Putinov projekat mrtvo slovo na papiru

Tanjug   | 01. 01. 2015. - 17:20h | Foto: AP   
Projekat ruskog predsednika Vladimira Putina, Evroazijska ekonomska unija (EEU), koja je "naslednik" carinske unije bivših sovjetskih republika, danas počinje da funkcioniše, ali pojedini stručnjaci smatraju da je ona samo "mrtvo slovo na papiru", prenosi "Dojče vele".


Istovremeno, ima i onih koji EEU smatraju nužnom, navodi nemački radio i ističe da Putinov projekat prolazi kroz teška vremena i da su odnosi među partnerima napeti.
 
Za razliku od carinske unije bivših sovjetskih republika, nova zajednica se ne sastoji od samo tri, već od pet zemalja - osim Rusije, Belorusije i Kazahstana, članice Unije su i Jermenija i Kirgistan, napominje se u analizi.
 

DV podseća da su u maju 2011. Rusija, Belorusija i Kazahstan postigli dogovor o utemeljenju privrednog saveza, a već tokom te godine počelo je da se radi na ugovoru o osnivanju Evroazijske unije.
 
"EEU se rađa u teškim vremenima. Rusija se bori s velikim ekonomskim problemima, a ima i trzavica među članicama Unije", upozorava nemački radio.
 
U tekstu se podseća da su nedavno beloruski predsednik Aleksander Lukašenko i njegov kazahstanski kolega Nursultan Nazarbajev posetili Kijev, gde su se sastali s ukrajinskim predsednikom Petrom Porošenkom, što je potez u kojem stručnjaci vide loš signal za Moskvu - i budućnost Evroazijske unije.
 
"Situacija nije ohrabrujuća. U ovoj fazi integracije moralo bi biti pozitivnih vesti. A sve je potpuno suprotno", kaže za DV Aleksej Portanski, profesor trgovinske politike na Moskovskom ekonomskom fakultetu.
 
Prema njegovim rečima, u poslednje vreme uočavamo komplikacije u odnosima Rusije i njenih partnera - sa Belorusijom je u toku sukob oko tranzita robe, a sa Kazahstanom zbog isporuke struje i uglja u Rusiju.
 
On objašnjava da će, i nakon ulaska Kirgistana i Jermenije u EEU, oko 80 odsto bruto domaćeg proizvoda te organizacije i dalje poticati iz Rusije, i ta zemlja će morati i da ponese glavni teret integracije.
 
"To se vidi već sad, na primer, što se tiče finansijske pomoći Belorusiji, a uslediće i ustupci zbog Kirgistana i Jermenije", tvrdi Portanski i naglašava da svaka nova zemlja koja pristupi EEU, za Moskvu znači - trošak.
 
"Dojče vele", istovremeno, navodi reči ruskog politikologa Andreja Pjontkovskog koji smatra da je Moskvi potrebna nadnacionalna organizacija da bi se osećala velikom i moćnom.
 
"Ruski susedi su proteklih godina samo iskoristili 'Moskvine imperijalne komplekse'", kaže on.
 
Ovaj stručnjak objašnjava da je Lukašenko za učešće u integracijskim projektima od Kremlja dobijao novac, a Nazarbajev garancije da se kazahstanske državne granice neće menjati.
 
"Nazarbajev je nasledio slabu zemlju na čijem severnom delu živi izuzetno mnogo Rusa", dodaje Pjontkovski.
 
Ali sad su, napominje on, i Lukašensko i Nazarbajev otkrili Putinove slabosti.
"I oni analiziraju zapadne sankcije protiv Rusije i vide koliko je ranjiva ruska privreda. Uprkos napetostima, EEU 1. januara počinje sa radom, doduše, samo formalno. Biće to mrtvorođenče, izmišljotina poput Zajednice nezavisnih država (ZND)", smatra politolog Pjontkovski.
 
S druge strane, Vladimir Šarihin iz moskovskog ZND instituta u razgovoru za "Dojče vele" napominje da se EEU ne sme ocenjivati samo u ekonomskom kontekstu.
 
"Ako pogledamo isključivo ekonomske prednosti i nedostatke po Rusiju, onda su tu samo gubici. Ali ako Uniju posmatramo u geopolitičkom i strateškom kontekstu, onda itekako vidimo i prednosti", ističe on.
 
Ovaj ekspert kao primer za to navodi prisustvo ruske protivvazdušne odbrane u Belorusiji i ukazuje da se ne sme razdvajati ekonomija i geopolitika kada se radi o EEU.
 
