Milošević je '99 znao svaki naš potez: analiza generala H.R. Mekmastera

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Tema: Milošević je '99 znao svaki naš potez: analiza generala H.R. Mekmastera (Moderatori: Mistreated, niko79, RASMC)

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Tema: Milošević je '99 znao svaki naš potez: analiza generala H.R. Mekmastera (Pročitano 1456 puta)

sergio ramos

22. Feb 2017, 10:02:32

Svedok stvaranja istorije

Kad si u Rimu ponašaj se kao Rimljanin

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МИЛОШЕВИЋ ЈЕ ЗНАО СВАКИ НАШ ПОТЕЗ: анализа генерала Херберта Рејмонда Мекмастера

ослобођење/блиц

Нови саветник за националну безбедност у администрацији Доналда Трампа, сматра како је НАТО 1999. занемарио чињеницу да исход рата зависи и од „југословенских реакција и иницијатива које су се показале немогуће за предвидети“

Амерички председник Доналд Трамп именовао је генерала Херберта Рејмонда Мекмастера за саветника за националну безбедност. Прекаљени командант познат је по свом вођству у Ираку, показао се као мајстор обрачуна са герилским и побуњеничким фракцијама, а медији у САД га карактеришу и као праву „интелектуалну громаду“.

Његова награђивана књига „Занемаривање дужности“ сугерисала је како је заправо страх команданата америчке војске да се одупру притисцима политичке агенде Беле куће током рата у Вијетнаму био један од кључних узрока пораза.

Током своје каријере у војсци, Мекмастер је написао бројне есеје и анализе рада америчке војске и њених стратешких циљева, међу којима се истиче анализа под насловом „Пукотине у темељу: Трансформација одбране и полазна претпоставка доминантног знања у будућем рату“, у којем се Мекмастер исцрпно бави НАТО бомбардовањем Југославије 1999. године.

У поглављу „Теорија испред праксе“, који почиње цитатом да „теорија не може бити прихваћена као коначна, кад пракса указује друкчије“, Мекмастер се бави стратегијом за успостављање доминације Америчког ратног ваздухопловства на потенцијалним бојним пољима будућности.

Дајући осврт на НАТО бомбардовање Југославије, Мекмастер дефинише „хибрис“ – старогрчки појам који означава претерано самопоуздање које доводи до прекорачења могућности и трагичног краја – као један од главних узрока лоших резултата америчких снага у Србији.

Мекмастер сматра да је оно што је научено у Југославији почетком деведесетих, потпуно занемарено 5 година касније на Косову, при чему су се српске снаге показале као веома „интелигентан и способан непријатељ“.

ПРЕТЕРАНО САМОПОУЗДАЊЕ

Искусни генерал као кривца за убеђеност америчкох војних званичника у исход рата означава „линеарно размишљање“. Према његовом мишљењу, НАТО је занемарио чињеницу да исход зависи и од „југословенских реакција и иницијатива које су се показале немогуће за предвидети“…

„Без неопходне силе коју би НАТО употребио како би наметнуо своју бољу Југославији и базирањем иницијалних акција на нереалистичним прерпоставкама о моћи ваздушних удара, Југославија је преузела иницијативу убрзо након што је рат почео. Упркос добрих припрема и слабијег непријатеља, НАТО није успео да оствари информациону надмоћ. Много се знало о непријатељу, али обавештајни подаци нису били довољни за праћење српске армије. Лоше време, облаци, планински шумовит терен умањио је ефикасност сателита, дронова и радара. Српске одлуке су изненадиле НАТО упркос бројним интеракција са југословенским лидером Слободаном Милошевићем током претходне четири године и прилике да се направе детаљне обавештајне процене“.

Даље, Мекмастер пише како је Милошевић искористио ситуацију како би интензивирао обрачин са Албанцима:

„Милошевић је предвидео потезе НАТО и контрирао им. Померио је трупе на границу с Косовом неколико недеља пре почетка ваздушних напада. Када је кампања почела, те снаге су избациле албанску популацију на улице, одузеле им лична документа, опљачкале имовину, спалиле њихове куће и погурали их као стоку ка македонскојх и албанскијх граници. НАТО је био изненађен и неприпремљен. Ваздушна кампања имала је нежељене последице – заправо је убрзала бруталне операције етничког чишћења које је требало да заустави“.

Тако је петодневна операција, прерасла у вишемесечну кампању.

