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"Barras Bravas":
Institutionalized violence in Argentine society and its relationship with football.
Copyright В© by Juan Pablo Iribarne

Violence in football is an issue that unfortunately exists around the world. Even though its consequences are usually similar, the roots and environment to which this movement responds differ enormously in each case. Argentina clearly represents a very special case, and the problem of the "barras bravas" can only be faced if every single aspect of this particular phenomenon is known. By looking at the origins and evolution of the "barras bravas," starting in 1958 with the first football related death and concentrating mainly up to 1985, a clear picture of the situation should be achieved. We will see that unless dramatic changes are made, and even though every party involved in the organization, promotion and profit-making around football know exactly who the leaders, members and financiers of these groups are, these "barras bravas" are most likely to remain. By analyzing mainly the influence that club directors, the police force, a faulty judicial system, and the media have on these organizations, we should understand why this is the case.

The concentration of the population and of resources in Buenos Aires has always brought along many kind of problems, and violence before, during and after football games is one of them. As Romero explains, the necessary opposition and rivalry which is necessary for this sport to be lived with passion exists but not between regions which are culturally and economically different as is usually the case, but within the same city, and even more so, within the same neighborhood.1 In Avellaneda, Racing and Independiente have their stadiums literally next to each other, and in Almirante Brown, there are three stadiums located in the same area. More than half of the total number of victims related to football violence took place in an area of two hundred kilometers squared, in which almost ten percent of the country's population lives. On average, six different games are played in Buenos Aires each weekend, and in addition to this several "barras bravas" coming from away games in La Plata or Rosario are very likely to meet with those from other clubs. Romero quotes a French journalist who had been given a scholarship precisely to study the extent and importance of this phenomenon in Argentina: 'You've got everything organized for violence.'2

Some figures will demonstrate how true this is. Again Romero is responsible for collecting this data, responding to a personal research starting in 1958 with the death of Alberto Linker. Since then, and up to 1993, there have been 74 acts of violence causing death, resulting in 146 deaths of which 60% responded to fan confrontation with the police and 40% to confrontation between fans. These figures include the "Puerta 12" "accident" in 1968, where 71 people died in the stairways to an exit following a River-Boca game, with people crashing and suffocating for reasons which, incredibly, are still officially unknown (a similar accident had taken place in 1944, leaving behind 7 deaths; it is said that in 1916, one spectator was killed in a match between Argentina and Uruguay; in 1938 two Boca Juniors fans had been killed by the police during a match between Boca Juniors and Lanus).3 In the end, this gives an average of one death every three months for the 1958-1993 period, with an average age of the victim of almost 26 years (most of them were between 13 and 17 years old and had nothing to do with "barra brava" organizations). On the other hand, 90% of the victims supported the visiting team, and only four of them were women.4 Until 1985, 85% of these deaths had taken place under military regimes, and in only 12 cases were the perpetrators of these crimes actually found and sentenced (see graph5).

History and characteristics of "barras bravas"

Traditionally, as Archetti and Romero describe, fans would move from one stand to the other at half-time, going behind their teamГ•s goalkeeper as a sign of support for their team.6 This would soon be no longer the case, and the practice was stopped in 1967, after Hector Souto, a Racing fan who had gone to watch his team with some friends, but made the mistake that day of deciding to go to the section occupied by fans from the opposite team, Huracan: he was beaten to death. The only motive, incredibly, was that some Racing fans had just stolen a flag from the Huracan crowd, and also caught some Huracan fans trying to recover their flag in "enemy territory," with a result which does not need to be described. The days when violence was only verbal, and limited to the referee and players of the opposite team, were over. In general terms, and especially considering how violent this and most sports were before the rationalization, industrialization and commercialization process which took place at the beginning of this century, we could say that violence had shifted from the players to the stands.7 Suddenly, groups of fans with known leaders started to carry out carefully planned attacks and operations, and a very complicated system of rivalry and alliances evolved, responding most of the times, as we will see, to trivial episodes. Why did these group of fans who were ready to die and to kill for their club emerge, and who financed their operations, transport and even their weapons?

Levinsky helps in answering these questions, arguing that these "militarily organized" groups originally appeared "to abolish any kind of opposition which the clubГ•s directives at that particular time might have had."8 Romero makes a deeper analysis, noting that this period coincided with the emergence of what he calls "Futbol Espectaculo S.A." or "Futbol Empresa," a completely new approach to the way football should be organized and conducted, arguing that


"...the existing corruption and violence was instrumentalized to control the maximum aspiration which is the game's result...the structure of the tournament practically guaranteed the championship to those teams who were able to win at home and at least draw away... the embarrassing and perverse official support given to these groups, precisely to even out the naturally adverse condition of playing an away game, is in the etiology itself of the 'barra brava.'"