On je uveren da će nova Unija vremenom postati "konkurent Zapadu, koji je siromašan u pogledu energije".
 
Ipak, EEU neće postati zaista konkurentan blok onom brzinom koja je planirana, smatra Aleksej Portanski.
 
Moskovski profesor ekonomije predočava da uspeh Unije zavisi najviše od toga koliko brzo će Rusija savladati aktuelnu krizu.
 
Prema njegovim rečima, što duže ruski geopolitički interesi budu imali prioritet u odnosu na privredu, to će duže trajati i "konstrukcija" Unije.
 
"Danas preovlađuje politička komponenta. Ali integracija bi u prvom redu trebalo da se dogodi u oblasti trgovine i privrede", zaključuje Portanski u analizi nemačkog radija.

Izvor: Blic

Поздрављају с Новим Годом!!!1!!

Kako se zigaju....

"Mrtvo slovo na papiru"..... 

Nemci ne bi bili Nemci da ne hejtuju rusku ideju. Ali dzaba, sve je OK a Kina i Indija za sada ostaju najblizi spoljni partneri. EU se preznojava 

Vise o tome: http://forum.burek.com/evroazijski-ekonomski-savez-t624520.html

И ЗНД је требало, барем на папиру, да изгледа фантастично... 

Lukašenko: Rusija treba da objasni odnos prema Belorusiji

Tanjug

Predsednik Belorusije Aleksandar Lukašenko rekao je danas da očekuje objašnjenje od Rusije o odnosu prema Belorusiji i izrazio uverenje da se među zemljama nakupilo mnogo problema, koji moraju da se rešavaju.
Ovde potpisTraži objašnjenje od Rusije: Aleksandar Lukašenko- Ponašanje našeg istočnog brata ne može da ne izazove zabrinutost. Ali mi ipak iz toga nećemo izvoditi nikakve zaključke, uključujući i mene, pre razgovora s predsednikom Rusije - rekao je šef beloruske države na sednici Saveta bezbednosti.

On je dodao da bi voleo da razjasni "zašto je potrebna takva politika Rusije prema Belorusiji.

 - Mi ne dramatizujemo situaciju, još jednom naglašavam tu činjenicu - kazao je Lukašenko.

Prema njegovim rečima, beloruske vlasti su konstatovale da glavne pretnje zemlje leže u privredi. A vlast odgovara interesima naroda.

Predsednik Belorusije je naglasio da je privreda za svaku državu "veoma opasan pravac udara", posebno za izvozno orijentisane i naročito u sadašnjoj situaciji."

Lukašenko je 3. decembra izrazio nezadovoljstvo time što je Rusija zabranila "mnogim beloruskim preduzećima isporuku robe na svoju teritoriju".

Prema njegovim rečima "glavno pitanje je u tome što je Rusija prekršila sve dogovore koji su postignuti u Carinskoj uniji".

- Pojavilo se mnogo tema koje je potrebno rešavati u belorusko-ruskim odnosima - rekao je 9. decembra Lukašenko.

- Bliski odnosi dve zemlje, dva naroda i sada moramo da konstatujemo da pravimo probleme tamo gde ih nema-  rekao je predsednik.


Русија: Спречен увоз 200 тона поврћа из Белорусије, 45 тона украјинског путера и више од 90 тона пољских и модлавских јабука


Управа за ветеринарски и фитосанитарни надзор РФ вратила је за два дана Белорусији више од 200 тона поврћа и воћа, увезеног у РФ уз прекршаје, док из Украјине није пустила 45 тона путера, саопштава управа ресора за Брајнску у Смоленску област.

Јуче на аутопуту М1 Москва-Минск у Смоленској области на контролном пункту Красна горка био заустављен је увоз око 190 тона робе. Више од 90 тона пољских и молдавских јабука се превозило уз кршење утврђених правила транзита. Преко 70 тона воћа и поврћа праћено је нетачним документима издатим у Белорусији, стоји у саопштењу.

Између осталог, било је утврђено да реекспортни фитосанитрани сертификати издати у Белорусији не одговарају копијама фитосанитарних докумената земље произвођача продукције. Још око 20 тона јабука из Србије је превожено без неопходних ознака фитосанитарних инспектора из Белорусије, који гарантују безбедност испоруке.