„Искуство је разоткрило опасности линеарног размишљања и неспремности за интеракцију до које долази са непријатељем када рат почне“, сматра Мекмастер.

После седам дана бомбардовања, генерал Весли Кларк је прометио да се НАТО суочава са интелигентним и способним противником који настоји да обесмисли све стратегије. Мекмастер пише да, иако су српске ПВО снаге биле веома застареле, оне су приморале НАТО авионе да лете на великим висинама, због чега је идентификација мете била нарочито тешка.

„Такође, користили су иновативне методе да одрже радаре активнима, а да не буду погођени. Срби су користили ниско-технолошким тактикама и импровизацијом којом су оборили Ф-117 стелт ловца. Те тактике приморале су НАТО да преусмери 35 одсто борбених залиха на обрачун са српском ПВО. Срби су научили да преваре и изманипулишу америчке обавештајце. Српске снаге су дозвољавале извиђачким авионима да идентификују мете, па су их онда мењале макетама. Око 500 од 3.000 прецизних пројектила погодило је ове макете.“

Упркос очигледном уважавању српских снага на нивоу домишљатости, Мекмастер главну кривицу за неуспехе кампање приписује Сједињеним Државама.

„Способност Срба да дођу до озбиљних обавештајних података о савезничким операцијама, упркос њихове технолошке инфериорности, доводи у питање компоненту порицања у оквиру ‘информационе супериорности’, чак и против непријатеља са веома основним способности. Срби су евакуисали одређене мете чим су се нашле на листи мета. Вероватно је да је југословенска влада имала шпијуне у НАТО штабу. Осим тога, шпијуни стационирани испред Авиано ваздушне базе, редовно су јављали када авиони узлећу на мисије“.

Мелмастер пише и како су се српске копнене снаге често инфилтрирале међу цивиле и избеглице како их НАТО не би лоцирао, што је додатно отежавало задатак Алијансе. Генерал наводи како се догађало да НАТО из ваздуха „види Албанце распршене по падинама брда, али уопште не види одакле их Срби нападају“.

Према мишљењу новог америчког саветника за националну безбедност, НАТО кампања у Југославији 1999. године доживела је неуспех: „Мање од 5 одсто српских борбених система уништено за 78 дана бомбардовања. НАТО напори да нападне копнене трупе непријатеља нису успели. Размере неуспеха постале су очигледне тек када је рат био готов“, закључује Мекмастер.

ГРЕШКЕ

Мекмастер наводи како су двосмислености у селекцији и идентификацији мета довели до бројних грешака у бомбардовању, од којих је највећа удар на кинеску амбасаду у Београду.

„Грешке су се догађале не због мањка информација; количина података и раздвајању добрих од лоших информација створили су потешкоће… У време бомбардовања (кинеске амбасаде), планери су били под притиском да пронађу 2.000 мета у Србији, јер су мете за петодневну кампању истрошене. Људске грешке, међу којима су и употреба старе мапе и неажурирана мапа локација које се не смеју нападати, довела је до грешке. Било је још најмање 20 других инцидената „колатералне штете“ која укључује бомбардовање бугарске територије, возова, конвоја, школа и болница. Ове грешке догодиле су се упркос великој дисциплини пилота. Након инцидента у којем је убијено око 80 албанских избеглица, за које су грешком помислили да су конвој, генерал Лиф, командир јединице која је извела напад, рекао је како је у питању ‘веома компликован сценарио у којем никада неће бити могуће утврдити све детаље“.

Према Макмастеру, колатерална штета и нереалистична очекивања довели су до продубљивања несигурности и све мање подршке међународне заједнице.

„Косовско искуство показало је да екстремна технолошка супериорност не води до информационе супериорности и не уклања несигурност. Срби нису били једнак такмац. НАТО је имао ваздушну надмоћ и суочавао се са старом, минималном ПВО. Срби нису могли да ометају НАТО комуникације и информационе состеме. Косово је показало да узроци несигурности леже углавном изван дохвата технологије: у политичкој природи рата, његовој људској диментији, сложености и интеракцији с непријатељем… На Косову, НАТО је претпоставио убеђеност у исход и био је неспреман“, закључује Мекмастер.

