Fallschirmjäger (vojni padobranci) :: Nauka ~ Tehnika ~ Military

ovde imamo neke sovjetske padobranske oznake pre 2.sv rata .veci deo sovjetskih padobranskih snaga je unishten u prvim mesecima rata ,a mnogi padobranci su zivote izgubili boreci se kao obichni peshadinci u konfuziji koja je zahvatila sistem .
tokom rata , pokushano je da se padobranske snage obnove ,medjutim nije bilo ni iskusnih oficira i vojnika , ni prave doktrine , niti dovoljno vezbanja . primera radi , njihova najveca akcija i najveci poraz - prelazak preko dnjepra - izveden je sa ljudstvo koje je vecinom imalo svega nekoliko skokova ,a nekima je chak to bio i prvi skok Smile

. opis iz wikipedije :

Dnieper airborne operation

(The following is a synopsis of an account by Glantz[3] with support from an account by Staskov[4].)

STAVKA detached the Central Front's 3rd Tank Army to the Voronezh Front to race the weakening Germans to the Dnieper, to save the crop and to achieve strategic or operational river bridgeheads before a German defense could stabilize there. The 3rd Tank Army, plunging headlong, reached the river the night of 21-22 September and, on the 23rd, Soviet infantry forces crossed by swimming and makeshift rafts to secure small, fragile bridgeheads, opposed only by 120 German Cherkassy flak academy NCO candidates who, with the hard-pressed 19th Panzer Division Reconnaissance Battalion, were the only Germans within 60 km of the Dnieper loop (virtually nobody). Only heavy German air attack and a lack of bridging equipment kept Soviet heavy weaponry from crossing and expanding the bridgehead.

STAVKA, sensing a critical juncture, ordered a hasty airborne corps assault to increase the size of the bridgehead before the Germans could counterattack. On the 21st, the Voronezh Front's 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards Airborne Brigades got the urgent call to secure, on the 23rd, a bridgehead perimeter 15 to 20 km wide and 30 km deep on the Dnieper loop between Kanev and Rzhishchev, while Front elements forced the river.

The assembly at the airfields was slow, necessitating, on the 23rd, a one-day delay and omission of 1st Brigade from the plan. Consequent mission changes caused near chaos in command channels and barely allowed for propagation of change orders, which got to company commanders on the 24th just 15 minutes before their units, not yet provisioned with spades, anti-tank mines, or ponchos for the autumn night frosts, formed on airfields to load for an 1830 liftoff. Owing to weather, not all the aircraft had arrived at airfields for loading, or on time, ruining loading plans; many radios and supplies got left behind. Best case, it would take three lifts to deliver the brigades. Units still arriving by (over-taxed) rail loaded piecemeal onto returned planes (which were slow to refuel owing to less-than-expected capacities of fuel trucks), while already-arrived troops changed planes, seeking earlier flights. Urgency and the fuel shortage prevented aerial assembly aloft; most aircraft, as soon as loaded and fueled, flew single file, instead of line abreast, to drop points. Assault waves became as intermingled as the units they carried.

As corps elements made their 170 to 220 km flights from four of five fields (one field received no fuel), troops (half of whom had never jumped) got briefed on drop zones, assembly areas and objectives only poorly understood by platoon commanders still studying new orders. Meanwhile, Soviet aerial photography, suspended several days by weather, had missed the strong reinforcement of the area, early that afternoon. Non-combat cargo pilots ferrying 3rd Brigade through drizzle expected no resistance beyond river pickets but, instead, were met by anti-aircraft and starshell fires from 19th Panzer Division (only coincidentally transiting the drop zone, and just one of six divisions and other elements ordered, on the 21st, to fill the gap in front of 3rd Tank Army). Lead aircraft, disgorging paratroopers over Dubari at 1930, came under small arms, machine gun, and quad-20 anti-aircraft fire from the armored personnel carrier battalion of the 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and elements of the division staff of 19th Panzer Division. Some paratroops began returning fire and throwing grenades even before landing; trailing aircraft sped up, climbed and evaded, dropping wide. Through the night, some pilots avoided starshell-lit drop points entirely, and 13 aircraft returned to airfields without having dropped at all. Intending a 10 by 14 km drop over largely undefended terrain, the Soviets instead achieved a 30 by 90 km drop over the fastest mobile elements of two German corps.

On the ground, Germans used white parachutes as beacons to hunt down and kill disorganized groups and to gather and destroy airdropped supplies. Supply bonfires, glowing embers, and multi-color starshells illuminated the bizarre and macabre battlefield. Captured documents gave Germans enough knowledge of Soviet objectives to arrive at most of them before the disorganized paratroops.

Back at Soviet airfields, fuel shortage allowed only 298 of 500 planned sorties, leaving corps 45mm anti-tank guns and 2,017 paratroops undelivered. Of 4,575 men dropped (seventy percent of the planned number, and just 1,525 from 5th Brigade), some 2,300 eventually assembled into 43 ad-hoc groups, missions abandoned as hopeless, and spent most of their time seeking supplies not yet destroyed by Germans. Others joined with the nine partisan groups operating in the area. About 230 made it over (or out of) the Dnieper to Front units (or were originally dropped there). Most of the rest were almost casually captured that first night or killed the next day (though, that first night, 3rd Co, 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment, suffered heavy losses while annihilating about 150 paratroopers near Grushevo, some 3 km west of Dubari).

The Germans (under) estimated that 1,500 to 2,000 had dropped; they recorded 901 paratroops captured and killed in the first 24 hours. Thereafter, the Germans largely ignored the paratroopers, to counterattack and truncate Dnieper bridgeheads. Germans deemed their anti-paratrooper operations completed by 2100 on the 26th, though a modicum of opportunistic actions against garrisons, rail lines, and columns were conducted by remnants through early November. For lack of manpower to clear all areas, forests of the region would remain a minor threat.

Germans called the operation a fundamentally sound idea ruined by the dilettantism of planners lacking an expert (but praised individual paratroops for tenacity, bayonet skills, and deft use of broken ground in the sparsely wooded northern region). STAVKA deemed this second (and, ultimately, last) corps drop a complete failure; lessons they knew they’d already learned from their winter offensive corps drop at Viazma hadn’t stuck. They would never trust themselves to try it again.

Soviet 5th Guards Airborne Brigade commander Sidorchuk, withdrawing to the forests south, eventually amassed a brigade-size command, half paratroops, half partisans, obtained air supply, and assisted 2nd Ukrainian Front over the Dnieper near Cherkassy to finally link up with Front forces on 15 November. After 13 more days combat, the airborne were evacuated, ending a harrowing two months. More than sixty percent never returned.

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