У понедељак на истом пункту Красна горка Управа за ветеринарски и фитосанитарни надзор РФ није пропустила из Белорусије више од 20 тона воћа и поврћа које су покшавали да увезу без пратећих докумената и уз неправилно испуњен реекспортни фитосанитарни сертификат.

Поред тога, 2. јануара инспектори горе наведене управе забранили су транзит из Пољске у Казахстан 19 тона јабука.

У Брајнској области на железничком пункту Брјанск-Љговски није пропуштено у РФ 45 тона путера украјинске производње. Терет је био намењен Казахстану. За време фитосанитарне контроле испоставило се да датум производње, наведен у пратећим документима, не одговара датуму указаном на паковању, а ветеринарски сертификат није потврдио да је извршена ветеринарско-санитарна експертиза робе.

(Глас Русије)

Ruble's woes spread to other ex-Soviet currencies


LONDON (Reuters) - Falling energy prices and the plunge in the Russian rouble are hitting currencies across the former Soviet states, with Belarus and Turkmenistan having already devalued this week and markets betting that Kazakhstan will follow soon.
Countries of the former Soviet Union have had their own currencies for two decades but many still depend on Russia, both for trade and for money sent home from workers living there.

Those with their own energy exports that are least dependent on Moscow, like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, are seeing revenues hit by the same falling oil prices that wrecked the rouble after the Ukraine crisis threw Russia's economy into reverse.
Financial markets are betting on a near 20 percent devaluation in the next three to six months in Kazakhstan's pegged tenge currency, which was already devalued by 19 percent last year.

Others that float more freely like Armenia's dram and Georgia's lari are also expected to tumble further along with bond and stock markets in the region.
"Obviously this sharp fall in the rouble and oil is putting heavy pressure on all of these countries," said Piotr Matys, an emerging markets strategist at Rabobank.

A devaluation can be helpful in rebalancing an out-of-kilter economy, but it also creates problems by pushing up the value and interest costs of any debt borrowed in international currencies like the dollar, and hiking inflation.
As the second biggest of the ex-Soviet economies, it is Kazakhstan and its tenge that is being most closely watched.

The benefits of last year's devaluation have been more than wiped out by the ruble's recent slump, and though the central bank has said there will be no repeat, oil's 50 percent price drop now means it may have no choice.
"If you look across the universe of oil producers, those that haven't adjusted yet will, it's as simple as that," said Jan Dehn, at emerging market specialist fund manager Ashmore.
"The ostrich solution of sticking your head in the sand and pretending it hasn't happened really doesn't work for very long."

Half of Kazakhstan's revenues last year came in one way or another from oil, so the state budget is likely to fall heavily into the red. And with the year-end cut off for many of the government's key performance metrics now passed, Kazakh watchers think a devaluation could come at any time.
"The NBK (Kazakh central bank) is trying to make a brave face of it and hold the line, but this line is really not credible," said Demetrios Efstathiou, head of CEEMEA Strategy at Standard Bank
"We think they will eventually want to move, the only question is timing."

OIL PRESSURE

Azerbaijan, the other big former Soviet oil producer, has a more robust balance sheet, having been one of the fastest growing economies in the world over the last decade. But it is bound to be hurt as oil and gas projects get shelved.
The Azeri currency, the manat , may fare better than the tenge. It has fallen only fractionally in recent months and authorities have a decent arsenal of reserves. But the pressure remains.
"They haven't devalued before so the question is whether they will devalue now," said Efstathiou. "There is a small chance, but I think Kazakhstan is much more likely."

It is not just the oil producers that are in trouble. Former Soviet states without oil of their own to sell tend to be the ones that are still most dependent on trade and economic ties with Moscow: like Belarus, Armenia and Ukraine itself.
Armenia relies on Russia for 80 percent of the remittances sent home by workers living abroad, a vital source of capital to fund a balance of payments deficit of 10 percent of GDP. Those workers are now earning devalued rubles.

Belarus sends Russia half its exports. Even distant Uzbekistan, with no Russian border, sends a quarter of its exports there.


No ex-Soviet country has seen its intimate economic relations with Russia more starkly exposed by the Ukraine crisis than Ukraine itself, which has been pushed to the brink of bankruptcy.
Its hryvnia was one of the few currencies to fall more than the rouble last year, and is now hovering just off an all-time low, awaiting a decision from the IMF on a desperately-needed bailout.
Ukraine's economy has been hurt not just by the direct impact of war with Russian-backed separatists that killed more than 4,000 people, but by the loss of cheap Russian gas imports and damage to its own Russia-bound exports.