На крају, амерички генерал додаје да је начин на који је НАТО водио рат довео до пролонгирања патњи како Срба, тако и Албанаца. Главни проблем био је то што НАТО није искористио надмоћ у ваздуху, како би успоставио доминацију на земљи. Чим су ефекти НАТО операција упарени са дипломатским притисцима и копненом офанзивом такозване „Ослободилаћке војске Косова“ (ОВК), напори су уродили плодом и Милошевић је морао да попусти, сматра Мекмастер.

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Da li i u političkoj sferi postoji kolonijalno potčinjavanje? Nekome se može i to pričiniti. Ali, kada Šreder ili Bler savetuju vladu, to nikako nije čin najcrnjeg ponižavanja nacije i ruganje žrtvama iz 1999. To nije ni tragična slika države koja je izgubila svako samopoštovanje. Ne, to je manifestacija mudrosti, dubokog političkog uvida i afirmacija realpolitike kakva nije viđena još od vremena kneza Miloša. Srbija je, nema sumnje, na pravom putu.

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sergio ramos

Poruka #1

22. Feb 2017, 10:10:01

Svedok stvaranja istorije

Kad si u Rimu ponašaj se kao Rimljanin

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Air and sea are not without their own frictions, uncertainties, and challenges that draw into question the assumption of dominant knowledge even in fluid environments. Indeed, the professionalism and high degree of skill in American air and naval forces conceal the complexity and danger associated with them. Air forces’ duel with air defense systems is a tactical and technological game of cat-and-mouse. Air space management for rotary wing, fixed wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, and air defense assets can create dangerous uncertainties even without enemy action. Long bombing missions push human endurance to the limit. The vulnerability of ships and aircraft increase as they approach land because proximity to land reduces warning time and maneuver space and subjects forces to the uncertainty that land harbors. The naval environment increases in complexity as ships enter shallow or confined waters. Submarines, mines, and land-based conventional threats such as missiles, underwater demolition teams, and high-speed boats blend into the clutter of inhabited areas and busy commercial shipping routes. The October 12, 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole demonstrated that vulnerabilities persist despite vast technological superiority.99 Because gaining access to land from sea and air is a critical capability for US forces and because missiles that can target sea and air platforms continue to increase in range and capability, naval and air forces will continue to operate in uncertain, dangerous environments and dominance of the air and sea domains enjoyed in recent conflicts through Operation Iraqi freedom will not go unchallenged in the future.

The Marine Corps, a service that operates in the air, on the sea, and on land understands the unique complexity of the ground environment and has rejected the prevailing assumptions about future war. In its “capstone concept,” the Marine Corps emphasized “timeless realities of human conflict” over technological change. It eschewed attempts “to redefine war on more humane or less risky terms.” It defined the nature of war as Clausewitz did: “A violent struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos, friction, and uncertainty – will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in technology.” Other services might adopt the Marine Corps definition rather than impose onto land a vision of war consistent only with operations in the air or at sea under conditions of unchallenged technological supremacy.

Hubris is an ancient Greek term defined as extreme pride that leads to overconfidence and often results in misfortune. In Greek tragedies, the hero vainly attempts to transcend human limits and often ignores warnings that portend a disastrous fate. The idea of dominant knowledge in war and the related overconfidence in so called ‘shock and awe’ precision strikes transcends the limits of the nature of war and, in particular, war’s human dimension. Hubris permeates the language of defense transformation and is particularly evident in the reductive fallacies of information superiority, dominant battlespace knowledge, and their various companion terms. Warnings were ignored.

The experience in Somalia from 1992-1994 might have served as a corrective to overconfidence in American military technological superiority. Ironically, Somalia instead reinforced faith in technology as a solution to complex national security problems. Painful images of the aftermath of Task Force Ranger’s fight in Mogadishu provided incentive to expect even more from sensors, missiles, and airplanes. President William Clinton resolved to substitute missiles and bombs for ground forces as a method for avoiding another Mogadishu. Engagement from a safe distance offered the comfort of action without risk of irreversible commitment. The Balkans became a testing ground for a strategy based on American military technology.

