А опет је тај исти патриот оборио два дрона над Газом и сиријски авион прије неку годину. Патриот је креиран са циљем да се користи против авијације, тек касније је модификован и за пресретање пројектила. На лош глас је изашао кад због рачунарске грешке систем није ни дејствовао против ирачког скада који је на крају погодио америчку касарну. Софтвер је иначе требао да буде ажуриран баш тих дана.

  Pomenuvši "loš učinak tokom Prvog zalivskog rata" mislio sam na ozbiljan članak (sa obiljem dokaza) koji pročitah negde pre par godina i tv-emisiju koja je brže-bolje uklonjena sa kabla.I članak i emisija se baviše neuspešnim presretanjem skadova koji su padali po naseljenim delovima Izraela.Zasnovani na javnim izjava svedoka i materijalnim dokazima.
  Davno je bilo,pa ne mogu da citiram izvor,izvinjavam se,ali ako ti je za neku utehu,gledao sam u to vreme i snimke starijih ruskih pvo-sistema koji omašuju.

Izrael ima mnogo ozbiljnije oružje od starih patriota.

Iron Dome instaliran je oko većih mesta i obara rakete ispaljene iz raznoraznih VBRova. Do sada su skinuli preko hiljadu takvih projektila a to je muva u odnosu na drona ili avion. Verovatno da na severu pokrivaju Haifu i Kirjat Šmonu, ali ne i na golansku visoravan jer bi to bio skup način za čuvanje ovaca, pastira i krša..

Добар чланак:

ESSAY; The Great Scud-Patriot Mystery

 WASHINGTON— The Patriot missile batteries hailed as the technological star of our Persian Gulf victory -- may or may not have stopped incoming Scud warheads.

Hold on, now -- how can that be? We saw with our own eyes, time and again on our television screens, the fearsome duel in the skies. The Scud appeared, the Patriots streaked up -- zap! the explosion lit up the sky, and the world breathed its relief at the marvel of our missile defense.

"Forty-two Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted," President Bush told proud workers at the plant producing the Patriots. His televised visit, at the war's halfway point, delivered an unmistakable message: the terror weapon Saddam Hussein aimed at civilians, which was designed to panic Saudis and to draw Israel into the war, was being effectively countered by space-age American technology.

The President's statistics were accurate but his message is subject to challenge. The interceptions -- those great midair explosions that thrilled us all -- did not, in many and perhaps most cases, stop the Scuds from delivering their payload of high explosives.

Gen. Colin Powell, the next day, was careful to back away from the impression the President had left. The Patriot "doesn't always get a catastrophic kill as a result of an interception." He explained: "Sometimes it [ the Scud ] breaks up . . . and so you have had cases where the warhead has landed and gone off."

Sometimes? The Scud warheads may have landed most of the time. The Patriot interceptions made a lot of noise and fireworks but may not often have hit their targets on the destructive nose.

If so, what did the Patriots hit? Fuel tanks. Most Scuds began to break up on re-entry into the atmosphere, about 15 to 12 kilometers in the air; this has been derogated as a sign of poor Iraqi adaptation of the Soviet-built missile, but at that dropping stage the warhead no longer needs the fuel tank; the explosive payload is well on its way to the general target area.

Coincidentally, that height is where the Patriot missile approaches the Scud at a combined speed of 6,000 m.p.h. and explodes, supposedly blowing up the warhead in a "catastrophic kill," or "warhead kill." But too many of the Patriots attacked the larger target -- the detached fuel tank -- making a satisfying bang, while the untouched warhead continued down and slammed home.

Our military misleadingly called such useless contact "mission kills" on the theory that the explosion might have deflected the warhead from its intended target.

But that explanation does not add up. If a warhead is targeted at a wide area of nine square kilometers, as the inaccurate Scuds are, what does it matter if the warhead is knocked off course a kilometer or two? It does the same terror-damage it was intended to do, but on a different neighborhood.

By war's end, the Iraqis launched about 85 Scuds. Estimates vary, but 10 hit Israel before the Patriots arrived; about 25 veered off into the Israeli or Saudi desert or into the drink. According to executives at Raytheon , the Patriot's builder, 50 Scuds were engaged and 49 intercepted. (The Scud that hit our barracks in Riyadh was somehow not engaged.) I'd say 160 Patriots were fired, most of which self-destructed.

How many of the claimed intercepts were real kills of warheads, not just fuel-tank hits or sideswipes? Raytheon's Walter Trainor, Patriot program manager, says "a small number of Scud warheads came through -- nowhere near the majority."

That rosy assessment may reflect self-interest, just as an opposite assessment may reflect Israeli commercial interest in producing the Arrow anti-missile missile, a coming competitor to the Patriot.

The payload is the payoff: did the Patriots hit the Scuds early enough to prevent a rain of destruction? No. Did that rain often contain Scud warheads? Yes.

"There has been a dispute about what part of the missile was hit," says a high Administration official, noting in passing that the final warhead was a concrete dummy. "The Saudis have not been all that forthcoming publicly. But clearly the Patriot was an asset, and absolutely vital in keeping Israel out of the war."

Psychology triumphed over technology. Why did the Scud, a terror weapon that delivered many of its warheads, fail to terrorize? The ironic reason: The Patriot, even if investigators find it failed in its military mission to kill warheads, averted Saudi panic and Israeli need for reprisal by providing a false sense of security.

http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/07/opinion/essay-the-great-scud-patriot-mystery.html


Изгледа да проблем није био у непресретању већ управу у пресретању.  Сам скад се уништи али бојева глава остане.