Gas debt repayments to Russia and spending to support the hryvnia have more than halved Ukraine's foreign currency reserves during 2014 to a 10-year low and left them under $10 billion, barely sufficient to cover two months of imports.


Putin’s Eurasian Dream Is Over Before It Began

FP
The Eurasian Union that came into effect on Jan. 1 isn’t a sign of Moscow’s growing regional influence. It’s a sign of its decline.

On Jan. 1, one of Vladimir Putin’s most ambitious foreign-policy projects and a longtime Kremlin dream became a reality. Unfortunately for Putin and his colleagues in Moscow, nothing about the plan will work.

The Eurasian Economic Union — a post-Soviet economic bloc of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia — was designed to allow the Kremlin to reassert influence in its backyard and counterbalance the Brussels-based, 28-member-state European Union, which has inched towards Russia’s borders over the past decade. Instead, the Kremlin’s prestige project, announced in 2011, but floated as an idea since 1994, limped out of the start gate in 2015.

Since taking power in 2000, Putin moved to rewrite the history of Russia’s tumultuous 1990s, a decade marred by war in Chechnya, an economic crisis in 1998, and a rudderless foreign policy in its former backyard. Putin not only made Russia’s military relevant once again by modernizing it and setting up military bases in neighboring countries, but also wielded influence with former Soviet countries by controlling economically vital oil and gas pipelines. The Eurasian Union was meant to be the next step to secure Moscow’s standing as the economic champion of the post-Soviet space.


The Eurasian Customs Union, the Eurasian Union’s precursor, formed in 2010 and designed to remove trade barriers and harmonize tariffs between prospective members, has already faced its share of problems. Originally comprised of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, the integration project expanded to include Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in 2014, but has not delivered the economic boom that its members were promised. Both Kazakhstan and Belarus have seen their exports become more expensive in the crucial Russian market due to the ruble’s exchange rate troubles, while cheaper Russian goods have made it hard for domestic producers to compete. As the ruble’s value tumbled some 20 percent in mid-December, consumers from Belarus and Kazakhstan crossed the border into Russia to snatch up deals on anything from cars to fruit as they found their buying power suddenly increased.

But the ruble’s fall will continue to create economic strain for the Eurasian Union’s four non-Russian members and 180-million-person market. In the medium and long term, the economic bloc will likely fail to deliver on its promises of breathing new life into its members’ industries and stimulating much-needed economic growth. “As Russia’s economy grows weaker, the Eurasian Union becomes increasingly irrelevant and unappealing for its other members,” says Luca Anceschi, a Central Asia expert at the University of Glasgow. “Eurasian integration was supposed to be about economic development, but it’s coming with a much larger price tag than its members expected,” adds Anceschi. With Belarus and Kazakhstan slowly realizing the economic costs of allying with Russia, cracks in the Eurasian Union are already beginning to show even before the foundations are set.

Since Western countries imposed the first round of sanctions on Russia in March, trade spats between Belarus and Russia have become the norm. Despite the political alliance between Minsk and Moscow, Russia banned meat imports from its neighbor in November, saying that Belarus had become a smuggling route for foods banned under the Kremlin’s counter-sanctions against the West. Belarus’s autocratic President Alexander Lukashenko called the restrictions “indecent.” This was followed by another incident, on Dec. 18, when Lukashenko tried to head off devaluing the Belarussian ruble by ordering the government to denominate trade with Russia in U.S. dollars or euros. About 40 percent of Belarus’s exports go to Russia, according to Belarus’s Foreign Ministry, and much of the rest goes to other former Soviet countries closely linked to the Russian economy. The Belarussian ruble lost 13 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in 2014 and Minsk is clearly worried about the spread of economic contagion from Russia and is looking for added protection.

In Kazakhstan, a key country for Moscow’s plans for Eurasian integration, relations with Russia have been strained by mounting economic and political pressures over the past year. Like Russia, Kazakhstan relies heavily on oil to finance its budget and has been hard hit by the price slump for crude. In February, Kazakhstan’s government devalued its currency, the tenge, by nearly 20 percent in one day due to falling oil prices. Sanctions on Russia have also taken an inadvertent toll on Kazakhstan, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasting that growth in Kazakhstan will slip from 6 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent in 2014 as a result of falling oil prices and the importance of trade with the Russian market.

