenosi dalje.

Zadnju sliku sam dobio od nekog... al ne znam od koga. U pitanju je MiG-15 sacuvan u Moninu.

Nadam se da valja nesto od ovog

e svaka cast pilot i colossus1167

Hvala base001 - drug Fighter mi je poverio duznost moderatora i ja nastojim da opravdam poverenje  Ne znam sve al cinim najbolje sto je u mojoj moci [ i arhivi i vezama sa drugima ]

хорошо сделанный Пилот, фотографии являются большими 

Fala drugar  Kolko dobra tema i autor tolko dobre i slike   

The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps was sent to fight in Korea in Nov 1950. They performed very well, shooting down over 1,300 UN aircraft of all types while losing only 345 of their own. 16 Soviet pilots made ace, with the top scorer being Evgeni Pepelyaev with 23 kills. This info comes from the magazine article, and the author got his info from various US and Russian publications. The 2:1 MiG-15 vs. F-86 statistic is from the "Red Star" series. It should be mentioned that American and Soviet info do not contradict each other with regards to kill tallies. Only if an American plane is brought down over the combat area was it counted as a "loss". U.S. Air Force does not count planes damaged beyond repair or forced to land on the way home. The Soviets do, so their figures are naturally higher with regards to kills.

This makes sense because MiG-15 is considered the better plane. Its just that Chinese and North Korean pilots were SO bad that the US could score a 13:1 kill ratio against them. Many US and Soviet pilots were veterans of World War II. Most of the Soviet pilots sent to Korea were veterans and aces, including Ivan Kozhedub, 3-time Hero of the Soviet Union with 62 German kills to his credit. So pilot quality was even (since USSR sent almost exclusively elite pilots, you could even say that man-for-man they were superior). In addition to their good scores against enemy fighters, the Soviet pilots were the primary reason the US stopped using B-29 bombers (US first switched from day to night bombing and, after 1951, hardly used them at all).


16 Soviet pilots of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps made ace. 
>The highest scoring was Evgeni Pepelyaev, with 23 confirmed kills (12
>F-86s, 6 F-80s, 4 F-84s, and one F-94.  Most of the Soviet pilots that
>were sent to Korea were veterans or aces of World War II.  Ivan Kozhedub,
>a 3-time Hero of the Soviet Union with 62 German kills to his credit, was
>one of those sent.
>The 64th was secretly sent to fight in the Korean War in Nov
>1950.  They did quite well, shooting down 1,300 UN aircraft of all types
>while losing only 345 of their own.  MiG-15s piloted by Soviets outscored
>the F-86 guys at around 2:1.  However, MiGs in the hands of North Korean
>and Chinese pilots were knocked down at something like 13:1 by the USAF. 
>There doesn't seem to be any Chinese or Korean aces. 
>I don't have all the details of this but there is supposedly a lot
>of good info on this in the Oct 1990 through May 1991 issues of Aviatiya
>i Kosmonavtika.  If there is anyone who can read Russian who has access
>to these, I'd like to know more details.  The 28 December 1991 edition of
>Krasnaya Zvezda should contain some info, too.

article on Soviet Aces in Korea:

Soviet Air Aces of the Korean War

by Igor N. Gordelianow

Recently, a distinguished Soviet airmen has told of his participation in the Korean War from 1952-53. This war started as a conflict between North and South Korean, but in a short time both the USSR and the USA were drawn into the battle. Alexandr Pavlovich Smortzkow was born in 1919. During the Korean War he served as the comra artder of the 18th Air craft Regiment. He was decorated with the "Gold Star" order for his service in the Korean War. He is also a "Hero of the Soviet Union" and at the present time he is a retired Colonel. He gave the following interview to a reporter of the Russian newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda: "in June 1950, I was flying MiG-15 out of Moscow when the commander of the Moscow Air Defense (PVO), General Colonel K. Moscalenko, informed me of the arrival of top secret orders concerning the conflict in Korea. The signal to initiate the orders, "Polikarpov Po-2 in Flight" had been received and we were to board a secret train at night to travel to the Far East. When we arrived in the Far East, we found the weather to be very bad; heavy tropical downpours such as I have never experienced in my lifetime. Many ducks were swimming on our airfield. First we operated from Mukdan airbase, but after a few days our 18-aircraft regiment was transferred to Andun airbase. "Our first flights were in formation with MiG - 15s from other regiments: 24 MiG-15 in three groups of eight aircraft. We were dressed in Chinese uniforms and our aircraft carried Chinese insignia. Initially, we were ordered to speak only Korean over the radio. Since most Russian pilots did not know Korean and we had to use Korean dictionaries for even the simplest words necessary for fighting and flying, as you can imagine, this order was soon abolished. "Our attitudes towards the American pilots were complicated. During the Second World War, we had been allies against Hitler. Therefore, in Korea, we did not view the Americans as enemies, but only as opponents. Our motto in the air was 'Competition - with whomever.' "Americans attacking North Korea in our area had two main targets: The bridges across the Yalunczyan River and the Andun power station which was supplying electrical power to North Korea. Our pilots protected these two objectives with great success. Out first aerial victory was scored by Akatow who shot down an F-86 Sabre. This free pilot later died of wounds suffered in combat; he had only one aerial victory. Also killed was my friend Valentin Filimonow who was shot down when two F-86 Sabres attacked his MiG-15. "My opinions about the relative abilities of Soviet and American aircraft and pilots were as follows: I thought the American pilots were very good. This opinion was shared by other Soviet pilots including my friends Vladimir Voistinnych and Pete Chourkin. However, the MiG-15 was a very good aircraft. It had only one big problem - the engine would stop abruptly during a sharp turn. As for the American aircraft: the F-80 Shooting Star was not very good, the F-84 Thunderjet was average, but the F-86 Sabre was very good. "One day we attacked a group of Australian Gloster Meteors. They were a big, easy targets for us. My friend Oskin and I destroyed five Meteors during this one fight. "One night we intercepted B-29 Superfortresses. I was listening to my radio - 'Group of B-29s in front of you!' I dove my MiG-15 with my heart pounding. Soon I saw the B-29s with many protecting fighters. I attacked and destroyed two B-29s and one of the escorting Sabres. Over my radio came the question: 'Alexandr! How are you getting on?' I answered with a furious 'Victory! It's O.K.!' That night our regiment destroyed five B-29s." Alexandr Smortzkow finished the Korean War with 12 victories (5 B-29, 2 F-86, and 5 Meteors.