In July 1995, the horror of Srebrenica, including the humiliating surrender of Dutch peacekeepers to the Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladic, and the subsequent murder of seven thousand Muslim men, finally overcame American and European reticence to use force against the Bosnian Serbs. To many, Mladic’s Serbs had seemed a formidable opponent; estimates of the number of ground troops needed to intervene in Bosnia were high. Bosnian Serb brutality against defenseless civilians, however, masked weakness. In early August, Croat and Muslim forces that America trained and equipped attacked and began to rout the Bosnian Serbs. Finally, in response to a brutal and senseless mortar attack on the Sarajevo marketplace that killed thirty-eight people and wounded eighty-five others, NATO air power struck Serbian forces in Bosnia hard. During the first twenty-four hours of Operation Deliberate Force, 300 strike sorties attacked Serb forces. It was a sharp contrast with the previous two years of irresolute and ineffective air strikes that NATO carried out in Bosnia under Operation Deny Flight. Deliberate Force complimented the Croat and Muslim ground offensives. For example, as Croat forces advanced across the Krajna River, any Serb unit that concentrated to stop them was subjected to devastating attacks from the air. The eleven day, 3,515-sortie air campaign was a success. Deliberate Force contributed significantly to the signing of the Dayton Accord in November after which NATO troops occupied the war-stricken province to enforce the peace.

Deliberate Force demonstrated air power’s ability to achieve strategic effects as part of a broad strategy and in conjunction with a complementary ground offensive. In 1999, however, when the Clinton administration confronted Serbian brutality in Kosovo the emphasis was on precision air power as the solution to that problem. Missile strikes and bombing, made increasingly effective by technological advances, appeared very attractive to an administration that wanted to use force, but also wanted to minimize risk and avoid public or congressional opposition. Between March 24 and June 7, 1999, the United States and its NATO allies conducted an air campaign against Yugoslavia to end human rights abuses against the ethnic Albanian, Muslim population in the province of Kosovo.

Operation Allied Force was planned as a five-day air campaign to coerce Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic to “withdraw his forces and cease hostilities” against the ethnic

Albanian population in the province of Kosovo. There was a high degree of confidence at the outset of the war. Rump Yugoslavia was a weak state unable to threaten NATO bases of operation or lines of communication. American military technology had continued to improve since the Gulf War. It was less than three years since the publication of Joint Vision 2010, but information superiority seemed within grasp. Unmanned aerial vehicles would provide greater fidelity of the battlefield in real-time. Joint STARS radar systems had an improved ability to track ground targets. Precision munitions including laser-guided bombs, cruise missiles, the new Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and Stand Off Weapon (JSOW) were available in great quantities. As the campaign began, American Secretary of State Madeline Albright declared on national television, “I think this is achievable in a very short period of time.”

Confidence, however, did not equate to certainty, even at the outset of the war. Political factors both within the United States and between the United States and its allies generated ambiguities and tensions that complicated military planning. The adversary was a sovereign nation with historical, cultural, and religious ties to Russia and much of Europe. As a result, the resolve of NATO allies was uneven despite the record of Serbian brutality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 105 Macedonia provided a base of operations, but the situation there was unstable; the majority of its populace was sympathetic to the Serbs and feared an uprising by their own ethnic Albanian population. Protests in Greece, a NATO member, threatened to shut down critical supply lines. The French and Italians were unenthusiastic about an intensive air campaign against Serbia and favored measured attacks to communicate resolve. Despite working on war plans from May of 1998 to March of 1999, differences among NATO members kept those plans in flux. As in Somalia, it proved difficult to operate as part of a broad coalition even under the rubric of the NATO Alliance.

Ambiguities in US policy and strained relationships between top civilian and military officials created more uncertainty and friction. President Clinton kept his policy deliberately ambiguous to forestall debate in the US Congress. The President’s announcement that he had no intention of using ground forces removed an important capability and dimmed the prospect of coercing Milosevic. The administration was determined to minimize the risk of casualties even if achieving that goal placed the achievement of strategic objectives in jeopardy. “Force protection” became part of the mission. Emphasis on minimizing collateral damage and the desire to maintain consensus among allies led to disagreements between top civilian and military officers; military officers regarded constraints on the use of force excessive. Strained relationships between top military officials over these and other issues added even more friction and impeded effective communication.107 Even before it began, Operation Allied Force demonstrated how political considerations are connected inexorably to the conduct of war and that intractable uncertainty in war derives, in part, from the interaction of military means with
political ends and factors that impede congruence between them.

Assumptions of near-certainty in war are both a product of and encouraged by linear thinking. Once the psychological dynamic of war was unleashed, the future course of events depended not only (or even primarily) on NATO’s bombing plan. It depended also on Yugoslav reactions and initiatives that proved impossible to predict. Without the necessary force to impose NATO’s will on Yugoslavia and having based initial actions on unrealistically sanguine assumptions about the coercive power of air strikes, Yugoslavia seized the initiative soon after the war began.