This also produced "a radical change in identity in the Argentine football player," especially encouraged after the disastrous performance of the Argentine national team during the World Cup held in Sweden in 1958, and following the model which Santiago Bernabeu had created with the triumphant Real Madrid. He mentions that the term "barras fuertes" already existed by 1958, and it would become "barras bravas" in 1967 following the testimony of a direct witness of Hector Souto's death.9

Romero defines "barras bravas" as "groups which go to the stadium with the unique objective of encouraging disorder and provoking physical and material damage" (or, in legal jargon, "a social manifestation of organized delinquency").10 Their organization was and is very simple, usually with a leader, followed by a reduced group of men who control and organize the largest group. To reach higher positions within the hierarchy, experience and "achievements" are essential. The leaders very rarely get involved in the actual physical attacks once they reach that status, and most of this "work" is carried out by their subordinates who are usually teenagers. Some members have even joined the club's board of directors, or formed entire opposition lists for elections in first and second division clubs. On the other hand, apart from possible subdivisions within these organizations in each particular club, a complex system of rivalry and alliances evolved between "barras bravas" of different clubs. These are described by a journalist from the newspaper Clarin as "...alliances not for progress...No. These are alliances of war. And we write war without inverted commas because there is no exaggeration in this context. In fact, we can even speak of an armed war." San Lorenzo de Almagro and Rosario Central represent the classic example of such alliances, everything starting after the leader of the "barra brava" from San Lorenzo (Milanesa) broke his arm in a confrontation with the "barra brava" from Rosario Central. While being attended in the Rosario hospital, "Milanesa" was visited by "Tula," the leader from Rosario Central, and from then on a lasting fraternity has evolved. 11 Not much needs to be added.

As Levinsky explains, in exchange for tickets to games and extra money sometimes, in some occasions the "barras bravas" simply get paid by club directors to do the job that these directors are supposed to do themselves. He estimates that in the last four years, at least twenty coaches have had to leave their position in response to concrete pressure from these groups, and many players belonging to teams which are close to being relegated have also been threatened several times. They have also been given financial assistance to go to the 1982 (the "Malvinas War" was going on at the same time), 1986, 1990 and 1994 World Cups.12 In terms of free tickets specifically, 1965 is the last year for which an official figure of the loss in revenue that this represented for the Argentine Football Association exists: $ 500,000. Romero then takes this figure an makes a linear estimate up to 1994, arriving at the incredible figure of $ 5 million. For the 1994 World Cup qualifying games, he notes that these tickets meant $1 million less in revenues of which $150,000 were directed exclusively to "barras bravas," averaging around 3,500 tickets per game, many of which were later re-sold at three times the price.13 The main objective at the Argentine Football Association level, rather than at the club level, Romero points out, is to preserve the votes that its directives get every time there are internal elections in clubs, and also to maintain sympathy with particular groups just in case the opposition becomes strong and help is needed in meetings. Another case where the explicitness of the financial assistance and strategic thinking and organization within and between "barras bravas" is shown was the traditional summer tournament held in 1994. Not only did the change in location have no influence in the presence of these groups (the tournament moved to Mendoza, 1000 km. away from Buenos Aires), being financed by the event's organizers and club directors, but they also decided to "behave correctly" this time, knowing how seriously the security issue was being faced in the United States in preparation for the World Cup.14

This clearly shows that violence in football has very little to do with the sport itself, and is much more closely related to the strength and legitimacy of institutions such as the police force or the judicial system in which a society functions. Football, unfortunately, is the scenario were the symptoms from this problem appear, but it would be very dangerous to confuse the symptoms with the actual roots of the problem, as many people do so often. It also shows once again the power that the media has in sending messages and information in a matter of seconds to any point in the world; it's hard to imagine these "barras bravas" behaving so correctly otherwise; this efficient control by the media was also very influential in the years previous to the 1978 World Cup held in Argentina, making repression even harder to assure that the problem, al least visibly and temporarily, did not exist.15 Romero introduces a quote from Dante Panzeri to stress the idea that football is only a small part of a much larger picture:


[...] Why did the Boca fans respond in such an embarrassing way last Sunday after the game ended? Was it that penalty which was not given by a referee who was supposed to respond to Boca's predilections? No. The reasons are somewhere else. And they must be looked for not in the realm of football ... [but] in the tolerance of the police, in the uncontrolled masses who have been given the right to destroy and have been exempted from having to respect anything. This is the consequence in a society whose directors prefer to continue, not to direct; to follow, not to show the way; directors who may well be in the political field, in the labor movement, in sport in general, and in football.16

The police force and the judicial system

Romero states that the image of the police in Argentina is not precisely that of a legitimate body, and is not characterized by the "delicate treatment of suspects nor for their concern with the rights of minorities." The brutal repression by the police, not only in football related events, and especially during military regimes, usually without any of its members being found responsible or punished for their abuses, has created a negative image in the population and a sentiment close to hate and fear towards them which still persists and will be hard to change. A good example is given precisely by the first death, in which Alberto Linker, a real football fan who had gone to the stadium that day even if his club was not playing, died following brutal police repression. Not only was the police officer responsible for this death never found even though direct witnesses have testified, but the police has also tried to invent many kind of alternative hypothesis which were all proven to be impossible. The huge protest which this brought to the public made the police decide not to go to any stadium the following Sunday. The result? Not a single incident.17