To keep itself afloat and back its way out of Moscow’s economic shadow, Kazakhstan is trying to show the world that it’s still a good place to do business. In November, Kazakhstan’s president of 25 years, Nursultan Nazarbayev, announced a $9 billion stimulus from the country’s national oil fund to boost infrastructure development and attract foreign investment. This summer, the government unveiled new exemptions that allow foreign investors to avoid paying taxes for 10 years. The government in Astana has also announced that it is prepared to offer 30 percent reimbursement of capital costs to investors once a foreign facility is up and running in the country.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is also actively strengthening ties with Western Europe. The European Union is already Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner, a relationship that will grow further after Brussels and Astana signed an enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in October — a deal similar to the one Ukraine signed in September. “The government is taking a gutsy approach to attracting foreign investment and it could actually work,” says Janet Heckman, the head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

“Our foreign policy has always been about the national interests of Kazakhstan first and foremost,” Erlan Idrissov, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister, told Foreign Policy in a recent interview. In addition to looking West, Kazakhstan has also been deepening ties with neighboring China. In 2013, China signed $30 billion worth of gas and oil deals and became the top investor in Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field — the largest in the world outside the Middle East. The trend continued on Dec. 14 as China and Kazakhstan inked $14 billion worth of infrastructure and energy deals — an important move for Kazakh economic independence, given that 80 percent of its oil exports are currently dependent on Russia-controlled pipelines and railways.

“We are not pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, pro-European, or pro-American in our foreign policy. We are pro-Kazakh,” Idrissov said. “If Russia can help us, we will turn to Moscow, but if Russia can’t offer us what we need to pursue our interests, we will turn elsewhere. It’s simply pragmatic.” In Oct. 2013, Nazarbayev accused Moscow of erecting unfair barriers to trade, describing the Customs Union’s Russian-dominated regulatory body as politicized and complaining that foreign trade distortions were causing major difficulties for his country’s market.

 Kazakhstan hoped that joining the union would help it develop a strong market for its local exports beyond hydrocarbons, but since accession to the Customs Union in 2010 the country has been flooded with Russian imports.

All of this has raised fears in Astana, as well as Minsk, that the Eurasian Union they just entered will, as per Russian design, lock the post-Soviet states into Russia’s political orbit. Fears over sovereignty were increased following the annexation of Crimea in March. “In the eyes of Kazakhstan, Crimea’s annexation was an announcement that Russia does not respect the sovereignty of post-Soviet states,” says Nargis Kassenova of Kazakhstan’s KIMEP University’s Central Asian Studies Center. Crimea has left both Kazakhstan and Belarus walking a diplomatic tightrope, unable to fully split with Russia, but weary of its new face. Lukashenko, despite advocating support for Putin, called the annexation of Crimea a “bad precedent” for the region in March. Speaking on Dec. 15, on the eve of two-day official independence anniversary celebrations, Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan will celebrate the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate in 2015 and urged his citizens to defend the country’s independence. The speech appeared to be a direct answer to a statement by Putin in August, who publicly said that Kazakhs had never had statehood before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

And while Kazakhstan and Belarus are diversifying their economic and political options, the Eurasian Union’s smaller members seem resigned to accept their fates as Russian satellites. Armenia’s National Assembly voted 103-7 on Dec. 4 to join the Eurasian Union along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia on Jan. 1. But even lawmakers who voted “yes” were less than enthused about linking their future to Russia. “We cannot survive without the Russian people,” said Mher Sadrakyan, a member of parliament from the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, echoing the view that an alliance with Russia is a necessary evil. Without Russia, Armenia would be left without support in its conflict with Azerbaijan over the predominantly ethnic-Armenian territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict there has been in limbo since a Russia-brokered cease-fire in 1994. Russia has a military base in Armenia and is the main supplier of arms to the Armenian military. “Without them [the Russians], they will devour us,” Sadrakyan said, referring to Azerbaijan.

Kyrgyzstan will also become a member of the nascent union — but with caveats. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev signed on the dotted line on Dec. 23, while noting that his country’s economy would not be ready for accession until May 2015. Major doubts persist in Kyrgyzstan about how joining the Eurasian Union will benefit the country’s economy, which relies heavily on the lucrative re-export trade of Chinese goods to other former Soviet countries. Eurasian Union membership will place new tariffs on Chinese goods, which will effectively strangle the re-export trade and could close major markets in the country — a development that the Kyrgyz Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Youth warned could double unemployment. Still, Moscow is Kyrgyzstan’s main benefactor, providing billions of dollars’ worth of aid to prop up its struggling economy. The country’s leadership is not prepared to put that vital lifeline in jeopardy.