Despite considerable preparation time and a weak enemy, NATO failed to achieve information superiority. Much was known about the enemy, but intelligence was not detailed

enough to keep track of the Serbian Army.109 Poor weather, heavy cloud cover, and mountainous, forested terrain degraded satellites, UAVs, and radars. Serbian decisions surprised NATO despite numerous personal interactions with Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milosevic over the previous four years and the opportunity to develop detailed intelligence estimates.

Milosevic anticipated NATO’s actions and countered them. He moved troops to the border of Kosovo weeks prior to the initiation of air and missile attacks. When the campaign started, those forces threw the Albanian population into the street, stripped them of their identification, looted their possessions, burned their houses, and drove them like cattle toward the Macedonian and Albanian borders. NATO was surprised and unprepared. The air campaign had the unintended consequence of actually accelerating the brutal ethnic cleansing operations it was intended to stop. A few weeks after the start of Allied Force, three-fourths of the ethnic Albanian population were refugees. Eight hundred thousand people crammed into camps outside Kosovo’s borders

« Poslednja izmena: 22. Feb 2017, 10:12:26 od sergio ramos »

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sergio ramos

Poruka #2

22. Feb 2017, 10:24:21

Svedok stvaranja istorije

Kad si u Rimu ponašaj se kao Rimljanin

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Poruke	20540
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Five hundred thousand more hid in the hills inside the province. Milosevic was not as easy to coerce as had been assumed. What was supposed to be a five-day air campaign drug into weeks, then months. The British government estimated that Serbs murdered ten thousand ethnic Albanians during the course of Operation Allied Force.

The experience revealed the dangers of linear thinking and being unprepared for the interaction that occurs with one’s enemy once war begins.

Interaction with the enemy created considerable friction, complicated the conduct of the air campaign, and generated uncertainty. On the air campaign’s seventh day, General Wesley Clark observed that NATO was facing “an intelligent and capable adversary who is trying to offset all our strategies.” Even though Serbian air defenses were antiquated, they forced NATO aircraft to altitudes above fifteen thousand feet which made target identification difficult. They also used innovative methods to keep their radars active, yet prevent them from being hit. The Serbs used low-technology tactics and improvisation to down an F-117 Stealth Fighter. Those tactics forced thirty-five percent of combat sorties to be allocated against air defense.

The Serbians learned to deceive and manipulate American intelligence. Serb forces allowed reconnaissance aircraft to identify actual targets then replaced them with decoys. Approximately five hundred of the three thousand precision munitions used struck those decoys. The Serbs learned the times when JSTARS conducted reconnaissance flights and had their forces halt on the sides of the road so the system would not detect “moving target indicators.”

After NATO began employing successfully a forward air controller in an A-10, Yugoslav forces sought concealment immediately upon hearing the aircraft.

The Serbs’ ability to obtain considerable intelligence on allied operations despite their technological inferiority draws into question the denial component of “information superiority” against even a foe that has very basic capabilities. The Serbs evacuated certain targets soon after they appeared on target lists. It is likely that the Yugoslav government had access to plans through spies at NATO headquarters. Additionally, spies stationed outside Aviano Airbase
provided early warning when aircraft departed on missions.

Perhaps most important, the instruments of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign, small mobile groups of paramilitary and police, were intermingled with the innocent civilian objects of their terror and were, therefore, unidentifiable and immune to NATO air power. Intelligence analysts often had clear pictures of Albanian refugees cowering in the hills, but could not locate the Serbs who were terrorizing them. Aircraft looked for targets in vain, sometimes refueling four times without dropping a bomb. Because aircraft could not land with bombs, millions of dollars of ordinance landed in the Adriatic Ocean or on the vacant countryside. Serbian Army tanks and other vehicles dispersed and hid. Even when Serbian tanks and artillery pieces were located, bombing might have provided an emotional catharsis, but the activity was irrelevant to stopping the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign. It was not until peacekeepers moved into Kosovo that

NATO discovered the full extent of Serbian atrocities committed against Kosovar Albanians.

Evidence that uncertainty remained the dominant feature of war was also found in the confusion over results of the bombing campaign. NATO greatly exaggerated losses inflicted on the Serbian military. Initial reports estimated that the bombing destroyed over 450 artillery pieces, 120 tanks and self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 220 armored personnel carriers. Nothing close to those numbers, however, were counted physically. The Allied Force Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team later reported the following numbers of destroyed equipment: 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery pieces. Those numbers suggested that less than five percent of the Serbian combat systems had been destroyed during the seventy-eight day campaign. NATO’s effort to attack enemy ground units failed. The extent of that failure became apparent only after the air war was over.