The journalist adds that some police officers are even part of "barras bravas," not as part of undercover operations which would make some sense, but simply leading as a hobby what they are really supposed to stop. On other cases, he argues that the lack of severity with which the police treats some "barras bravas" may be linked to the provision of information by these groups on more serious crimes.18 If this is not enough to show how distorted the entire picture is, the following quote by a police officer which Romero considers to be one of the men who knows more about "barras bravas" in Argentina will do the work: "Violence in football is an invention, the maximum cowardice that society and above all the media have, to cover up its real problems and its real violence."19 It seems to me that violence in football is precisely, as was argued before, a symptom of the real problems and real violence in Argentine life which are as far way from being inventions as anything can ever be. It would be interesting to ask to this official if the hundreds of "barras bravas" members who are taken out of jail after spending some hours inside each weekend are simply an illusion, or if the money that clubs spend in paying for their bails is imaginary.20 Whatever the truth may be, the fact is that especially trained units have been created to combat this illusion, representing, according to Romero, an expenditure for the Argentine Football Association in 1993 alone of 15% of its earnings, involving around 100,000 policemen during the entire year.

It is also clear that not too much can be expected from the police unless an efficient and transparent judicial system exists, which is not the case in Argentina. The corrupt and tremendously slow procedures complicates even the most simple case. Again, Romero points out that Congress has passed two laws in the last ten years "with surprising unanimity" specifically targeting this problem. But if structural changes are not made, it will be hard for any law to have any serious impact. It may give people who really want "barras bravas" out of the picture the impression that the government is finally doing something about it, but a closer look shows that nothing is being done about it. This conversation between Levinsky and Fernando Miele, president of San Lorenzo de Almagro, shows the general insecurity that exists around this issue:

Miele: "I would never pay transport for a guy to go to the World Cup, not even for him to go to cause disorder to Cordoba. I'm not interested. I'm not in that business. Because you have to see where things may end up. If that guy tomorrow kills someone and says 'the trip was paid by the president of San Lorenzo' then this brings problems to me and I donГ•t want to know anything about it. This does not happen in big clubs. These groups obviously exist, and we know who they are, as everybody else does...why would I lie?
Levinsky: "So why donГ•t you send for their arrest?"
Miele: "And what kind of protection do we have?"
Levinsky: "The police, whatever..."
Miele: "But we have to live with protection and thatГ•s why we pretend the code to change, because if this group goes in through one door and gets out as easily through the back door, then its obvious that things will not change, but if they go in and stay there, then it's different."

The role played by the media

By analyzing the media, Romero shows that even though everyone seems to know exactly what this phenomenon is about when they address the subject, this is generally not true. He also argues that not only is nobody doing anything to stop this violence, but that in fact, in any case the problem is being perpetuated: "...violence has always been part of the business around football," and the media has had a lot to do with this.21 To start with, for any kind of discussion on the subject to exist, unfortunately someone must first die. It is also necessary that the death has "spectacular" characteristics, as there have been cases where fans have died and very little importance, if any, was given by the media. Once the topic of "barras bravas" reappears, Romero considers the general focus of editorials and related articles to be very repetitive, usually directed to "the corresponding authorities" (which he is not so sure who they really are), facing the issue as a problem which must end, which is limited to a few uncontrolled fans, and which can clearly be abolished if enough will exists to do so. The turning point of the media coverage of violence on football was encouraged by the peak of incidents between 1983 and 1985. Until then, the media had treated the issue as something occasional, as exceptions to the rule. From then on, he continues, coverage has been such that currently these incidents have become something trivial, treated almost like an habit, and with very short coverage, not reflecting the seriousness and the importance that the issue really has.22

Conclusion

Even though Romero provides excellent information and is the only one who ever collected data on this subject, a better research would have resulted if a wider variation in sources had been used. With this limitation in mind, however, it is hard to imagine someone who might know more about the "barras bravas" phenomenon than Romero. His books are also convenient as they look at the same problem but from very different perspectives, going from a case by case analysis to a chronological description of what was happening in Argentina in the political and economic spectrum and comparing this to the world of football. On the other hand, there are not that many authors who have focused in this issue, probably in part as a response to the lack of commercial appeal of the subject, but also because it may be hard to match the experience and grasp of the subject that Romero and a few others have.
In the end, we could refer to the "barras bravas" as one more case in which sport is not only a reflection but also a part of society. It should be clear that it is impossible to isolate the violence which exists in everyday life from the world of sports. The variety of factors and participants who perpetuate this violence is as large as the variety in motives that they have for doing so in the first place. Everybody knows very well who these "barras bravas" are and who provides the financial support they need. What not that many people know is what these "barras bravas" really mean. Hopefully, by this time you are part of this "select" group. If you are, you should notice that unfortunately the future does not look so promising unless the structural changes mentioned before take place. Something that has so little to do with football is making so much harm...it may soon become hard to distinguish if we are talking about death in football or the death of football.

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