The Eurasian Union looks like a major dud. With Armenia and Kyrgyzstan reluctant members at best, and Belarus and Kazakhstan looking for alternatives to closer ties with Moscow, it’s becoming clear that the Eurasian Union won’t be the geopolitical game-changer Putin hoped for. Eurasian integration was meant to be the final step in Russia’s return to dignity and leadership, but instead the union is evidence of the Kremlin’s decaying foreign-policy aspirations.

 

Belarus may start talks on visa-free EU travel


EU Observer:  12. January 2015

Belarus may get the first step towards a visa-free regime with the EU if it releases political prisoners in time for an Eastern Partnership summit in May, senior officials from the Latvian EU presidency have said.
Latvian foreign minister Edgars Rinkevics last week said there are some "new openings" with Belarus and that there is a prospect of starting talks on a visa-free regime with the EU.
It would be a breakthrough in EU-Belarus relations, which remain all-but frozen under the authoritarian regime of president Alexander Lukanshenko, who jailed scores of dissidents after his rigged re-election in 2010.
Rinkevics, whose country borders Belarus, said that starting talks on visa liberalisation would "also address civil liberties concerns we have".

But according to Andrejs Pildegovics, state secretary in the Latvian foreign ministry, releasing the remaining political prisoners is key to a positive decision.
"We will not review our stance on political prisoners. They have to be freed, three remain behind bars at this moment. We continue to pressure Belarus on their liberation and the same goes for the treatment of minorities," Pildegovics said on Friday (9 January) in Riga.

Twenty years of zero progress

He added, that with presidential elections coming up in autumn in Belarus, it will also be important for Lukashenko to allow rivals to mount a challenge him and for the elections to respect international standards.
"Hopefully we can see some progress by May. On the EU-level we had a long 20 years of zero progress - it’s worse than hibernation”, Pildegovics said.
He noted that the months following Russia’s assault on Ukraine, Belarus has become increasingly interested in better relations with the EU, especially on economic co-operation.
"But before we deliver in a consistent way, they have to deliver on human rights issues”, he said.

Juris Poikans, a Latvian diplomat in charge of the EU's Eastern Partnership policy on closer ties with former Soviet states, which includes Belarus, told this website that the single biggest issue in visa liberalisation is whether to include diplomatic passport holders in the first stage of the visa-free talks.
"They want to have the same format as Azerbaijan and Armenia, who started visa liberalisation talks. But in the case of Belarus, we'd have to change the mandate, as it currently does not include diplomatic passport holders," he said.

Poikans said that compared to two years ago, when the Lithuanian EU presidency also sought to resume ties with Belarus, "the contacts now between the EU and Belarus have become more intensive."
"Belarus wants to be represented at the Riga summit at the highest possible level," Poikans said, pointing to the potential presence of Lukashenako, who is on an EU blacklist, at the event.

Belarus in recent months has been feeling the squeeze from the Russian economic meltdown, triggered by EU sanctions and a falling oil price.
Last week, the Belarusian central bank lowered the value of the Belarus rouble by around seven percent compared to the US dollar, after a weakening of 20 percent in 2014.
Belarus also imposed capital controls and said that all exports to Russia - mainly trucks and industrial machinery - will be carried out in dollars or euros.

Even though it has signed up to a customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan, Belarus last autumn circumvented a Russian ban on EU dairy and meat by re-exporting Latvian, Polish and Lithuanian products to Russia under Belarusian labels.
In December, Moscow caught on to the practice and banned all Belarusian food imports, prompting an angry reaction from Minsk.
Lukashenko also sacked his prime minister, central bank governor and top ministers in late December after they failed to deliver on his promise that Belarus will be safe from the Russian economic woes.

Polish cards

Meanwhile, it took a step back on minority rights.
Lukashenko's government recently passed legal changes that ban local officials from applying or holding the Polish Card - a document issued by the Polish foreign ministry for people of Polish descent living in former Soviet republics but unable to obtain dual citizenship.
The Polish card allows its holders to obtain visas and work permits in Poland. Belarusian MPs, public workers, soldiers and rescue workers are also banned from applying for this card and they have to give it back if they already received it.
According to Polish news agency PAP, up until 15 May 2014, Polish consulates had received around 140,000 applications for the Polish Card, with around 110,000 cards being issued.
Most of the cards were issued in Belarus (63,000) and Ukraine (60,000) and some 7,500 in the Baltic states.