Because of ambiguities in target selection and identification, many targets were hit unintentionally. Mistakes occurred not because of a lack of information; the sheer volume of data and the difficulty in separating good from bad information presented difficulties. As Secretary of Defense William Cohen attested after the war, “our vast intelligence system can create such a haystack of data that finding the one needle that will pinpoint a target in the right time frame is difficult, indeed.” The best-known intelligence failure was the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. At the time of the bombing, planners were under pressure to find two thousand targets in Serbia because targets for the five-day air campaign were exhausted. Human errors, including the use of an old map and a failure to update a no-strike list caused the error. 117 There were at least twenty other incidents of “collateral damage” including bombs that fell in Bulgaria and struck trains, convoys, a school, and hospitals.118

These mistakes occurred despite great discipline on the part of the pilots. After an incident in which eighty Albanian refugees were reported killed in what was mistaken for a military convoy, Brigadier General Leaf, commander of the unit who conducted that attack, observed that it was
“a very complicated scenario and we will never be able to establish all the details.”

Collateral damage concerns and unrealistic expectations created additional friction and uncertainty as the air campaign continued; commanders and planners were determined to avoid another disastrous error that might unhinge already decreasing political support for the effort. Benjamin Lambeth, an expert on the air campaign, observed that: “Thanks to unrealistic efforts to treat the normal friction of war as avoidable human error, every occurrence of unintended collateral damage became overinflated as front-page news and treated as a blemish on air power’s presumed ability to be consistently precise.” Many targets hit in Serbia were selected due to distance from the civilian populace rather than for their military value and thus contributed little to the objective of coercing Milosevic. Even very careful targeting procedures, however, could not prevent inadvertent damage. After the two-week moratorium on bombing Belgrade that followed the Chinese embassy incident, the first night of renewed bombing damaged the residences of the Swedish, Spanish, and Norwegian ambassadors as well as the Libyan embassy and a hospital.

The Kosovo experience demonstrated that even extreme technological superiority does not lead to information superiority or remove uncertainty and friction. The Serbs were no “peer competitor.” NATO enjoyed air supremacy and faced antiquated, minimal air defenses. The Serbs had no ability to disrupt NATO communications or information systems. Kosovo demonstrated that the causes of uncertainty in the conduct of war lie mainly outside technology’s reach: war’s political nature, its human dimension, its complexity, and interaction with the enemy. Military organizations should, of course, take all possible action to minimize uncertainty and friction, but they must be prepared to win in an uncertain environment. In Kosovo, NATO has assumed certainty and was unprepared.

The assumption that the war in Kosovo would lie in the realm of certainty undermined

NATO’s ability to meet objectives and prevent suffering. Near-certainty combined with long range precision fires was supposed to vitiate the need for ground forces and a make possible a fast, low-cost, low-casualty war. The campaign was supposed to last five days; ti lasted eleven weeks and ended after 40,000 aircraft sorties and the threat of a ground invasion. The way in which the war was conducted increased the suffering of both Kosovar Albanians and Serbian civilians and made air power much less effective than it would have been if it had been employed as part of air-land operations. NATO achieved dominance of the air, but that achievement did not translate into dominance on the ground. The absence of a ground force to compel the Serbs to desist from their campaign of terror and to render ineffective the countermeasures taken against air forces allowed Serbia to terrorize the ethnic Albanians and work to turn world public opinion against NATO. The mismatch between stated objectives and military strategy made it a war of paradoxes. It was a war waged with one sided casualties, but one that generated ambiguous results. It was also a war waged under the auspices of compassion, but conducted in a way that increased, or at least permitted the suffering of those on whose behalf it was initiated Those who conducted Operation Allied Force deserve great credit for laboring under constraints and overcoming considerable uncertainty and friction. The failures of Operation Allied Force were not failures of air power; they were failures based on unrealistic expectations that elevated a military capability to the level of strategy. The U.S. experience during Operation Allied Force exposed the ideas of information superiority and dominant battlespace knowledge as fundamentally unsound. Once the effects of Operation Allied Force were combined with other elements such as increased diplomatic pressure (especially from Russia), a Kosovo Liberation Army offensive, and the threat of a NATO ground offensive, NATO succeeded and Milosevic acquiesced.