Ivan Kozedub, the great Soviet ace of the Second World War (62 victories) and "Hero of the Soviet Union" with three "Gold Stars", was the commander of all the Soviet fighter regiments in Korea. He did not fly in Korea, but his regiments accounted for 258 viaories.

Other Soviet Aces of the Korean War:

Nikolay Shkodin: 5 victories (4 F-86 and one F-84G). During the war he flew 150 combat missions. He is presently a General-Major retired.

Yevgeny Pepelyaev: with 23 victories, he was the top Soviet ace in the Korean War. He was known as the "Big night boy".

Anatoly Karelin: 9 victories (all B-29s destroyed at night during "Free Hunter" missions.

Other Soviet aces were:

Nikolay Ivanov (6 F-86), Mikhail Mihin (9 F-86), Nick Sutyagin (23 victories), L. Schukin (more than 10 victories), and D. Oskin (more than 10 victories).

Other Soviets with more than 10 victories were: G. Pulov, G. Ohay, S. Veshnyakov, G. Ges, A. Boytzow, and D. Samaoylov.

Alexandr Smortzkow's interview concluded: "Before my last flight of the War, my division commander ordered that we were to attack Sabres and then fly back to the USSR. On this flight, I was wounded in the leg. Back in the USSR, I learned that an American pilot with the Russian name, Makhonin, had been captured along with his brand new F-86. It was interesting to study his aircraft up close. "Thus, the war was finished for us. However, many of my good friends had perished in Korea and they were buried at Port Artur."


Name                  Kills                      Comments

Sutyagin N V        21+2   (21 personal and 2 in group)
Pepelyaev Ye G   19             (and 4 more Pepelyaev's kills was recorded on his wingman score)
Smortzkow A P    15
Schukin L K         15
Oskin D P         14             (or 11 on another sources)
Ponomaryov M S  14              (or 11 on another sources)
Kramarenko S M   13
Sutzkow         12
Sheberotov N K   12
Bakhayev S A         11
Dokashenko N G   11
Ohay G U         11               (and 6 in WW2)
Pomaz                   11
Samoylov D A         10
Milaushkin M S      10
Pulov G I         10              (or 8 on another sources)
Mihin M I          9
Subbotin S P        9
Zabelin N V         9
Ges G I         8              (or 9 on another sources)
Fedorets S A         7    confirmed and 1 unconfirmed - unconfirmed victory is downing of the best of American aces McConnell plane on 12.04.53.
Babonin N N        7
Zaplavnev I M     7
Ivanov L M        7     (not Nikolay Ivanov from the list who have 3 cofirmed kills 1 unconfirmed kill and 2 damaged planes)
Bokatz B V       6
Vishnyakov S F   6
Zameskin N M     6
Nikolayev A P       6
Nikulin P F       6
Boitsov A S       6
Hvostontsev V M    6
Abakumov B S    5
Bashman A T     5
Belousov V I              5
Berelidze G N           5
Bogdanov G I              5
Gerasimenko N I    5
Danilov S D             5
Dmitryuk G F             5
Karelin A M             5
Korniyenko N L    5
Kochegarov A M    5
Lepikov V L              5
Naumenko S I    5
Obraztsov B A    5
Olenitsa              5
Prudnikov               5
Siskov B N              5
Shelamanov N K    5
Shkodin N I              5                         (or 3 on another sources)