Even if the war had been waged with technology anticipated in the year 2020, those capabilities would not have reduced significantly the uncertainty and friction. In 2020, enemy in forests and villages would have remained undetected and supply of Serbian forces could not have been interdicted because Serbs used small civilian trucks to get supplies to their units. Perhaps most important to the outcome in Kosovo, technology of the future will remain unable to distinguish the small forces that carried out the ethnic cleansing from innocent civilians.

Even if one assumes near-perfect information, that information is only relevant if it can be translated into near-perfect military operations in the context of a sound strategy that supports policy goals. Information, in other words, is not an end in and of itself. Kosovo, however, like Somalia, did not provide a corrective to flawed assumptions concerning future war.

As one book on the subject of Kosovo observes, NATO “won ugly,” but won nevertheless and even a modest success can emasculate lessons. Senior administration

officials declared Operation Allied Force “history’s most successful air campaign.” The Defense Department’s Kosovo After Action Report stated that Operation Allied Force “provided a real-world test of information superiority concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010.” The report

noted that: “U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities provided unprecedented levels of support to NATO warfighters. The supporting intelligence architecture included a worldwide network of processing centers and high-speed data communications, all operating in direct support of combat operations in Kosovo. “ Those observations were true, but they appeared without qualifications concerning the limitations of technologies.

The intelligence section of the report recognized that precision munitions require precision intelligence and cited obstacles intelligence collection such as “adverse weather, nighttime, concealment and deception techniques, or rapid movement,” but suggested that these difficulties would succumb to the “modernization path.” Defense procurement programs would generate an improved “sensor mix” that when combined with processes such as “dynamic collection management, common battlespace awareness, and interoperable intelligence systems and architectures” would “improve precision intelligence capability.” The Department decided to “focus on specific technical enhancements in response to Kosovo.”
The engineering approach to war was actually strengthened by its failures.

As the Department of Defense released its report on Kosovo, the Joint Staff was working on Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020). The extension of the vision another ten years gave technology more time to deliver on the capabilities that Kosovo drew into question. The experience of Kosovo did, however, generate caveats in JV2020. JV2020 warned that “we should not expect war in the future to be either easy or bloodless” and stated that “friction is inherent in military operations” and derives from the following factors:

•   effects of danger and exertion

•   existence of uncertainty, and chance

•   unpredictable actions of other actors;

•   frailties of machines and information

•   humans

Additionally, JV2020 asked readers to “remember that information superiority neither equates to perfect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of war.” These cautions appeared disconnected with other portions of the document, however, that highlighted the “information revolution” and the “profound changes” that it would create in the conduct of military

operations. Although JV2020 attempted to administer a corrective to the assumption that near-certainty would be the dominant characteristic of future war, caveats could not overcome the momentum behind the belief that technology would lift the fog of war.

As the Joint Staff prepared a revised Joint Vision document in July 2002, it based the effort on the following assumption: “Dramatic improvements in intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities will facilitate near-continuous surveillance of the battlespace. Analysis of this continuous information flow will produce the type of current and predictive intelligence that enables the US Armed Forces to achieve full spectrum dominance.” The qualifiers and warnings of JV2020 disappeared. The words fog and friction were absent from the revision and the word uncertainty appeared only in connection with the future strategic environment.130 Flawed assumptions about future war overcame the reality of Kosovo.

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Raven_Claw3190900

Poruka #3

22. Feb 2017, 15:03:14

Legenda foruma

...члан секције младих трезвењака...

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Citat

These mistakes occurred despite great discipline on the part of the pilots. After an incident in which eighty Albanian refugees were reported killed in what was mistaken for a military convoy, Brigadier General Leaf, commander of the unit who conducted that attack, observed that it was
“a very complicated scenario and we will never be able to establish all the details.”

Али о српским злочинима знате све детаље мамицу вам покварену.

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Prefer a feast of friends to the giant family

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inicio

Poruka #4

22. Feb 2017, 22:38:11

Superstar foruma

Americki patriota

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Pol
Poruke	75692
Zastava

I-mate 30 Pro

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ni bog ne prasta sve...

celavi oces cokoladicu...

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Tema: Milošević je '99 znao svaki naš potez: analiza generala H.R. Mekmastera (Moderatori: Mistreated, niko79, RASMC)

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